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PREFACE 
SOME STUDENTS of management have been impressed by 
the universals of the administrative processes in the various areas 
of application and have ignored the specific setting of a man-
agerial problem. Others prefer to qualify their statements by 
references to the surrounding facts of the specific situation. This 
study represents research based upon the second viewpoint. In 
this case, access to the details of the company history and to the 
executive organization has made possible a comprehensive study 
of the managerial processes as they evolved through time. These 
processes have been determined in part by events in the history 
of the company, in part by the institutional setting, and in part 
by personal characteristics of the individual executives. 
Many works on management and organization have given 
greatest emphasis to the largest corporations, the civilian govern-
ment, and the military forces. The managerial problems have 
been assumed to be the same-but simpler-for the smaller 
operators. This study raises the question of whether the ap-
proach to management by the chief executive of the smaller 
company might not be somewhat different from the approach 
indicated by writers who have studied the large firms. 
The available sources of information made possible a com-
prehensive study of Ashland Oil & Refining Company, Ashland, 
Kentucky, a relatively small firm. Annual reports, audit reports, 
minutes of the board of directors, and the company magazine 
were available. In addition, letters, which from the company's 
inception had been written monthly by Paul G. Blazer, the chief 
executive, to the members of the board of directors, explained 
in detail the facts of the preceding month, current operational 
problems facing the company, decisions made and reasons for 
them, alternative courses of action, and opinions on the man-
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agerial processes. A complete file of these letters was located 
after an extended search and formed the basis for the research. 
In this way, it was possible to determine the detailed thoughts 
at the time of an action without depending upon memory. 
These written sources provided the foundation for a series 
of personal interviews with those who had knowledge of the 
company's operations. Interviews were secured with a majority 
of the members of the board and all principal operating execu-
tives. Competitors, a union leader, and an investment counsel 
offered comments that helped to round out the complete picture 
of the company's organization and operations. However, by far 
the most important interviews were those with Blazer over a 
period of two and a half years. In these, the chief executive was 
able to elaborate on comments in the monthly letters and to add 
to his previous observations concerning his ideas on management. 
A tape recorder provided a means for more careful study of the 
facts and opinions expressed in many of the interviews. By 
replaying the recordings, it was possible to appraise the comments 
analytically with due regard for intensity of emphasis, inflection 
of voice, and other indications of the ultimate meaning of 
comments. By comparing the tape-recorded comments with the 
statements in the letters, it was possible to delineate the basic 
trend in Blazer's thinking. Rationalization could be detected 
more easily. Throughout most of the interviews a nondirective 
approach was relied upon, except in those instances in which 
certain specific information was desired for continuity. 
By these methods it has been possible to approach the core 
of the thinking of one chief executive over a period of time and 
to organize his concepts of management in light of the factors 
as he saw them at the time and place of the specific decision. 
References to Blazer's written and verbal comments will be made 
extensively in order to support the principal statements. 
In order to interpret managerial decisions and the fundamental 
managerial philosophy upon which they were based, it is man-
datory to consider them as within the framework of the economic 
Vlll 
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conditions and personal relationships which existed at the time. 
This study, therefore, examines the economic structure and 
functioning of the oil industry. The techniques of the business 
historian are required to establish the chronological development 
and the personal factors so necessary to a sound evaluation. 
This study, undertaken initially for a doctoral dissertation at 
the University of Chicago, was made possible by the cooperation 
of Paul G. Blazer, former president and chairman of the board 
of directors of Ashland Oil & Refining Company. On September 
15, 1952, he consented to make all company documents available 
which were necessary for an intensive study of the management. 
His interest in business research motivated him to devote his 
time to interviews. All requests for information were granted. 
Company executives gave me their enthusiastic support. 
Arthur J. Points, controller, served as a valuable liaison between 
the operating personnel and myself. I am indebted especially 
to the following members of the board: E. L. McDonald, 
Lexington, Kentucky; the late James L. Martin, Chicago; Walton 
T. Davis, Louisville; and Robert D. Gordon and William C. 
Freeman, Chicago. Valuable information was provided in inter-
views with former owners of predecessor companies, including 
Earle M. Craig, Freedom, Pennsylvania, and W. H. Bennett, 
Buffalo, New York. 
Earl Wallace, Lexington, Kentucky, former vice president 
of the Standard Oil Company (Ohio), furnished valuable infor-
mation about Ashland Oil over its entire history as seen from 
the viewpoint of a competitor. J. Fred Miles, Louisville, granted 
interviews and access to early records in his possession. 
Although the facts upon which this study is based have been 
made available from company records and other related sources, 
the members of the management of Ashland Oil & Refining 
Company do not subscribe to my interpretations and conclusions, 
which are the product of my own judgment and for which I 
accept personal responsibility. 
J. L. M. 
lX 
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THE SETTING FOR SUCCESS 
Ashland Oil's Place in the Petroleum Industry 
ALTHOUGH THE petroleum industry in the United States 
recognizes its beginning in 1859, when Edwin L. Drake drilled 
the first commercial oil well, near Titusville, Pennsylvania, its 
modern character dates from the early years of the twentieth 
century, when a series of events transformed its structure. The 
opening of the southwestern oilfields, announced spectacularly 
by the Spindletop gusher near Beaumont, Texas, in 1901, and 
the mass production of automobiles, initiated by the Model-T 
Ford in 1908, established a new supply-and-demand relationship 
for petroleum which resulted in a vast and rapid growth of the 
industry. In 1911 the old Standard Oil Company was broken up 
by a Supreme Court order, and the petroleum industry was 
thrown open to all comers. 
Many came; and as the industry prospered, so did its members, 
large and small, whose enterprises were sound. But one of the 
smaller firms, Ashland Oil & Refining Company (and its prede-
cessor, Ashland Refining Company), experienced a rate of growth 
that was exceptional even for an industry characterized by 
unusual expansion. This study presents an analysis and interpre-
tation of the management of this Kentucky business by its chief 
executive, Paul G. Blazer, from its inception, through the period 
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of growth, to a time of relatively large size. Its purpose is to 
analyze all of the important factors that have determined the 
management of that company and to organize the important 
components of the managerial philosophy of the chief executive 
into a unified body of thought. The focus is on the relationships 
of Blazer with the board of directors and with the operating 
officers and department heads. 
The study of Blazer's managerial objectives and concepts 
necessarily is both a biography of the chief executive and a 
history of the company. This story covers a relatively short time. 
It begins in 1918, when J. Fred Miles, an Oklahoma oil promoter, 
organized a Kentucky crude oil producing company which six 
years later financed the formation of a small refining company. 
It ends in 1957 with the retirement of Paul G. Blazer, the chief 
executive of Ashland Oil & Refining Company, who in thirty-
three years had built a company with a quarter of a billion 
dollars in sales. 
The assets of the refining company grew from $250,000 in 
1924, when it was organized with Blazer as manager, to $8,000,-
000 by 1940; $24,000,000 by 1947; $67,000,000 by 1949; and 
$175,000,000 by 1956. Net income after taxes increased from 
$36,000 in 1924 to $13,500,000 in 1956. At no time during the 
entire history did the refining company end a year with a net 
loss. Its ratio of net income (after taxes) to owner's equity 
fluctuated between 6llz percent (in 19 34) and 40 percent (in 
1928 and 1948). 
This growth has been accomplished by accretion and by 
merger of approximately fifty companies (the more important 
of which are listed in Exhibit 1). The most important accessions 
took place in 1930-1931 and 1948-1950. In the former period, 
the company acquired a refining company and a pipeline; in 
the latter, Allied Oil Company, Aetna Oil Company, Freedom-
Valvoline Oil Company, and Frontier Oil Refining Corporation 
merged with Ashland (see Exhibit 2). 
The fact that Ashland Oil·was an "independent" in an indus-
2 
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try dominated by very large firms makes the success more 
interesting. Furthermore, a large portion of the profits through-
out its history resulted from refining operations-a branch of 
the industry in which it is generally considered difficult to main-
tain stable earnings over a long period of time. Naturally, 
faced with these facts, one would wonder just how this company 
happened to make this achievement. 
Was this success merely the result of luck? Was the company 
riding a growth industry in which any firm would be able to 
make such a showing? Undoubtedly, as we will see later in the 
historical facts, chance cannot be ruled out altogether. Never-
theless, a comparison of Ashland Oil's profitability with that of 
other companies in the same industry, as charted in Exhibit 3, 
points to the conclusion that factors other than chance were 
significant determinants of this success. It will be noted in 
studying Exhibit 4 that Ashland's ratio of net income after taxes 
to capital and surplus was consistently higher than the ratio for 
eighteen of the major companies and also higher than the ratio 
for nineteen independents except for the war years. This excep-
tion is interesting, since the least dramatic success occurred 
during periods of governmental controls, when many of the de-
terminants were out of the power of the company management. 
Was this record by the company the result of the "intuition" 
and "innate ability" of Blazer? The story which develops in the 
following chapters indicates that certain qualities possessed by 
Blazer were necessary for the strategic actions. Yet the important 
question is whether prospective managers might be able to 
develop a "way of thinking" based upon concepts held by Blazer 
which likely would enable them to improve their own adminis-
trative ability. The concluding chapters will summarize these 
concepts and the important determinants of the achievements 
of the company and Blazer. This discussion should aid the 
development of better executives. 
The reasonable conclusions derived from the historical facts 
in the following chapters are that the company was consistently 
3 
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SoME CoRPORATE AcQUISITIONS OF AsHLAND OIL & REFINING CoMPANY* 
Name and Location of Corporation Major Activity Date of Approximate 
Purchase Cost 
Big Dipper Oil Company Production 1919 $ 445,000 
(Warren County, Kentucky) 
Quaker Oil Company Production 1919 240,000 
(Lee County, Kentucky) 
Great Eastern Refining Company Refining 1924 250,000 
(Ashland, Kentucky) 
Union Gas and Oil Company Production 1925 5,000,000 
(Martha, Kentucky) 
Highland Oil Company Marketing 1929 25,000 
(Hillsboro, Ohio) 
Home Oil Company Marketing 1929 85,000 
(Maysville, Kentucky) 
Southern Ohio Oil Service Company Marketing 1929 15,000 
(Pomeroy, Ohio) 
Dawson-Pepper Oil Company Marketing 1929 27,000 
(Crooksville, Ohio) 
Keaton Oil & Gas Company Production 1929 250,000 
(Johnson County, Kentucky) 
Economy Bulk Sales Company Marketing 1930 40,000 
(Columbus, Ohio) 
Tri-State Refining Company Refining 1930 300,000 
(Kenova, West Virginia) 
Cumberland Pipe Line Company Transportation 1931 420,000 
(Home Office: New York City) 
Rix & Corbin, Inc. Marketing 1936 29,000 
(Lexington, Kentucky) 
Giles Oil Company Marketing 1936 90,000 
(Cynthiana, Kentucky) 
Mt. Sterling-Aetna Oil Company Marketing 1938 23,000 
(Mt_ Sterling, Kentucky) 
Allied Oil Company Marketing 1948 11,500,000 
(Cleveland, Ohio) 
Aetna Oil Company, Inc. Marketing 1950 4,500,000 
(Louisville, Kentucky) 
Freedom-Valvoline Oil Company Marketing 1950 4,000,000 
(Freedom, Pennsylvania) 
Frontier Oil Refining Corporation Marketing 1950 2,600,000 
(Bufblo, New York) 
Kellogg Petroleum Products, Inc. Marketing 1954 1,350,000 
(Buffalo, New York) 
R. J. Brown Company Marketing 1956 1,000,000 
(St. Louis, Missouri) 
* Includes only the more important acquisitions of Ashland Oil & Refining 
Company and its predecessors, Swiss Oil Corporation and Ashland Refining 
Company. When exchanges of stock were involved in an acquisition, the cost 
was estimated by using the current market value of Ashland stock received. 
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successful and that this success was the result of certain man-
agerial concepts and operational policies directed by Paul Blazer. 
These concepts and policies provide interesting and unique 
information for the development of improved administrative 
thought and action. It will be shown that there are many ways 
in which Ashland's operations and managerial techniques dif-
fered from those of the larger companies. 
PERSONAL BACKGROUND OF BLAZER 
The chief determinant of these ideas and policies was the mind 
of Blazer, the chief executive. His life prior to joining the 
company, therefore, will help in the understanding of the nature 
of the man whose judgments directed the fortunes of the 
company. 
Paul G. Blazer was born in New Boston, Illinois, on September 
19, 1890, and spent his early life in nearby Aledo, where his 
father was a newspaper editor. While attending William and 
Vashti College at Aledo in 1908-1909, he promoted and operated 
a magazine subscription agency which provided him with an 
independent income. In 1910 he became manager of student 
subscriptions of Curtis Publishing Company in Philadelphia, 
Pennsylvania. In his boyhood, Blazer had obtained extensive 
advertising experience on his father's newspaper, which proved 
valuable in his future jobs. Although he was progressing suc-
cessfully in his first executive position and although he had 
been offered a job at $100 per week by Crowell Publishing 
Company, he decided in 1914 to enter the University of Chicago, 
where he majored in social sciences and attended law school. 
He liked mathematics and physics but did not receive formal 
training in chemistry or engineering. Because war was imminent 
in early 1917, he dropped out of college just prior to becoming 
eligible for an undergraduate degree, enlisted in an army hospital 
unit, and married Miss Georgia Monroe in April, 1917. Dis-
5 
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charged honorably from the military service as a result of a 
physical disability, he became advertising service manager of 
Chittendon Press, a Chicago printing company. In the role of 
advertising service manager for that company, he made his first 
contacts with the oil industry through the printing of an industry 
directory. 
In 1918 Blazer joined a former schoolmate, J. E. Shatford, 
who had worked for the latter's father in a refinery at Blue 
Island, Illinois, and who had acquired a refinery at Joliet. Blazer 
soon became sales manager and vice president of the younger 
Shatford's firm, Great Northern Refining Company, which sold 
the output of both the Joliet and Blue Island refineries. 
The need for additional crude oil to supply the Joliet refinery 
resulted in Blazer's first trip to Kentucky to investigate the Cow 
Creek (Estill County) area of eastern Kentucky and the Warren 
County area of western Kentucky. His purchasing activities 
resulted in the formation of the Great Northern Pipe Line 
Company. The quest was so successful that Blazer purchased 
more than enough crude oil and sold the surplus to other refining 
companies. Contacts made during these years of crude oil sales 
proved most valuable in future operations. Many acquaintances 
in the oil industry, referred to in his letters, date from these 
sales. Blazer's ability to forecast crude prices enabled him to 
anticipate changes in the crude market and to advise acquaint-
ances wisely on the proper times to buy or sell crude. Personal 
relationships with oilmen, important in later negotiations, were 
strengthened in this manner. 
In 1919 the Great Southern Refining Company was organized 
by the same financial interests. While employed by Great 
Southern in Lexington, Kentucky, Blazer obtained additional 
sales management experience, and during extended absences of 
the company's president, he acquired his first experience in 
refining management. He tried new methods in the simple 
refining process of that time and soon became known as a 
refining specialist, although he had had no engineering educa-
7 
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tion. His interest in adaptations of refining techniques con-
tinued to be an important characteristic of his executive career. 
Blazer resigned his position with Great Southern to seek an 
association in refining in which he would own a greater financial 
interest. At the time of resignation, he was negotiating with 
Petroleum Exploration, Inc., Sistersville, West Virginia, which 
was considering integration into refining. Because unanimous 
approval by the board was required, a single dissent blocked the 
refining venture by Petroleum Exploration at Latonia, Kentucky. 
On January I, 1924, Blazer was hired by Swiss Oil Corporation 
to organize Ashland Refining Company, of which he became 
one of the incorporators. As partial incentive, Blazer was given 
an option to purchase 10 percent of the capital stock in the 
company. 
NATURE OF THE PETROLEUM INDUSTRY 
The general characteristics of the industry are especially im-
portant as determinants of the actions of the Ashland manage-
ment. The fact that the industry has experienced continued 
growth makes it possible to assume that expansion is normal 
and even necessary. It enables some companies to continue to 
operate with techniques and policies which probably would 
cause difficulties in a more mature industry. This growth encour-
ages managers who possess imagination, vision, and little respect 
for generally recognized methods of management to experiment 
with new techniques. 
The dynamic nature of the industry demands that decisions 
be made quickly and that they be changed suddenly as a result 
of unexpected developments. Discovery of a new oilfield, a new 
process of refining, a new law, or a change in the pattern of 
transportation and marketing have often quickly altered the 
future outlook of a company. 
The smaller the company in the industry, the greater the 
need for its management to adjust to external conditions. The 
9 
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management of the smaller company usually cannot affect sig-
nificantly the industrial pattern; but as a company grows and 
becomes a significant factor in the industry, it becomes better 
able to plan its own policies for the longer run with more 
assurance that those policies will affect the pattern of the in-
dustry. 
The complexity of the oil industry has caused many manage-
ment problems. Some observers feel that the four major 
branches are separate industries in themselves. Most, however, 
consider production of crude oil, transportation of crude and 
refined products, refining, and marketing as major segments of 
a single industry. An integrated company has operations in all 
of these four branches. In many companies four major executives 
are chiefs of these segments; often operations in these segments 
are through separately incorporated companies. The scope of 
top management is complex and broad; a specialist in any one 
segment may have extreme difficulty in securing a broad outlook 
into all aspects. Furthermore, related activities are becoming 
more closely associated with petroleum: petrochemicals offer 
broad opportunities for expansion, and rubber and other indus-
tries have become allied through discoveries of new products 
and processes. 
Several recent studies have shown the importance of vertical 
integration in the oil industry. McLean and Haigh explained: 
"Large, integrated units have gradually emerged as the pre-
dominant form of business organization in the oil industry 
because the economic climate in the industry has been generally 
favorable to the integration process for a long period of time."1 
The growth of integrated companies had its origin in the char-
acter of profit opportunities in the four branches, the character-
istics of the physical facilities necessary in the process, the nature 
of the managerial job in conducting the activities, and the 
1 John McLean and Robert W. Haigh, The Growth of Integrated Oil Com-
panies (Boston, Harvard University Graduate School of Business Administration, 
1954), 663. 
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absence of serious obstacles to vertical integration. McLean and 
Haigh found that from 1920 to 1950 the proportionate share of 
the industry's capacity held by small firms declined from 28 
percent to 15 percent. The means by which Ashland Oil 
countered this trend and later became large therefore offers an 
interesting area of study. The fact that all large oil companies 
and many small ones are integrated is important in considering 
the process by which Blazer sought the proper pattern of inte-
gration for his company. McLean and Haigh came to the con-
clusion that "there have always been many different integration 
arrangements in the oil industry which would permit profitable 
operations and effective competition .... It appears therefore 
that the formation of integration patterns is fundamentally a 
process of progressive adaptation by which individual companies 
work out the particular structures best suited to their own par-
ticular external and internal situations."2 
The oil industry is composed of 8,000 to 10,000 producing 
firms, more than 17,000 wholesale distributors, almost 200,000 
independently operated retail service stations, but fewer than 200 
refining companies. Generally the structure of the industry is 
described as composed of "major" and "independent" oil com-
panies. The term "major" usually applies to the twenty largest 
companies, which do approximately 75 percent of the total 
business; all the rest, including Ashland Oil, are "independents." 
Historically, the term "independent" referred to those com-
panies not connected with the old Standard Oil Company 
which was dissolved in 1911, but the Temporary National Eco-
nomic Committee in the late 1930's began to call the largest 
twenty "major." The terms thus are loosely used, and some so-
called "major" companies, for example, Phillips Petroleum and 
Sun Oil, might argue that they should be classified as "inde-
pendents." In any event, absolute size of the company appears 
to have much greater importance in organizational and man-
agerial problems than does relative size. 
2 McLean and Haigh, 674. 
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The structure and competitive behavior of the industry has 
been under examination continually throughout its history. 
These investigations and the resulting legislation and court 
decisions have defined the legal setting that has determined 
the manner in which the Ashland management has reacted to 
a given set of circumstances. The federal government has given 
special attention to the encouragement and protection of the 
independent. Its efforts have often been discouraged by the 
actions of other independents. It is clear that the "independent 
producer" -the small, nonintegrated, crude oil production wm-
pany-has interests that conflict with the "independent refining 
company"; often both have different viewpoints from that of the 
"independent jobber." On many occasions the divergent views 
have resulted in one group of independents testifying in behalf 
of the actions of the larger companies against other groups of 
independents. The larger firms have found that it is more 
effective to allow the smaller ones with common interests to 
lead. Some small firms have often found it good business to 
support the larger companies. 
In this setting the Ashland management has consistently 
resisted the promotion of restrictive legislation to control the 
actions of the largest companies. It has felt that any attempt 
to freeze the relationships by a pattern of regulatory procedures 
would be to its own disadvantage; such attempts would eliminate 
the opportunities for shifting into new profitable areas. Although 
the management appeared to appreciate the beneficial effects 
of protective legislation on the opportunities of a small firm, it 
often supported the viewpoint of the larger companies. The 
apparent paradox was resolved in the pragmatic appraisal of each 
separate case. Generally, Blazer felt that independents could 
benefit more from the danger of governmental action than from 
the action itself. 
13 
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In order to explain the evolution of Blazer's managerial philoso-
phy, it is necessary to consider the characteristics of petroleum.3 
The fluid nature of the commodity facilitates materials handling. 
The ability to transport crude petroleum and refined products 
by pipelines, tankers, and barges sets the stage for integration 
into transportation through company-owned facilities. This liq-
uid characteristic makes a continuous process in production 
desirable and demands that close coordination be maintained 
among the various stages of production. 
The ease of movement, the high value of the commodity, the 
tendency to evaporate, and the high cost of storage space above 
ground necessitates continued close attention to the control of 
inventories. The organizational structure of an oil company 
must provide for means by which this flow of crude oil from the 
well to the consumer can be regulated and adjusted to the cir-
cumstances of the moment. In order to obtain security of both 
the source and the outlet of this flow, many firms have directed 
their efforts toward better balance in their integration. 
The fact that oil is concealed in the ground and will flow 
to another's property, if not developed by an owner, has im-
portant effects on the problems of crude oil supply. Uncertainty 
in the exploration phase prescribes that a firm which desires to 
operate on a systematic basis with a secure supply of crude oil 
from its own wells must work with a long-range plan and use 
the law of large numbers to substitute a calculable factor for an 
indeterminate risk. 
The chemical construction of hydrocarbons creates a poten-
tially infinite number of different products which can be pro-
duced from crude oil. The various processes of treating the 
hydrogen and carbon elements lay the foundation of a dynamic 
industry. Such chemical characteristics make refining thea-
3 P. H. Frankel, Essentials of Petroleum: A Key to Oil Economics (London, 
Chapman & Hall, 1946). 
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retically a problem of alternative products (variable quantities 
of different products can be obtained from a given barrel of 
crude oil) rather than of joint products (fixed proportions of 
each fraction must be produced from a barrel of crude oil). 
Practically, the potential changes in proportions is limited by 
technological problems. Greater flexibility can be purchased 
if the manager desires to place additional equipment in his 
refinery. The greater this flexibility, the greater is the choice 
that the manager has in the quantity of each fraction that he 
can produce. His problem then becomes more complex in that 
he must not only estimate the demand for a single product but 
also the relative fluctuations in the demands for a number of 
alternative products. He must make both short-run and long-
run decisions relating to his correct actions for a particular 
situation. 
The different proportions of the various fractions are partly 
determined by the different grades of crude oil. Petroleum is 
far from standardized: some types are suitable for a high per-
centage of gasoline; some yield less volume but higher quality 
of gasoline; some contain foreign substances-sulphur, for ex-
ample-and require additional processing to eliminate the unde-
sirable elements. The base of the crude oil may vary from 
predominantly asphalt to primarily paraffin. Other character-
istics of crude oil make the raw material of the industry very 
heterogeneous and less adaptable to a single standardized process. 
AREA OF OPERATIONS OF ASHLAND OIL 
Most of Ashland Oil's operations have taken place in the area 
bounded by the Mississippi River on the west, the Allegheny 
Mountains on the east, the Great Lakes on the north, and the 
Cumberland River on the south. During the greater part of its 
history the company has concentrated its operations within the 
three states of Ohio, Kentucky, and West Virginia. In this ter-
15 
ExHJ:BIT 5-AJtu OF 0PEMTIONS, 
Wisconsin 
Michigat~~ 
LANSINfl 
HUNTINGTO~-
Illinois Indiana 
*DECATUR * INDIANAPOLIS 
*sr. ELMO 
~ 
Ke1 
.. 
AsHLAND OIL & REFINING CoMPANY 
Pennsylvania 
COLUMBUS* 
TON 
West Virginia 
• JL_ Principal Offices Refineries 
Product Terminals 
.... : Lake Tankers 
River Towboats and Barges 
Ashland Products Line~ 
Common Carrier Products Lines 
* 
Sales and Operating Offices 
BLAZER AND ASHLAND OIL 
ritory a few independent refiners and their distributors compete 
aggressively with a large number of the major oil companies. 
This marketing area has certain unique characteristics. It is 
close to an economic ridge of transportation costs: the largest 
refineries in the area receive their crude oil supplies principally 
from the Southwest; and refined products come from the West 
by pipeline, from the Gulf Coast by river barges, and through 
products pipelines from refineries and terminals on the eastern 
seaboard. It is the competitive marketing territory which marks 
the highest points of transportation costs from the largest oil-
fields and refining areas. It is here that competition from the 
East meets competition from the South and from the West. A 
filling station on one side of the street may receive its gasoline 
from a large eastern refinery on the Delaware River, and the 
station across the street may be supplied from a refinery in 
Oklahoma or Texas. 
Although several oilfields are relatively close to this market, 
their production is insufficient to supply the demand for oil 
products: the specialized crude oil of Pennsylvania has declined 
in volume since its discovery in 1859, thus eliminating it as an 
important source other than for the manufacture of lubricating 
oils; eastern Kentucky has had production for a number of 
years but has remained an unimportant source relative to other 
areas. The largest source nearby is the Illinois basin, located in 
southern Illinois, western Kentucky, and southern Indiana, the 
importance of which increased rapidly in 1937 as new fields were 
discovered. The development of flush production in 1938 in 
the Illinois basin was of fundamental importance to the growth 
of Ashland Oil in the late 1930's. The extremely rapid develop-
ment of these fields and the rapid production decline of each 
well caused a peak production to be reached in June, 1940, and 
a decline in total production thereafter in spite of continued 
drilling activity. 
A most important characteristic of the location of Ashland Oil 
is the availability of water transportation. As Exhibit 5 illustrates, 
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the Ohio River flows through the center of operations, making 
possible low-cost barge transportation. In addition, the Great 
Lakes provide a waterway along one side of the territory. During 
the early development of crude oil transportation, pipelines were 
constructed from the Southwest into and through the area. 
The operation of many of these lines as common carriers per-
mitted the growth of small refineries. 
The market for petroleum products in this area is concentrated 
and capable of absorbing the many products from a barrel of 
crude oil. The density of population and automobile registra-
tions causes the area to have a large consumption of gasoline. 
The northern temperatures make domestic fuel oil an important 
product. The large number of manufacturing plants and railroad 
shops offer a market for industrial lubricants. Industrial firms 
within the area also receive naphthas of varied types as raw 
material for their products. Asphalt for highways and residual 
fuel oil for steel mills are important uses for the heavier fractions. 
Often in each market area of the oil industry there has been 
a reference marketer. Usually this marketer has been referred 
to as a price leader, although studies have indicated that while 
he may lead prices up, he characteristically follows them down. 
The comment is made often in the petroleum industry that a 
certain area is "Indiana territory" or "Jersey territory." Ashland's 
area of operations falls within parts of a number of different 
"territories": the reference marketer in Ohio has been the 
Standard Oil Company (Ohio); in Kentucky and Tennessee, 
Standard Oil Company of Kentucky; in West Virginia, Standard 
Oil Company (New Jersey); in Pennsylvania, the Atlantic Re-
fining Company; in New York, Socony-Vacuum Oil Company; 
in Indiana and Illinois, Standard Oil Company (Indiana). 
Ashland Oil has always operated in areas in which these large 
companies had a part in establishing reference points around 
which other firms planned their actions. This fact has put a 
premium on concepts and policies that would permit Ashland 
Oil to adjust to these multiple reference marketers with a 
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minimum of confusion and a maximum of attention to each 
local situation. If the company had operated in an area in 
which there was only one major marketer, the problem of main-
taining attention would have been simplified and subject to 
greater standardization. The need to adjust to one set of condi-
tions established by one company in one territory and to a second 
set of conditions established by a second company in a second 
territory has determined in part the managerial behavior of 
Ashland Oil. 
This characteristic of adjusting to multiple reference marketers 
made it possible for Ashland Oil to remain insignificant in the 
area of each marketer and, therefore, to avoid some of the 
threats of retaliation that might have resulted from attracting 
too much attention by a large increase in volume in any single 
area. The strategy that evolved from this characteristic was one 
of shifting expansion plans from one territory to another in 
order to decrease the chance of significant results being felt 
by any single marketer. In other words, the attempt was to 
keep from getting too great a share in any single territory. 
In 1956 Blazer looked back upon his experiences in the man-
agement of Ashland Oil and explained to a meeting of the 
Newcomen Society the way he looked at the challenges which 
faced a company which had grown as rapidly as his: 
These fields of human relations are deserving of, and are receiving, 
greatly increased attention from all-corporate managements. As a 
company grows, the complexity and the importance of these relation-
ships increase. In an expanding industry, however, continued corpo-
rate growth and skill in the solution of related problems appear to 
be necessary for competitive survival. The degree of success of man-
agement in meeting these interesting challenges appears to me to be 
of even greater significance than the growth of the business. 
As Ashland Oil has continued to grow, so we have struggled to 
retain the informal, friendly organization of a small company. We 
have endeavored to inject into our relations with the public, our 
employees, customers, and stockholders, what I like to think of as a 
small-town, large-family attitude! That becomes increasingly difficult 
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now that we are owned by 30,000 stockholders, and operate in 
hundreds of communities through a number of thousands employees, 
with sales of $250,000,000 per year. 
The chapters which follow describe the nature of this growth. 
Chapter II is, in a sense, a preliminary history of the company 
from which the refining firm developed. It provides most of the 
discussion of exploration, development, and production of crude 
oil. Chapters III and IV relate the history of the refining 
operations and activities which are the heart of the book: 
Chapter III covers the operation of the small Ashland Refining 
Company; Chapter IV describes the beginnings of Ashland Oil 
& Refining Company as it developed into a medium-size organiza-
tion. 
The period of extremely rapid growth through mergers is the 
subject of Chapter V. This chapter outlines the background of 
each of the larger companies which became a part of Ashland 
Oil and analyzes how these companies fit together. Chapters VI 
and VII respectively bring together the transportation and mar-
keting activities. They also finish the historical aspects by 
describing the activities of the large oil company in the 1950's. 
The primary biographical section, begun in this chapter, is 
completed with the analysis in Chapter VIII. Paul Blazer's 
managerial philosophy is summarized and evaluated in Chapters 
IX and X. 
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WILDCATTER IN KENTUCKY 
The Operations of Swiss Oil Corporation 
OIL PRODUCERS in the United States looked forward to 
a very prosperous year in 1918. The wartime demand for 
petroleum products had jumped the price of crude oil from less 
than $1.00 a barrel in 1915 to approximately $2.50. Too, the 
number of motor-driven vehicles on the highways was expected 
to exceed six million. Gasoline had already replaced kerosene 
as the chief product of crude oil, and the thermal cracking 
process discovered in 1912 by Dr. William M. Burton was begin-
ning to show its importance for automobile fuel. 
The promise of easy money encouraged wildcatting-speculative 
drilling in unproven oilfields-during 1917 and 1918, and men 
with big dreams and little capital eagerly flocked to wherever 
a new strike was reported. To Kentucky they came after Charles 
Dulin found oil on Tick Fork of Cow Creek, near Irvine, in 
1916. Oil had been struck in the state as early as 1819, although 
there had been no considerable commercial production until 
the 1880's, and there had been mild booms in 1900 and again 
in 1912. In the few years after Dulin's find, however, oil explora-
tion pushed Kentucky's production to a peak of more than nine 
million barrels in 1919. If the finds were never as spectacular 
as those of Oklahoma, which was also experiencing an oil boom, 
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the risks were fewer; the Kentucky oil sands were much nearer 
the surface than the Oklahoma pools, and consequently less 
capital was required to drill a well. 
J. FRED MILES AND THE FORMATION OF SWISS OIL 
The requirement of less capital attracted J. Fred Miles, a wild-
catter who had been operating in Oklahoma, to Kentucky in 
1917. He traveled throughout eastern Kentucky purchasing oil 
leases in untested areas. On May 15 he contracted to buy forty-
nine producing wells in Estill C,ounty from United Oil Com-
pany. To search the extremely complicated titles to the leases 
for these wells, he employed a Louisville lawyer, E. L. McDonald. 
When McDonald found the titles to be defective, the Cleveland 
financial interests who had considered backing Miles decided 
against proceeding further. Miles' original effort to promote an 
oil-producing company died for lack of outside support. 1 
On a second attempt a year later, Miles made contacts with 
men who possessed sufficient venture capital and succeeded in 
incorporating Swiss Oil Corporation in Kentucky on June 21, 
1918. This was the second corporation using the name Swiss, 
the first being organized as Swiss Drilling Company in Oklahoma 
by Miles in 1910. Leases in seven eastern Kentucky counties 
were transferred to the new Kentucky corporation. J. I. Lam-
precht, president of National Refining Company, Cleveland, was 
elected president, and Miles became treasurer and general man-
ager. E. L. McDonald, who has remained an officer in Swiss 
and Ashland Oil for more than forty years, was named secretary 
soon after formation. Since Lamprecht, who was interested in 
the Kentucky corporation primarily as a supplier of crude oil to 
his refining company, did not attend a Swiss board meeting, 
Miles was the principal driving force. 
Miles expanded Swiss' operations into the Big Sinking field 
1 Further information concerning this initial effort by Miles can be found in 
Miles v. United Oil Co., 192 Ky. 542 (1921); 204 Ky. 346 (1924). 
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in Lee County during the first months of 1919. A sawmill was 
constructed near Fixer on Bobby's Ridge to supply lumber for 
the camp-fifteen three-room houses, a schoolhouse, a church, a 
commissary, a "flicker," a large headquarters house, and a base-
ball diamond. The nearest railroad was at Torrent, twenty-two 
miles to the northeast, to which transportation was provided by 
several span of horses purchased from a brewing company. There 
were no roads in the area, and often block and tackle were used 
to carry heavy items from one ridge to another. 
Labor during this period was scarce. Most of those hired were 
unskilled workers who came from surrounding eastern Kentucky 
counties. Total employment in 1919 increased from ten to ap-
proximately twenty-five men. 
Membership on the Swiss board of directors changed rapidly. 
During the summer of 1919, Miles interested a number of 
Chicago investors in the company's operations. After James L. 
Martin had visited Fixer to report on the possibilities of the 
company, H. J. Halle, Martin J. lnsull, Arthur Reynolds and 
George M. Reynolds of Continental and Commercial National 
Bank, J. L. Washburn, and later, Ogden Armour bought Swiss 
stock. These men were to play a major financial role in the 
company during later years. Martin, who became a director on 
July 10, 1919, remained on the board until his death in May, 
19 54. He was elected chairman of the board of Ashland Refining 
Company in 1935. 
On March 1, 1919, the first dividend was paid on the Swiss 
stock. During the following months of 1919 and 1920, earnings 
of the company supported a liberal dividend. As a result, the 
company was able to obtain additional capital, with which Miles 
expanded his drilling operations into Warren County, Kentucky, 
two hundred miles to the southwest of the Lee County field. 
A well known as "Big Moulder," drilled earlier in the year near 
the Barren County line, was such a fabulous producer that Miles 
purchased it along with a pipeline and other equipment on July 
10, 1919. 
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The purchase of Big Moulder probably had a lasting effect 
on the future management of Swiss. Because Miles spent a 
relatively large part of the new funds obtained from the Chicago 
financial interests on a single well which soon after purchase 
produced only a fraction of its expected output, he was later 
unable to maintain his prestige with the stockholders. In addi-
tion, his construction of an expensive gasoline plant in Lee 
County hurt his reputation. Events eight years later showed the 
effects of this lack of confidence. 
At the end of 1919 the Big Sinking field was booming; price 
of Somerset crude oil, which it produced, was $3.25 a barrel; 
assets of Swiss Oil Corporation were valued at $2,700,000; eleven 
leases and 131 wells were producing earnings, slightly more than 
enough to cover dividend payments of $215,275. Expansion con-
tinued through the purchase of Quaker Oil Company, which 
owned nearby leases in Lee County. Charles E. Evans, one of 
the larger stockholders of Quaker Oil, served continuously on 
the board of Swiss and Ashland Oil. 
In 1920 Swiss experienced its last boom. Little of the profit 
was retained in operations; the general manager's salary was 
increased and a short-term loan was obtained. Lamprecht died 
and John Gund, owner of a Lexington, Kentucky, brewery, was 
made president of the company on October 16, 1920. The rapid 
change of events is tersely described in the words of the annual 
report for 1921: 
During the latter part of 1920, the opinion was freely expressed 
that consumption was overtaking the supply, and that there was 
necessity for increased production. As a result, the development 
of oil resources and search for new pools were stimulated to an 
unprecedented extent. In January, 1921, Somerset Light Oil was 
selling at $4.50 a barrel, and a prosperous year for the oil producer 
was in prospect. An unexpected decline due to over supply and 
various contributing causes drove the price down in the course of a 
few months from $4.50 to $1.00 per barrel. 
This sudden change of the price together with the very 
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5\HSS OIL CORPORATION 
B A L A N C E S H E E T 
A S S E T S 
CURRENT: 
Cash on Hand and in Bank 
Accounts Receivable and Note~ 
Stockholders and Employees 
Swiss Pipe Line Company 
Trade and Other Accounts 
Receivable: 
$n,l52.07 
8,000.00 
13,943.46 
Inventory of Oil in Storage Tanks 
Total Current Assets 
INVESTMENTS: 
Swiss Pipe Line Company Stock 
PROPERTY: 
Producing Properties 
Drilling Tools and Machinery 
Furniture and Fixtures 
Gasoline Plant 
Pipe Line 
~ Reserves for Depletion and Depreciation 
Nonproducing Leases 
Total Assets 
L I A B I L I T I E S 
CURRENT: 
Notes Payable 
Accounts Payable 
Reserve for Federal Taxes 
Total Current Liabilities 
~ STOCK ~ AND OUTSTANDING 
SURPLUS: 
Appreciation of Lease in 1919 
Paid in Surplus 
Earnings from Period p£ June 21, 1918 
to December 31, 1921 
Dividends Paid during years 
1919 and 1920 
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$ 53,265.20 
39,095.53 
5,570.34 
$3,297,514.46 
21,091.09 
3,442.46 
239,948.55 
23,379.88 
$3,585,376.44 
647,319.72 
$2,938,056.72 
265,431.28 
$ 346,000.00 
74,235.95 
67,355.78 
$ 131,300.00 
180,160.00 
343,562.52 
$ 655,022.52 
558,095.18 
$ 97.931.07 
83,100.00 
3,203,488.00 
$3,384,519.07 
$ 487,591.73 
2,800,000.00 
96,927.34 
§3,384,519.07 
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serious current financial condition at the end of 1921 (for ex-
ample, current assets totaled $97,931.07, and current liabilities, 
$487,591.73; see Exhibit 6) would have terminated the company 
if it had not been for the financial connections in Chicago. 
Not until April, 1922, however, were the short-term liabilities 
refunded into first mortgage 7-percent sinking fund gold bonds 
with a maturity date of May 15, 1927. In the handling of this 
issue, Robert D. Gordon, Chicago investment specialist, first 
became interested in the company. 
The problems of the oil industry were serious during these 
early years of the 1920's. In the annual report for 1921, Miles 
continued his explanation of the factors which affected the 
company's condition: 
The great depression . . . was largely the result of the combined 
operation of the following, viz. 
1. The reaction after inflated war conditions from which no 
branch of industry has been exempt. 
2. The excessive drilling campaign in 1920 induced by high price 
of oil and prediction freely made of oil shortage resulted in discovery 
and development of large new pools. 
3. Decline in industrial demand for fuel and lubricating oils and 
heavy ends of refined products. 
4. Stagnation in export demand for all petroleum products. 
5. Unprecedented heavy imports of oil from Mexico. 
Total production of oil in the Big Sinking district declined 
because few new locations for drilling were available to com-
pensate for the normal production decline of the existing wells. 
The annual report for 1922 summarized the conditions: 
Our principal producing properties are in Lee and Magoffin Counties, 
Kentucky. Those in Lee County have been almost completely 
developed by drilling to the extent that is considered profitable, 
with crude oil at present prices, and our best properties in Magoffin 
County have only a limited number of locations to be drilled. 
On June 5, 1922, the second president of Swiss died. He was 
succeeded by Senator Thomas A. Combs of Lexington, Ken-
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tucky, who was then president of Fayette Home Telephone 
Company and Combs Lumber Company. The fortunes of the 
oil company were at their lowest ebb. In 1923 losses ran to 
$259,250.49, which represented not quite 10 percent of the 
total asset value of the company. The trend was downward; it 
was obvious that something had to be done quickly. Many of 
the stockholders advocated liquidation of the company, but 
Miles and Combs searched for other possibilities. 
REVITALIZATION OF SWISS OIL 
At the meeting of the Swiss board of directors on January 28, 
1924, two propositions were advanced by the management which 
were of such proportions that it might be maintained that the 
company began in 1924, not in 1918. Swiss Oil Corporation 
was, in fact, all but dead. Certainly the life of the company 
could not have been prolonged without some enormous change. 
That change occurred, curiously, at a time when the company 
had very limited resources. 
The first proposal was the purchase of Union Gas and Oil 
Company of Martha, Kentucky, for a price not to exceed 
$4,500,000. This Lawrence County company had been in-
corporated under the laws of Indiana on March 21, 1917, by 
A. B. Ayres of Fortville, Indiana, Frank M. Millikan of In-
dianapolis, and A. C. Albin of Newman, Illinois. On July 8, 
1920, an office was opened at Paintsville. 
During the early twenties the three owners expanded drilling 
operations as fast as possible, but they found that their funds 
were limited, although they were relatively wealthy. Previous 
to this venture they had been primarily gasmen finding oil on 
the properties where they were looking for gas. The stockholders 
of Union found themselves confronted with numerous legal 
difficulties primarily resulting from failure to drill on leases 
within the proper time. Other oilmen were buying "top 
28 
WILDCATTER IN KENTUCKY 
leases" from the owners of the land and were successfully 
taking away valuable oil rights. So in 1923, when a Philadelphia 
firm offered $4,250,000 for Union, they decided to sell their 
properties. 
Why should the owners be willing to sell? The answer to 
this question was that in spite of their realization that the 
properties were worth much more than the final selling price, 
they considered the following factors: the company had been 
organized originally for the production of gas, and the owners 
knew little about oil; the immediate drilling on a number of 
leases was a prerequisite for holding the leases; numerous suits 
being brought against the company were causing legal obstacles; 
and there was clearly disagreement among Ayres, Albin, and 
Millikan which made a situation where one of the owners found 
himself in the minority opposing the other two. Ayres, who 
owned 40 percent, had been willing to sell on the last account 
alone. 
After several months of negotiations with Swiss representa-
tives, on July 26, 1924, the stockholders of Union gave an option 
for the purchase of all the stock of the company at a price of 
$5,000,000. An initial payment of $1,500,000 in cash was to be 
made; the vendors were to retain control of the operations of the 
company until another $1,000,000 could be accumulated out of 
the net earnings; and the remaining $2,500,000 was to be paid 
at the rate of $200,000 per quarter. The option was renewed 
several times, but the Union stockholders had indicated that 
extension would not be made past January 12, 1925. 
The properties under question were appraised by J. I. Lam-
precht, n, president of National Refining Company, at approxi-
mately $12,500,000. Even with this appraisal it appeared to be 
impossible to interest any of the investment houses who in-
vestigated the financial requirements, for Swiss Oil Corporation, 
with small net assets and a poor earnings record, was attempting 
to purchase a company with assets many times its own. 
As it might be expected, Combs, Miles, and McDonald had a 
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difficult time interesting any financial groups. Starting in 1923, 
they had negotiated with Shaffer Oil and Gas Company, which 
later decided against the venture. Then an attempt was made 
to merge with Union, but two of its three owners, Millikan 
and Albin, declined the offer. Combs and Miles next traveled 
to New York and Cleveland in quest of financial backing. C. N. 
Manning and J. D. Van Hooser of Security Trust Company, 
Lexington, accompanied the Swiss representatives on some of 
these trips. A. D. Hambleton & Company of Baltimore and 
Blair & Company of New York showed some interest, but 
neither would handle the deal. Cyrus Eaton of Otis and Com-
pany, Cleveland, seemed ready to make an offer at one time, 
but he failed to follow up with a definite commitment. 
After this "nibble" from Otis, a local group in Lexington 
made a definite offer; however, the directors of Swiss felt that it 
was not attractive and refused it at a board meeting on January 
10, 1925. At this meeting Combs stated that unless the offer 
could be exercised, he would recommend that the company 
liquidate its affairs, for it was losing money and it would only 
be a question of time until its entire capital would be lost. It 
was then that James L. Martin, of Pynchon & Company, made 
a move to investigate whether his partners would help finance 
the transaction. Since Pynchon had eleven partners scattered 
in Chicago and New York, Martin was forced to make rapid 
contacts. On the last day of the option, confirmation was 
obtained which made possible the purchase of the Union 
properties. To make the notes marketable, it was necessary to 
issue $2,000,000 of 7-percent mortgage notes and $2,000,000 of 
common stock of Swiss Oil Corporation in order to obtain 
$1,750,000 in cash. Later in 1927 a lawsuit was brought by one 
of the stockholders of Swiss claiming that the loan was illegal 
under Kentucky law, alleging that the $2,000,000 in common 
stock was given without due consideration. The case was decided 
in favor of the defendants on November 25, 1927, and affirmed 
in an appeal on May 10, 1929. 
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The record of the decisions of the judges offers important 
information concerning the condition of Swiss Oil Corporation 
on January 12,1925: 
At the time of the transaction the defendant corporation faced 
liquidation. Without the acquisition of the stock or property of the 
Union Gas and Oil Company it could not continue in business .... 
Every day which it continued to operate under existing conditions, it 
was getting farther and farther behind. This is not disputed. 
Prior thereto, the stock of the defendant corporation was selling 
at from ten to twenty per cent of par value, whereas after its acquisi-
tion in 1926, its stock, according to Miles' testimony, was worth par. 
... Evidently the defendant corporation is in a flourishing condition 
notwithstanding the depression in the oil market. 
It clearly appears to have been, if not the universal, at least the 
general opinion of the officers and directors of the Swiss Company 
that it had no recourse but liquidation unless it acquired the Union 
Gas and Oil Company properties .... The Swiss Company could 
not have borrowed $2,000,000 in the usual way. Its own property 
was already mortgaged. It appears that its first mortgage bonds, 
issued several years before, had been underwritten at 90 per cent of 
their face. 
True, several of the directors of that Company bought from 
Pynchon & Company substantial amounts of the bonds at but little 
above their cost to Pynchon & Company. But as we understand the 
record, such sales were intended not as a means of securing the 
contract from the Swiss Company, but of insurance to that extent 
of Pynchon's ability to sell the securities at some profit.2 
At the time of the Union purchase the Chicago interests 
gained majority control of Swiss. R. D. Gordon became a 
director and has remained active in the affairs of the company 
for more than thirty-five years. The large powers once held by 
Miles, the original promoter and general manager of the com-
pany, now were limited by the board of directors. For the next 
2 William H. Lamprecht II v. Swiss Oil Corporation et al., 32 F. (2d) 646 
(6th Cir. 1929). 
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fourteen months Miles battled to regain his previous control. 
Then on March 21, 1927, a new superintendent was employed 
to fill the vacancy created when Miles left to start a refining 
company in Louisville. 
Until he was forced out, Miles had used his close relationships 
with National Refining Company to strengthen his position. As 
a boy in Oklahoma, he had met the elder Lamprecht, president 
of National Refining Company. Lamprecht was not only the 
first president of Swiss Oil Corporation, but National was a 
most important customer of Swiss. During the financial crisis 
of 1921-1922, advances from National Refining Company helped 
Swiss carry its large current liabilities. The brief of the defend-
ants in Lamprecht II v. Swiss Oil Corporation indicates the 
internal relations within Swiss Oil Corporation during the two-
year period, 1925-1927: 
It came to the attention of the directors during the summer of 1926 
that the stockholders were being circularized for the purpose of 
getting options on their stock, and at the directcr's meeting on July 
24, 1926, the matter was brought up and Mr. Miles was asked to 
state whether he had any connection with it, and whether Mr. Berry, 
who was sending out letters and option agreements to stockholders, 
was acting under the instructions of Mr. Miles. Mr. Miles said he 
had no connection with the matter; and that he would send a letter 
to all the stockholders stating this fact. Accordingly such a letter was 
prepared by the President [Combs] of the Corporation, but he 
[Miles] refused to sign it, and so far as the evidence discloses he 
never did send such a letter. 
It is respectfully submitted that the evidence given by Mr. Miles 
at the trial fully discloses that he was engaged in an attempt to place 
the control of the corporation in the National Refining Company, 
the Corporation's principal customer at that time and as long as 
Mr. Miles was in the saddle and exercised complete control over the 
Company's business and affairs, the National Refining Company 
felt no need to invest in the Company's stock, but shortly after his 
activities were curtailed and his powers subordinated to those of the 
president, the National Refining Company considered the best 
interests would be served by buying into the Company. 
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Until the annual report dated March 3, 1925, Miles had 
signed all company reports. After that date and until 1935, 
Combs, the president, signed them. The date of the curtailment 
of powers of Miles, the former general manager, was significant 
in the affairs of Swiss Oil. 
The organization of the Ashland Refining Company was the 
result of action of the Swiss board of directors on January 28, 
1924; Paul G. Blazer was named general manager of the new 
firm. At the time, this event appeared to be much less important 
than the Union purchase, which was approved at the same 
meeting of the Swiss board, for it involved an expenditure of 
only $212,000, in contrast to the $5,000,000 price for the Union 
company. This small transaction was reported in the minutes 
of the board of directors of Swiss Oil Corporation as "negotia-
tions ... toward the purchase of the plant of the Great Eastern 
Refining Corporation, located near Catlettsburg, Kentucky, from 
which it appeared that said plant could be purchased at the 
price of $212,000 to be paid $50,000 in cash and the balance in 
five installments." 
Thus the management of Swiss Oil Corporation decided to 
integrate forward into refining. It was this action in 1924 that 
gave birth to a subsidiary which within twelve years became 
the chief operation. 
PERIOD OF DECLINING PRODUCTION 
After the purchase of the Union properties and until 1942, 
the company did little to increase its oil reserves. It drilled a 
few wells, but not enough to offset the decline in production. 
The relatively large capital expenditures for production in 1930, 
evident in Exhibit 7, were for secondary recovery by repressuring 
with gas the properties obtained from Union. 
From 1925 to 1935 the producing properties were managed 
by Combs from Swiss' home office in Lexington, while the 
33 
v.J 
~ 
ExHIBIT 7-PERCENTAGE OF ToTAL CAPITAL ExPENDITURES PLACED INTO PRODUCTION oF CRUDE OIL, 
AsHLAND OIL & REFINING CoMPANY, 1924-1956 
PERCENT 
100 
75 
50 
25 
o~------~----------------------._--------------~ 
1925 1930 1935 1940 1945 1950 1955 
WILDCATTER IN KENTUCKY 
growing refining operations were supervised by Blazer in Ashland. 
Blazer kept the Swiss management informed by lengthy letters 
and reports, but he experienced little interference in his manage-
ment of the Ashland operation. Blazer had very little to do with 
the producing branch, which then was completely separate 
from refining, both geographically and organizationally. Except 
as a member of the Swiss board after 1929, Blazer was not con-
cerned with production of crude oil at the time when he was 
having great success in refining, transportation, and marketing. 
Later, in 1935, when the offices of Swiss Oil Corporation were 
moved to Ashland, the producing branch was a stepchild. It 
was the only part that had not been built by Blazer. 
Exhibit 8 shows the actual net production of crude oil from 
1924 to 1956. From a high of 2,675 barrels per day in 1926, 
net production dropped gradually throughout the 1930's. The 
only interruption was the slight upward effect of the repressuring 
operations of 1930 and a small increase in 1938. Exhibit 9 shows 
that in 1925 Swiss' crude oil production was 15 5 percent of 
Ashland's crude runs to stills, whereas it was only 24 percent by 
1938. This drop was the result of the slow but steady increase 
in refinery runs. 
After 1927, crude oil prices were not high enough to encourage 
major emphasis on production. The price of Somerset grade of 
crude oil produced in eastern Kentucky dropped from $2.30 a 
barrel in 1927 to $0.90 in the early 1930's. The tremendous 
production from the newly discovered east Texas fields made the 
operation of the small wells in eastern Kentucky uneconomical. 
By July, 1930, Ashland was purchasing 75 percent of the crude 
oil carried by Cumberland Pipe Line Company, which collected 
most of the crude in eastern Kentucky. Ashland thus was able 
to obtain more than adequate supplies from independent 
producers. Blazer saw that Swiss was losing money in produc-
tion; therefore he reasoned that deemphasis on production was 
logical. In fact, at times he found that excess supply of crude 
oil was a problem. He was aware, however, that he must offer 
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a market for independent producers in order to keep them as a 
potential future source of supply. He expressed his views to 
the Swiss president in 1930: 
As a result of this emergency, I would recommend that the Swiss Oil 
Corporation, as the largest producer of Eastern Kentucky crude oil, 
curtail production in so far as that can be done without benefiting 
your neighbors or injuring your properties. 
As I see it, the present situation endangers the Ashland Refining 
Company only in so far as it threatens the prosperity and continued 
operations of Eastern Kentucky producers whom we must look to for 
further supplies of oil. I am not worried on our own account, but 
since we are the only important present outlet for Eastern Kentucky 
crude oil, heavy responsibility rests upon us. 
This sense of responsibility to the independent producer was 
maintained through Ashland's history and was one of the reasons 
the company could continue to obtain sufficient crude oil from 
independent producers in spite of the low percentage of com-
pany-owned production. 
Although Seep Purchasing Agency, representing South Penn 
Oil Company, originally a part of the old Standard Oil Com-
pany, had for many years posted the official market price for 
Eastern Kentucky crude oil, Ashland had become the principal 
purchaser and refiner of Kentucky oil and began posting its own 
market price, which usually was higher than the price paid by 
Seep. In February, 1931, Seep Purchasing Agency discontinued 
the purchasing and posting of a market for Kentucky crude oil, 
and thereafter the official market price was posted by Ashland. 
The Texas Company, the only other important purchaser and 
refiner of Kentucky crude oil, accepted Ashland's postings. The 
reason for this change in the pricing of Kentucky crude oil was 
Ashland's ability to accept all the oil that was offered to it and 
to pay more than anyone else. 
This leadership in crude purchasing fell to Ashland early in 
1931 within three months after the Ashland management had 
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attempted to sell the producing properties to several of the large 
oil companies. In the last three months of 1930 the financial 
pressure on the Chicago interests in Swiss was so great that they 
asked Blazer to sell the producing properties. For two months 
Blazer talked with representatives of Cities Service Company, 
Sinclair Refining Company, and others. Since all had more 
crude oil than they needed, no satisfactory sales could be 
arranged. If these negotiations had succeeded, the history of the 
company would have been significantly altered. Ashland would 
have had no ownership in producing fields and so would not 
have been in a position to make its strategic purchase of a pipe-
line one year later. 
The price of Swiss stock was so low in the early 1930's that it 
would have been easy for an investor to gain control of the 
company. This was the period, however, of severe stress in 
financial markets. During this unsettled situation, William C. 
Freeman of Chicago first learned that there was such a firm as 
Swiss Oil Corporation, and in 1935 he began his long member-
ship on the board of directors. One day a banker brought this 
financial specialist a basket of certificates representing part of 
the collapsed Samuel lnsull empire and requested Freeman 
to see if he could realize any value from them. In that pile of 
paper were shares in Swiss Oil Corporation. 
The greatly devalued stock on Freeman's desk reflected the 
continuing financial difficulties of Swiss. In his letter to Combs 
on January 9, 1934, Blazer referred to the 1931 situation: 
The present favorable financial condition of the Swiss Oil Corpora-
tion contrasts most favorably with the situation which I recall 
prevailed three years ago this week. There were outstanding at that 
time Swiss debenture notes totalling $778,000 which were maturing 
on the 15th of the month. Due to prevailing disturbed financial 
conditions, the sale of the new issue of Swiss bonds had not met 
with the degree of success anticipated. Our companies, as a group, 
were already borrowing $845,000 from banks, which was the extreme 
limit of their credit. Default of the maturing notes, which would 
have been disastrous for the sale of the new bonds, was threatened 
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and doubtless would have occurred except that you pledged your 
own credit and that of the Combs Lumber Company to raise an 
additional $100,000 for the Swiss Oil Corporation; also, on the day 
before the notes were due, another large stockholder and director, 
following your example, pledged his personal credit to raise approxi-
mately the same amount to make up the remaining deficit, thereby 
enabling the company to weather the storm. Probably few of your 
stockholders knew of the danger that threatened at that time, and 
probably an even smaller number of your stockholders know that 
only a few years previously the directors of the company had debated 
as to whether it might be better to liquidate the corporation while 
there were still sufficient assets to pay off the creditors. Instead, the 
officers and directors took the only alternative-they plunged more 
heavily into debt and purchased new properties. 
In January, 1933, the par value of the capital stock of Swiss 
was decreased from $5.00 to $1.00; the assets of the company 
were written down by $2,225,000 to reflect the lower market 
values; a capital surplus was created for the purpose of making 
dividends possible. In 1934 Swiss extinguished its long-term 
indebtedness and paid a liquidating dividend from capital 
surplus. In a letter to stockholders dated June 15, 1934, Combs, 
the president, communicated the glad news: 
You will be interested to know that your company has paid and 
retired every dollar of its bonded indebtedness, 18 months before 
final maturity, bonds in the principal sum of $430,400 having been 
paid since January l, 1934. Your company has not, at this time, any 
bank borrowings nor does it owe anything other than small current 
accounts. 
The management of Swiss now began to consider a possible 
merger with its subsidiary, Ashland Refining Company, whose 
earnings by 1935 were approximately ten times those of the 
parent producing company. 
On April 7, 1935, Thomas A. Combs died. In the consequent 
reorganization, James L. Martin became chairman of the board 
of Swiss and Blazer became president. For the first time Blazer 
held operating responsibility for the production of crude oil. 
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Combs had entered the management of Swiss when it appeared 
that nothing could be done for the company. He had success-
fully revitalized the producing company, supported and encour-
aged Blazer in his operations of Ashland Refining Company, and 
paid out the entire indebtedness of Swiss at the bottom of the 
Great Depression. His death removed the last real reason to 
maintain separate companies in two locations. On October 31, 
1936, Swiss Oil Corporation and Ashland Refining Company 
were consolidated. 
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The Operations of Ashland Refining Company 
THE ALMOST offhand manner in which the board of direc-
tors of Swiss Oil Corporation decided to integrate forward into 
refining belies the careful work in preparation for this action. 
It reflects, however, the directors' trust in Paul Blazer, who was 
named general manager of the newly organized Ashland Refining 
Company. 
Blazer and Ashland more than fulfilled the board's expectation 
of substantial returns on its investment in the refinery. Although 
the initial operations of Ashland Oil & Refining Company were 
in Swiss' production of crude oil, the stable foundation for its 
future growth was laid in 1924 with the refining activities. 
Throughout the thirty-three years after that date, the Blazer 
management based all of its decisions to integrate backward 
into transportation and production of crude oil, and forward 
into transportation and marketing of the refined products, upon 
the assumption that the chief source of profits was refining. 
CHARACTERISTICS OF REFINING 
Refining is the manufacturing stage of the petroleum industry. 
Its nature is determined by the varying chemical qualities of 
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crude oil and the processes required to segregate the fractions 
or components of the refined products. Furthermore, the de-
mand for various fractions fluctuates greatly. Add to these 
factors dynamic and rapid technological change, and it is not 
surprising that successful refining operations require manage-
ment to watch closely the numerous variables and to adjust 
operations to unique sets of conditions. 
The processes which the refining manager must direct and 
control may be divided into three groups: distillation, alteration, 
and purification. Distillation is the basic process which involves 
heating the crude in a still and running it through a fractionating 
tower; as the gases cool, they condense on various trays within 
the tower, depending upon the boiling point of each fraction. 
The fractions are then piped off as different products-gasoline, 
kerosene, fuel oils, and so on. When Ashland came into being 
in 1924, refining involved little else than a simple distillation. 
Techniques of alteration have been developed in the industry 
in the last forty years. Thermal cracking was the first to affect 
the operation of Ashland; later, catalytic cracking became a 
necessity as the required quantity and quality of gasoline in-
creased. Both processes involve the breaking of heavier hydro-
carbon molecules into lighter ones: heat is the agent in the 
case of thermal cracking; a foreign substance is used in catalytic 
cracking. Polymerization and alkylation are other advanced 
methods of alteration; in these processes the lighter gases are 
treated in order to make heavier fractions of high-quality gaso-
line. Alteration can also be achieved by use of additives. 
Numerous types of purification are needed to eliminate 
undesirable elements which may be present in crude oil. Some 
crudes have a high sulphur and salt content which, if not re-
moved, causes excessive corrosion. Lubricating oils require spe-
cial processing and purification. 
Continuous operation in all processes is made possible by the 
fluidity of the product. The need for large amounts of heat 
makes economically mandatory a work schedule of twenty-four 
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hours a day, seven days a week. Large amounts of capital equip-
ment and relatively few laborers are required. Operating per-
sonnel must remain alert in order to control the processes; 
maintenance personnel must keep the equipment in operating 
condition and aid in the periodic cleaning process known as 
"turnaround." 
Management of a refining company depends upon several 
economic characteristics of the operations. Bain summarizes 
these factors in the following manner: "The principal economic 
aspects of refinery operation include the magnitude of the cost of 
refining, the manner in which this cost varies with the scale and 
character of facilities, the degree to which the variety of phy-
sically different refined products obtained from crude are subject 
to conditions of joint supply and cost, and the manner in which 
costs are apportioned among refined products."1 
The cost of the complete manufacturing operation in the 
oil industry is small relative to the cost of crude oil, cost of 
transportation, and cost of distribution. Bain has observed that 
"efficiency and cost control in refining are not necessarily 
prerequisite to survival in the petroleum industry." Of course, 
Bain's statement applies to the integrated company. A firm 
which attempts to specialize in refining, where the margin is 
relatively small and unstable, must be very efficient. The refining 
specialists must adopt measures, including managerial tech-
niques, which will offset the disadvantages of nonintegration. 
A company which has operated profitably over a long period 
in the refining branch primarily must have developed operational 
and managerial techniques especially suited to its circumstances. 
The short-run costs determine certain operating policies of a 
refining firm. Variable processing costs, including fuel, supplies, 
and direct labor, are small relative to total fixed costs. The re-
finer, given a plant of a certain size, usually desires to maintain 
capacity operations at all times, because the incremental proc-
1 Joe S. Bain, The Economics of the Pacific Coast Petroleum Industry 
(Berkeley, University of California Press, 1944), pt. I, 84-85. 
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essing cost near capacity is insignificant as compared with the 
total unit cost of products refined (including the cost of the 
crude oil). The nonintegrated refiner treats his crude oil costs 
as variable; even a small cost disadvantage in the purchase of 
crude oil (for example, 10 cents per barrel) will be of major 
importance to his total variable costs. The integrated refiner 
looks upon a large part of his crude oil costs as fixed and does 
not consider them of importance in the short run. The policies, 
therefore, that control the operation of an oil company will 
depend, in part, upon its degree of integration. 
A study of long-run costs of refining introduces the compli-
cated problem of the optimum size of a refinery. Location of a 
refinery in a small city such as Ashland, Kentucky, may yield 
wage differentials in favor of the smaller refinery. The delivered 
cost of the crude oil increases when extra amounts must be 
secured from more distant fields. The market area surrounding 
the refinery might be able to support only a relatively small 
throughput. 
Ashland's management has weighed the variables in its adjust-
ment to long-run cost factors. In addition, Ashland Oil has 
specialized in capitalizing on opportunities to buy small refineries 
at bargain prices. Special operating practices appear to have been 
efficient in the small-scale plants. 
During Ashland's thirty-three years of operations, the factors 
favoring larger scale have multiplied. The introduction of pipe 
stills and continuous cracking by 1927 caused the optimum scale 
to increase; the minimum size of crude distillation units neces-
sary to supply feed stock for a catalytic cracking unit was an 
added factor forcing a larger plant by 1940; increased use of 
pipelines to deliver products from the refinery increased the 
market area to a size that would support a large-scale refinery 
after World War II; the development of petrochemicals calls 
for even larger plants. 
Important aspects of the economics of refining are the con-
cepts of common or alternative costs and joint costs. The 
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distinction between the two is important in a study of the 
development of operating policies. As the economist defines 
the term, true joint costs exist when two or more final products 
emerge from a productive process in proportions which are 
absolutely invariable. Alternative or common costs exist when 
two or more final products emerge from a productive process in 
proportions which can be varied at the discretion of the manager. 
In the early methods of refining, especially in straight dis-
tilling, the fractions flowed from the process in a fixed propor-
tion; the only way in which the manager could vary the 
quantity of his refined products was by altering the definition 
of each fraction. New processes have continually been discovered 
by which the various fractions can be reprocessed and additional 
quantities of other fractions obtained. Theoretically, the refiner 
could continue to combine or break down the molecules in a 
given crude oil so that he could attain almost complete vari-
ability among the products produced. Economically, however, 
many of the presently known methods of chemically treating 
the fractions are impractical. If sufficiently complicated trays, 
"side-draw pipes," and special processing equipment are included 
in the design of a refinery, it is possible to obtain increased 
variability. A fundamental aspect of Ashland's operational poli-
cies was the attempt to make more products alternative rather 
than joint in the short run. 
This technical refining potential will be referred to later as 
one aspect of technological flexibility. A small refinery without 
cracking facilities must produce products under almost true joint 
cost conditions and is therefore limited in the application of 
this concept. A large refinery with the necessary technical 
equipment finds that the managerial problems of coordination 
distract attention from producing small quantities of specialty 
products. The medium-size company, theoretically, can acquire 
the necessary equipment and at the same time can give executive 
attention to smaller quantities of specialty products. 
But in 1924 Blazer's first concern was not with specialty 
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products. His immediate task was to derive profits from a 
refinery which had been operating at a yearly loss of almost 
$50,000. 
THE LEACH REFINERY 
The refinery purchased by Ashland Refining Company and 
financed by Swiss Oil Corporation in 1924 was at Leach, Ken-
tucky, on the Chesapeake and Ohio Railroad approximately six 
miles up the Big Sandy River from its confluence with the 
Ohio River at Catlettsburg. 
The location at Leach had been considered for a refinery by 
several groups prior to 1922. The president of Great Southern 
Refining Company had given thought to it in 1921. Possibly 
some of the first ideas about a refinery at that location were 
those of John Buckingham, president of an Ashland bank, and 
Paul Blazer, who was then vice president and sales manager of 
Great Southern. 
The refinery had actually been constructed in 1922 for Great 
Eastern Refining Company. John C. Kelly and J. A. Dalton, 
who were primarily coal operators, were the chief owners of 
Great Eastern. In spite of the fact that the plant was tech-
nically efficient, Kelly and Dalton lost $96,325 in less than two 
years. As a result of these unprofitable refining operations and 
their additional financial problems in the coal business, Swiss 
was able to buy the plant for $212,000 in cash plus the market 
value of the inventories. 
The purchase was the result of a combination of factors. 
First, the unprofitable operations and financial difficulties of 
Great Eastern set the stage for possible negotiations. Second, 
Swiss Oil Corporation was finding it difficult to secure markets 
for its crude oil. Combs and Miles had been looking for some 
operation which could help reverse the declining trend in their 
company's business. The refinery at Leach was located near a 
common-carrier pipeline which could be used for cheap trans-
47 
(l) 
Louisville, 
using Cumber• 
land Pipe Line 
& rail trans• 
portation 
(2) 
Cincinnati & 
Latonia, using 
Cumberland Pipe 
Line & rail 
transportation 
(3) 
Lexington, 
using Cumber• 
land Pipe Line 
& water trans• 
portation. 
(4) 
Pryse, using 
Cumberland Pipe 
Line. (Typical 
of Great South• 
ern s 1 tuation) 
(5) 
Catlettsi>urg, 
using Cumber• 
land Pipe Line. 
ExHIBIT 10 
NOVEMBER 1·1923 AVERAGE RETURNS PER BARREL 
OF KENTUCKY CRUDE REFINED AT VARIOUS POINTS. 
******************************************** 
CASH YIELDS 
Gasoline 3lx9.75 • 3.02 
Kerosene 8x6.75 • ,54 
Gas Oil l0x4.75 - .47 
Fuel 47x3. 75 - l. 76 
Per gallon 5. 79¢ 
Per barrel $2.43 
Gasoline 3lxl0 - 3.10 
Kerosene 8x6.7S • .54 
Gas Oil lOxS .so 
Fuel 47x4 - 1.88 
Per gallon 6.02¢ 
Per barrel $2.52 
Gasoline 32x9.SO - 3.04 
Kerosene 8x6.125· .49 
Gas Oil 10x4 .40 
Fuel 47x3.31 - 1.55 
Per gallon 5.48c 
Per barrel $2.30 
Gasoline 32x9.2S - 2.96 
Kerosene 8x6 .48 
Gas Oil l0x4 .40 
Fuel 47x3.25 - 1.53 
Per gallon s.37c 
Per barrel $2.25 
Gasol1ne 32x9.75 - 3.12 
Kerosene 8x6.75 • .54 
Gas Oil 10x4.75 • .47 
Fuel 47x3.87S· 1.82 
Per gallon 5.95.;: 
Per barrel $2.50 
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COST OF CRUDE & MFG. 
Market 1.46 
Premium(average) .13 
Pipeage .25 
Transportation .41 
Mfg. & Sales .40 
$2.65 
Market 1.46 
Premium(aversge) ,13 
Pipe age .25 
Transportation .41 
Mfg. & Sales .40 
$~.65 
Market 1.46 
Premium(average) .13 
Pipe age .24 
Transportation .15 
Mfg. & Sales .40 
$2.38 
Market 1.46 
Premium(average) .13 
Pipe age .24 
Transportation .oo 
Mfg. & sales .40 
$2.23 
Market 1.46 
Premium(average) .13 
Pipe age .24 
Transportation .oo 
Mfg. & Sales .40 
$2.23 
NET PROFIT 
22¢ loss 
13¢ loss 
8¢ loss 
2c profit 
27c profit 
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portation from the Swiss and other Eastern Kentucky wells to 
the refinery. Third, Blazer, who had previously made numerous 
contacts in the oil business in Illinois and Kentucky and who 
had obtained experience in refining operations while working 
for Great Southern Refining Company, was available for its 
management. 
When purchased, the refinery had a capacity of between 
1,000 and 1,500 barrels of crude oil per day. Its greatest 
advantage lay in its favorable location. This factor was clear 
to the management at the time of the purchase and remained 
important to successful operations over the ensuing thirty-three 
year period. In November, 1923, prior to the purchase, the 
most important advantages were analyzed in a report to the 
Swiss board by Paul G. Blazer, summarized as follows: 
1. Leach, Kentucky, is close to a marketing area which experiences 
the highest prices for finished products. The reason for these high 
prices is that oil flows east from the large fields of Oklahoma and 
Texas and meets the oil flowing west from Terminals on the East 
Coast at points along a line extending from Utica, New York, 
through Johnstown, Pennsylvania, to Charlottesville, Virginia. The 
areas around this line or "economic ridge" are those of highest 
transportation costs. If a firm could operate along this line at low 
costs, it is obvious that it would have a large competitive advantage. 
2. Leach is close to the crude oil supply of Eastern Kentucky. 
Availability of crude oil would be a minor problem and the cost of 
transporting the crude oil from the well to the refinery would be low 
if the common carrier pipe line was used. 
3. Industrial plants in the area will make it possible to dispose 
of the fuel oil produced in a skimming plant at advantageous prices. 
4. The existence of river transportation from the refinery will 
make it possible to extend the marketing area along the river and 
still keep transportation costs low. 
5. Sufficient skilled labor is available within the immediate 
market area. 
With this lengthy report was a tabular comparison of the 
hypothetical average returns per barrel of crude oil refined at 
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five possible locations: Louisville, Cincinnati, Lexington, Pryse, 
and Catlettsburg (Leach). Exhibit 10 is a reproduction of this 
table. The estimated 27 cents per barrel profit clearly would 
have been superior to that of the other locations and large 
enough to tempt a producing company to integrate forward. 
This estimate proved to be high for 1924 and 1925, in which 
the profit per barrel actually earned was 8 cents and 14 cents 
respectively. Adverse conditions resulted in an inventory loss 
during the first half of 1924, improvement took place in 1925, 
and by 1926 the actual profit per barrel of 25 cents was near the 
estimate of November, 1923. 
Ashland Refining Company began business on February 11, 
1924. Blazer as general manager was assisted by only one full-
time operating executive, Charles A. Jouett, the first refinery 
superintendent. Total employees numbered twenty-five, not in-
cluding five clerical and supervisory personnel. In a short time 
this small group trebled the throughput which Great Eastern 
had attained. Major improvements were postponed, but atten-
tion was given to small individual economies. The first opera-
tions used a batch method of distilling, whereas modern re-
fineries had adopted a continuous process. Ashland's manage-
ment attempted to guard against those practices which had 
caused the early problems of Swiss-primarily, overextension of 
financial resources. This policy was mandatory, since the parent 
could ill afford to invest additional funds in its refining venture 
at the time of the Union Gas negotiations. 
ONE-MAN MANAGEMENT 
In his first annual report to the Swiss board, Blazer delineated 
several operational policies that were to continue throughout 
his management. There was strict credit control, which mini-
mized the requirements of working capital; for example, at the 
end of the first year, a total of only $53.00 in accounts receivable 
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was older than one month. Ashland made sales in carloads lots 
to minimize the cost of small direct shipments; barges served 
buyers located adjacent to river delivery points. The company 
depended upon independent jobbers as its sales outlets. Atten-
tion to small details, especially those relating to costs, was 
characteristic of initial operations. The management cooperated 
closely with independent producers in order to establish greater 
security in crude oil supply. Close attention to the level of 
inventories provided further security of raw materials supply 
and decreased risks from price changes. 
The major equipment of the original plant consisted of four 
batch shell stills. Although they were of a design that other 
refinery managers were changing, the company secured a gas-
oline yield of 30.48 percent from 450,000 barrels of crude oil in 
1924. This compared with an industry average for that year of 
31.2 percent. 
Refinery prices were unstable. It was not uncommon to be 
operating at a sizable loss in one month and at a profit in the 
next. Since, even at this early date, gasoline contributed more 
than half of the realization per barrel of oil, it became urgent 
for Ashland to increase gasoline yield. The inflexibility of the 
original equipment made it difficult to adapt quickly to new 
conditions. Blazer discussed this situation in his report to the 
board of directors in 1926: 
Due partly to general conditions but primarily to the fact that fuel 
oil represents a larger part of our finished product than of our com-
petitors, we made our best showing during the winter months when 
fuel oil was in demand and lost money during the summer months 
of high gasoline consumption. 
Ashland's equipment in 1925 yielded slightly more than 30 
percent gasoline, while the industry averaged 32.4 percent. By 
1926 the industry's average had increased to 34.9 percent. Con-
sequently, Blazer submitted to the Swiss board in August, 1925, 
an illustration (Exhibit 11) of the effect of this yield upon 
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ExHIBIT 11 
COMPARISON OF ACTUAL RESULTS OF REFINERY OPERATIONS USING ORIGINAL EQUIPMENT 
WITH ESTIMATED RESULTS USING FRACTIONATING TOWERS, July, 1925. 
Using Original Equipment Using Fractionating Towers 
~: Return per 100 gallons of crude ~: Return per 100 gallons of crude 
Gasoline & 
naphtha $.1446 30.19 Gals, 
Kerosene .0651 7.18 
Fuel & gas 
oil .0431 58.99 
Evaporation, 
etc. .oooo 3.64 
100.00 
Realization per bar. crude oil 
Cost: 
Cost of crude including premium 
Transportation of crude 
Cost of manufacturing, overhead, 
etc. (55,ll9 bar.) 
Cost per bar. crude oil 
Loss per bar. crude oil processed 
using original equipment 
" 
II 
II 
$4.365 
.467 
2.542 
$7.374 
2.638 
.24 
~ 
$3.097 
3.164 
.L:..Qll 
Gasoline & 
naphtha 
Kerosene 
Fuel & gas 
oil 
Evaporation, 
etc. 
$.143 
.0651 
34. Gals. 
4. 
.0425 58,36 II 
.oooo 3.64 
100.00 
Realization per bar. crude oil 
£!!!!: 
Cost of crude including premium 
Transportation of crude 
Cost of manufacturing, overhead, 
etc. (55,ll9 barrels) 
Cost per bar. crude oil 
Profit per bar. crude oil 
processed using fractionating 
towers 
II 
$4;862 
.260 
2.480 
$7.602 
2.638 
.24 
_:lli. 
$3.193 
~ 
$ .049 
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operating profits. These figures reveal that an increase of the 
gasoline yield to 34 percent would result in an increase of 9.6 
cents per barrel in realization. Costs would be decreased slightly 
-2 cents per barrel-if fractionating towers were used. All other 
assumptions remained the same in both illustrations. Actually, 
however, the amount of loss due to evaporation was soon de-
creased from the 3.64 percent shown in the table to 1.86 percent 
in January, 1926. Both the estimates in the table were more 
conservative than the guarantees by the prospective builders of 
the equipment. 
In step with rapid changes in the industry during 1925-1926, 
Blazer changed the distillation in two stills from a batch opera-
tion to a continuous process; the batch method was maintained 
in the two other stills. "Bubble" or fractioning towers were 
constructed for each of the stills in the continuous process. 
These improvements, completed early in 1926, cost approxi-
mately $100,000-almost 50 percent of the initial cost of the 
plant. 
The very favorable earnings record of this early period re-
sulted from a favorable location, an expansion of diversified 
lines of products, low manufacturing and overhead costs, and 
an increased gasoline yield. Blazer explained in a report to the 
board: 
We are now having a more diversified line of gasoline and naphtha 
and can seek new markets thus minimizing our risk from price wars. 
Now that we can manufacture gasoline with proper specifications, we 
are giving our product trade names. For example, our Red Pepper 
aviation gasoline which sells at a premium of 5 cents per gallon is 
already meeting with great favor. Our new fractionating equipment 
enables us to more than double our production of high test gasoline 
for which we have a good market practically the year around. 
A strong oil market helped earnings at times (for instance, 
1926 and 1928); however, Blazer looked upon times of market 
weakness as potentially benefiting his company. In 1925 he 
commented: "Many refineries are already showing losses and 
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some are planning to close down. That will doubtless help the 
situation." When marginal firms were forced out of the market, 
the more efficient firms would then have a better chance of 
operating at a stable profit. 
Low manufacturing and overhead costs resulted from making 
small changes in operations as the situation demanded. Although 
Blazer was not an engineer and had little experience in refining 
prior to 1923, his emphasis upon small improvements rapidly 
gave him the reputation of being a refining specialist. His suc-
cess in the development of more efficient heat exchangers was 
less dramatic than many later actions; yet it probably was one 
of the most fundamental reasons for large profits at times when 
other companies had difficulty in obtaining any return from 
refining. In a report to the board, Blazer emphasized the 
importance of this factor: 
Our substantial increase in throughput can be attributed to our new 
system of towers and heat exchangers which outside refinery engi-
neers report as being the most efficient they have seen. By utilizing 
what was previously waste heat, the temperature of our crude is raised 
to over 360 degrees and about half of the gasoline has been taken 
off before the crude goes to the first still. 
Blazer gained valuable experience in making use of old equip-
ment, and this enabled him to capitalize repeatedly upon the 
acquisition of equipment which others considered obsolete. 
Executive attention to small economies made it possible to 
increase the efficiency of operations primarily through attaining 
throughput always in excess of "capacity" and sometimes almost 
double previous efforts. 
Blazer referred in a report to the board of directors to these 
small economies: 
We are practicing economy in many small matters, which until 
recently have been considered of too little importance to bother with, 
but viewed over a period they amount to substantial sums. The 
expenditures for the equipment to obtain these economies are small 
in comparison with the ultimate savings. 
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Blazer recognized the tremendous technological advances 
being made in the industry. After Dr. Burton of Standard Oil 
Company (Indiana) developed his method of thermal cracking, 
other processes became available. By the early 1920's the 
Holmes-Manley process of the Texas Company, the tube-and-
tank process of Standard Oil Company (New Jersey), the Cross 
process, the Fleming process, and the Jenkins process were in 
use by competitors. The Dubbs process, owned by Universal 
Oil Products Company, was available to independent refining 
companies. 
By the end of 1926 Ashland's management had placed a 
Dubbs thermal cracking unit in operation at a cost of $150,000. 
Although numerous changes were made in the original equip-
ment, this plant has remained important in the refining facilities 
of the company. The personal care and attention given the 
Dubbs unit during the twenty-seven years made possible its 
efficient use much longer than would normally be expected. The 
organization which made this possible was one key to the 
technological advance of the company. 
Such management techniques of Ashland made it feasible to 
produce numerous specialty products which were too trivial for 
the large companies to consider and too technical for small 
refiners to handle. In 1926 Blazer reported on some of these 
products: 
We manufacture six grades of aviation or high test gasoline and two 
grades of commercial gasoline. These various grades of gasoline 
are sold under many different trade names, central and southern 
Ohio affording us our greatest market. We make eight grades of 
naphtha which include paint blender's naphthas, rubber solvent, dry 
cleaners' naphtha, soap makers' naphtha, manufacturer's kerosene, 
special motor tractor fuel, domestic furnace distillates, black oil for 
mine use, road oil, ink oil, and seven grades of petroleum coke. 
Until 1928 Ashland had little staff organization. Indeed, at 
one time Blazer found himself operating without any other 
line executive of any kind. In 1927 he remained at the refinery 
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for three days continuously as the only major overseer when 
Miles, having purchased a shutdown refinery at Louisville, 
employed Ashland's refinery superintendent at a higher salary, 
who in turn took with him almost his entire staff of trained 
supervisors. For a short period, the company literally operated 
as a "one-man" enterprise. 
Until operations became larger, Blazer negotiated all of the 
sales personally and made decisions concerning the types of 
specialty products that he could refine. Changes in prices of 
the numerous products caused him early to consider incremental 
costs of each product in relation to its potential price as the 
controlling factor. 
The development of the diversified line of products, the 
shifting of market areas to yield a greater netback,2 and the 
ability to make improvements to obsolete refining equipment 
that proved to be the best available at the time were factors 
which enabled the company to continue to make profits in spite 
of the instability of the petroleum industry brought on by new 
techniques which were rapidly making older refining methods 
obsolete and by discovery of new oilfields which caused wide 
fluctuations in the crude oil market. 
The year 1926 was the last one of prosperity in the oil 
industry for a long time. Crude oil sold for $2.60 a barrel, the 
highest pnce since 1921 and higher than it would be until after 
vVorld War II. In 1927 the drop in crude oil prices to $1.68 
per barrel caused many producing properties to operate at a 
loss. At the same time, earnings of Ashland Refining Company 
continued to increase, from $186,230 in 1926 to $213,586 in 
1927. 
During this period of management by a single executive, 
Blazer was interested primarily in "staying competitive" in 
refining activities rather than in striving for greater integration. 
Swiss operated independently as a producing company; Ashland 
2 Netback refers to the net receipts of the company at the refinery gate after 
subtracting all of the marketing and transportation expenses. 
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Refining operated separately in the manufacturing branch. There 
was little coordination between the two except through cor-
respondence between Combs and Blazer. Refining included the 
operations of a small river barge that delivered finished products 
to points within fifteen miles of the refinery. 
By the end of 1928 the Ashland management had completed 
its major task of modernizing the Leach refinery. During this 
single year the throughput was increased from 47,000 to 120,000 
barrels per month, raising the profit to $423,917, representing 
a return of 43.78 percent on owner's equity. Blazer reported to 
Swiss: 
So far as our skimming plant is concerned it is not probable that we 
can obtain during 1929 further important improvements in either 
plant economy or quality of products. We have gone about as far 
as our type of distilling equipment will permit. 
The company was to make no major improvement in refining 
for the next ten years. The management had obtained its Dubbs 
thermal cracking unit when it had appeared necessary. The next 
revolutionary developments in the industry did not occur until 
catalytic cracking appeared in the late 1930's. Blazer timed his 
major capital expenditures so that the new equipment would not 
rapidly become obsolete. 
During these ten years, most of the top executives of the 
later periods were first added to the organization. Chapter 9 will 
analyze this evolution of the human element in the organization 
and show how the management constructed an organization 
that later was capable of rapid expansion. The "Ashland family" 
became a small, compactly organized group of personnel with 
little experience in the oil industry. Additional personnel hired 
at the depth of the depression were young and also inexperienced. 
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Beginning in 1927 and continuing for a number of years, the 
management received offers to purchase parts or all of the 
Swiss-Ashland companies. Because a minority of the stockholders 
were in favor of liquidating Swiss or selling the company as a 
whole, Blazer followed up the initial offers in a number of 
cases, although he personally did not want to accept them. He 
commented in a letter to a member of the board of directors 
on May 24, 1929, that "it is my opinion that a closely coordi-
nated, economical, small operation such as we are gradually de-
veloping, can show larger earnings on the amount invested than 
if our refining and distributing operations were absorbed into a 
larger organization." 
In October, 1928, an offer was made by the Texas Company 
to purchase Swiss' interests in the Big Sinking producing wells 
for $375,000. (These marginal properties eventually were placed 
under one ownership; in 1945 Ashland Oil purchased the hold-
ings of the Texas Company.) 
In August, 1928, after a new management had assumed direc-
tion of the Standard Oil Company (Ohio), talks were held 
preparatory to more formal negotiations relating to the sale of 
the Leach refinery to Standard. No actual offer was made 
because conditions in the Ohio company changed and made the 
sale impossible. Later, Standard acquired a refinery at Latonia, 
Kentucky, which could serve the southern portion of its market-
ing area. This refinery was the plant that in 192 3 Blazer was 
preparing to manage as a subsidiary of Petroleum Exploration. 
In June, 1930, Vacuum Oil Company showed interest in 
marketing facilities in Ohio which Ashland had acquired by 
that time. In August a feeler came from Shell-Union. The 
Standard Oil Company (Ohio) was named in further talks. 
Starting in 1931 and from time to time for the next twenty-
five years, there were rumors that Ashland was controlled or 
would become controlled by a major oil company. Standard of 
58 
ECONOMIES OF OBSOLESCENCE 
Ohio was often specifically mentioned. Blazer reported that dur-
ing the depression, customers and competitors would visit the 
refinery in order to determine its status, since it appeared 
unbelievable that a refining company could continue to make 
profits without becoming controlled by a large firm. He felt that 
larger companies had suggested to Ashland distributors that 
his firm was very insecure, causing them to worry about the 
possibility that they would find themselves later without a sup-
plier. This uncertainty among the customers was no small 
problem for Ashland's management. 
The belief that Ashland was controlled by another company 
probably resulted from reports about the various offers. More-
over, the large number of transactions that oil companies had 
with each other might have been interpreted as evidence that 
the companies were operated under a single control. During 
these years Ashland sold most of its gasoline in the wholesale 
market and often to large companies. There were many sale 
and exchange agreements with Standard of Ohio. Personal 
friendships and social relationships might have given further 
indications of an ownership connection. Blazer remained close 
friends with several officers of competing companies. Indeed, 
as a result of his personal friendships with executives in Ethyl 
Corporation and Standard of Ohio, relations between Ashland 
and some of the Standard companies were often as close as 
those effected between members of the Standard interests by 
their corporate heritage. 
During the entire history of Blazer's operations in the oil 
industry, his personal acquaintances with leading men in the 
industry influenced his managerial techniques. Attendance at 
the various trade meetings enabled him to strengthen his 
prestige. Although no quantitative weight can be given to the 
importance of these personal relationships, it can be said that 
undoubtedly these contacts helped in times of crises. But 
Ashland at no time was in the control of any other oil company; 
Blazer was the ultimate source of all policies. 
59 
FIRST EXPANSION IN REFINING VIA MERGER 
The first major purchase of another partially integrated company 
took place on April 9, 1930, when Ashland Refining Company 
acquired Tri-State Refining Company. Tri-State's refinery had 
been built in 1925 and improved in 1928 by the addition of a 
Jenkins thermal cracking unit. Tri-State had been the other 
principal competitive purchaser of Somerset crude from the 
Cumberland pipeline and had been the owner of service stations 
in Ashland's marketing area. The Tri-State purchase furnished 
additional cracking capacity and marked the first time that 
Ashland integrated forward into retailing of gasoline. The 
purchase was defensive as well as offensive, since Ashland's 
management feared the effects of possible purchase of Tri-
State's facilities by a competitor. 
In 1956 Blazer recalled this purchase in a speech: 
One afternoon in 1930, I received a telephone call from the owner 
of the Tri-State Refining Company, which a few years earlier had 
built a new refinery of modern design across the Big Sandy River at 
Kenova, West Virginia, within sight of our refinery. He and I were 
close friends and keen competitors. He was inexperienced, however, 
in the business of oil refining and marketing. He told me that his 
plant recently had been losing almost $1,000 per day and that he 
would turn it over to us if we would assume and promptly pay off 
the accumulated indebtedness which he personally had guaranteed. 
He named an approximate figure of around $300,000 and we closed 
the deal over the telephone. I learned later that he had been trying 
to sell his refinery to one of the larger oil companies. 
The annual report for 1930 by Swiss Oil Corporation to its 
stockholders summarized the facts of the purchase: 
Through these two subsidiaries [Ashland Refining Company and Tri-
State Refining Company] the Company now owns and operates two 
refineries within a very short pipeline distance from the Company's 
producing wells, one plant near Catlettsburg, Kentucky, refining 
about 4,000 barrels of crude oil per day, the other located at Kenova, 
West Virginia, across the Big Sandy River from Catlettsburg, 
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refining approximately 1,500 barrels of crude oil per day. Both plants 
are modern, having efficient "cracking" stills and low-cost operation. 
The purchase of Tri-State Refining Company, made just 
prior to a sharp drop in sales of petroleum products, caused 
Ashland Refining Company, for the first time, to curtail its 
throughput because of insufficient sales. The decline became 
more severe, and by the first three months of 1931 the refining 
operations lost $33,000. Ashland's ability to meet a crisis 
through flexibility was especially evident at this time. Although 
the depression grew worse, the refining company was able to end 
the year with a net profit of $126,134 in spite of its first three 
months of losses. Like results were achieved on other occasions, 
although not to the same degree. 
SUCCESSFUL OPERATIONS DURING THE DEPRESSION 
The refining company continued to show substantial profits 
annually through the depression. Blazer stressed flexibility as a 
fundamental factor in his letters to Swiss' president: 
We are able to shift some of our production, because of flexibility 
in our operations, from gasoline to kerosene and furnace distillates, 
which bring higher prices than gasoline; we are succeeding in shifting 
some of our gallonage from cut-price areas to other territory, which 
as yet, has not been seriously affected. 
A second factor in Ashland's successful operations during the 
depression was its ability in obtaining tetraethyl lead for use in 
regular gasoline to maintain a competitive position in octane 
ratings. Blazer reported that in spite of the opposition of several 
large companies, Ethyl Corporation began to sell lead for regular 
gasoline: "You will be interested to know that with the exception 
of one shipment to the Standard Oil of New Jersey, we received 
the first shipment of the 'yellow' lead." 
A third important aid came from the development of a method 
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of using the residue from the cracking process in the manu-
facture of a type of asphalt known as "cutback." After several 
years of trouble in meeting specifications, the company found 
the answers to its problems and asphalt became an important 
product. On May 19, 1934, Blazer explained in a letter that 
"our asphalt revenue last year accounted for a substantial part 
of our operating profit for 1933." The company organized a 
separate corporation, the Kentucky Stone and Tar Company, 
to promote its road-building activities. 
A fourth favorable factor was the extent of integration which 
existed during these years. Blazer observed in a monthly letter: 
Viewing our group of companies as a whole we are approximately 
30 per cent integrated. We have slightly over 30 per cent of our 
crude supply and distribute through our own marketing facilities 
about 30 per cent of our gasoline output .... At times like the present, 
profits from the operation of the pipe line, our distributing operations 
and also from other "sidelines" cushion our refinery losses. 
PURCHASE OF A CRUDE OIL PIPELINE 
In 1931 eastern Kentucky crude oil flowed primarily to three 
refineries-Ashland's Leach refinery, Tri-State's Kenova, West 
Virginia, refinery, and Texas' Pryse refinery. The first two 
depended on Cumberland Pipe Line Company for a main artery 
from its crude oil supply (see Exhibit 12). This line had 
been started in 1902 by the Standard Oil interests. During the 
period of flush production, the line had operated at a profit, 
but with the decline of the oilfields, the firm, which was being 
managed from New Y ark, found revenue diminishing. It ap-
peared to Ashland's management that Cumberland operated 
with excess personnel and costly facilities. Furthermore, Blazer 
believed that dependence on Cumberland's tariff actions might 
have a serious effect on Ashland's profits. 
Soon after the purchase of the Tri-State refinery in April, 
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1930, Blazer discussed with Cumberland's management the 
possible purchase of the pipeline. By this time Ashland was 
receiving 75 percent of the oil delivered by the line. Before 
approaching the Cumberland interests, Blazer had talked with 
representatives of National Supply Company concerning the 
probable cost of construction of a new line. With this possi-
bility as a weapon, Blazer negotiated for the Cumberland line. 
He had been given the power to go much higher than the price 
at which he actually was able to buy the facilities. 
The story of the negotiation with the Cumberland manage-
ment was summarized by Blazer in 1956: 
The Cumberland Pipe Line Company owned and operated the Ken-
tucky pipelines of the Southern group of pipeline companies, which 
had a network of thousands of miles of gathering and trunk lines 
extending from the oil fields of Kentucky, West Virginia, and western 
Pennsylvania, to the large refineries located along the Delaware 
River. They were headed by Forrest M. Towl, located at 26 Broad-
way, in New York City, who as a young engineering graduate from 
Cornell University, had gone with Mr. Rockefeller in 1885, and had 
become chief engineer of the original Standard Oil Company. I 
thoroughly enjoyed my negotiations with Mr. Towl in connection 
with the purchase of the pipeline properties. He was truly a gentle-
man of the old school. 
The principal stockholder in Cumberland was the Rockefeller 
Foundation, which owned approximately 25 per cent. The balance 
of the stock was publicly owned, since it was traded on the New York 
Curb Exchange. Some of my friends and associates thought we were 
taking on more then we would be able to handle. 
Within a few weeks [after taking over the Cumberland line) we 
had put into effect many economies which turned the previous 
operating loss of Cumberland into a profit of more than $15,000 per 
month, thereby providing the installment payments as they came 
due. Our economies did not involve any reductions in wages; Mr. 
Towl had agreed that Cumberland would take care of any employees 
we might not require. One girl in our office, with a comptometer, 
took over the work which was reported to have required much of 
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the time of fifteen men at Oil City, Pennsylvania, who had been 
receiving the crude oil runs by telegraph daily from each Kentucky 
lease and had been computing the number of barrels by hand. That 
was 25 years ago. Today, a large electronic computer could do the 
same work in a few minutes each day. 
The purchase of the Cumberland Pipe Line . . . was the most 
significant acquisition we ever have made. 
After a year of negotiation, Ashland purchased for $420,000 
the pipeline, in which there had been a total investment of 
$3,600,000, and on September 26, 1931, organized a new com-
pany, the Ashland Oil & Transportation Company, to operate 
the line. The terms of the sale were $60,000 in cash and four 
$90,000 4-percent notes payable at six-month intervals. The 
down payment was less than the value of an inventory of crude 
oil included in the purchase but not shown on Cumberland's 
books. The discrepancy (more than $75,000) resulted from a 
3 percent evaporation allowance for crude oil received from the 
producer. The evaporation had possibly been as high as 3 
percent at one time, but over the years the New York manage-
ment of Cumberland had failed to ascertain the actual amount 
of crude oil held. 
The saving in transportation cost soon after the acquisition 
was approximately equal to the installment payments. In effect, 
Ashland acquired the pipeline at no investment. 
The Cumberland purchase also gave Ashland several experi-
enced executives, including W. H. Keffer, a future vice president. 
Most important, it gave the company security in transportation 
of its raw material supply. The purchase also permitted better 
planning for the continuous flow of oil from wells through the 
refinery. 
The purchases of Tri-State Refining Company in 1930 and 
of Cumberland in 1931 were the two major acquisitions during 
this early period of expansion. They set the pattern by which 
Ashland continued to grow in later years: emphasis was on 
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purchase of old equipment which could not be operated profit-
ably by former owners; immediate and detailed attention was 
given to economies and improvements so that operations could 
quickly become profitable; acquisitions were balanced with 
previously owned equipment; fixed charges were held to a 
minimum through astute bargaining, by which property was 
purchased at a fraction of its original cost; and expansion gen-
erally occurred at times when the oil industry was depressed. 
EFFECT OF GOVERNMENTAL FACTORS ON COMPANY POLICIES 
Changes in the philosophy of the new federal administration 
in 1933 had their effects on the company. When it appeared 
that there was a possibility that the refinery employees would 
be unionized, the management took the initiative and actively 
encouraged organization. Blazer preferred an industrial type of 
union because he wanted to have the employees in one associa-
tion. He wanted to know what he was confronted with and to 
forestall possible future organization by craft unions which 
might be more unfriendly to management. The result was that 
the company invited organization by the predecessor of the Oil 
Workers International ( CIO). 
The NRA code with its wage regulations caused a change in 
company policy. Blazer wrote to the Swiss board in August, 
1933: 
We are trying to get our plant in exceptionally good condition so 
that we will be able to reduce the size of our organization a little 
later. If our plant is unionized, which now appears probable, we will 
have every incentive to keep the size of our organization at a mini-
mum figure, even to the extent of adding to our equipment expense. 
. . . With relatively cheap labor, it has always been our policy to 
keep our plant investment at a minimum figure even though it 
meant, in many cases, extra labor expense. To a certain extent that 
policy will now be changed. Our hourly labor rates in the plant will 
now average 40 per cent higher than heretofore. 
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At this same time, the oil industry faced the question of the 
desirability of price fixing by the government. Blazer resisted 
such efforts, although he felt that most executives within the 
industry seemed to favor price regulation. In a letter to Combs 
in 1933 he wrote: 
A very large section of the oil industry wants price regulation, but 
I have been afraid of any form of artificial price-fixing, since under 
government regulations we might lose our natural economic advan-
tage. Given a free competitive market, I feel that with a better 
organization and better equipment than ever before, we will be able 
to successfully cope with whatever problems may arise, but with the 
uncertainties and possible favoritism of artificial regulation, we might 
find ourselves in a less favorable position than in the past. 
During the decade after 1928, Blazer became confident that 
his small, compact organization had advantages which would 
enable it to maintain profitable operations if competition were 
allowed to operate. Then came the death of Thomas A. Combs, 
and at the moment when Blazer had consolidated his approach 
to the operational problems of a small refinery, he found himself 
in charge of a medium-size, partially integrated oil company. 
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Ashland Oil-A Medium-Sized Company 
ASHLAND OIL & Refining Company was the consequence 
of the legal consolidation of Swiss Oil Corporation and Ash-
land Refining Company on October 31, 1936. Several factors 
made this consolidation desirable; however, the proximate cause 
of the amalgamation was a Kentucky law passed in 1936 which 
would have increased the taxes of the two companies if they had 
remained separate. 
Although not stated in print at the time, the death of 
Thomas A. Combs in 1935 should be included as a reason for 
the consolidation. Combs had lived in Lexington while acting 
as president of Swiss Oil Corporation from 1922 until his death. 
His influence had been of such proportions that it would be 
reasonable to assume that no relocation of the home office 
would have been considered while Combs was the president. 
Yet the change in the relative position of the two companies 
and the continued increase of Blazer's prestige and power had 
moved the center of influence from Lexington to Ashland. 
Consolidation, therefore, furthered the potential coordination 
between the production and other phases of operations through 
the central location of offices. 
The financial details of the consolidation were quite simple. 
RELUCT ANT ENLARGEMENT 
All of the 8-percent preferred stock of Ashland Refining Com-
pany had been called under the provisions of the stock agree-
ment, and the 10-percent minority interest owned by Blazer 
was bought by the company at its stated book value. The 
total capitalization of the new company was $2,000,000; it 
included 1,000,000 shares of common stock, exchanged share 
for share for the common stock of Swiss Oil Corporation, and 
100,000 shares of 5-percent preferred stock, half of which was 
offered to the public at the time of consolidation. These securi-
ties were traded on the New York Curb Exchange. 
Blazer was interested in obtaining publicity from the Exchange 
listing in order to lay the foundation for further financing. Up 
to this time the stock of Swiss Oil Corporation had been 
traded publicly on the New York Curb Exchange without formal 
listing by the company. After the consolidation, Blazer gave 
special attention to the development of a good name in invest-
ment circles. The results of this attention were important to 
the future growth of the company; the way was being paved for 
further expansion should the opportunity arise. 
EXPLORATION AND DEVELOPMENT 
Blazer's influence on the company's operations led to emphasis 
upon refining and integration forward into marketing. Yet the 
extent to which the refining operations could be expanded was 
limited by the supply of crude oil available in the eastern Ken-
tucky fields. The discovery of new fields in Illinois in 1937 was 
a fortuitous event that was prerequisite for expanded refining 
operations at the Catlettsburg location. These fields also gave 
Ashland Oil a suitable area in which it could expand its own 
producing activities. Until these, fields were discovered, Ashland 
Oil had no undeveloped properties of importance. 
Until 1942 Ashland's management either purchased its crude 
oil or bought marginal properties. It saw no reason to extend 
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operations to any great degree into exploration and develop-
ment. Blazer reasoned that in spite of the numerous problems 
which confronted the nonintegrated refiner, he could maximize 
profits from the use of his limited funds by increasing operations 
in branches other than production. However, after the Illinois 
fields became important potential sources of crude oil, the com-
pany obtained leases in western Kentucky and a separate explora-
tion department was organized. This new effort represented one 
of the few times that the company entered a new activity without 
first purchasing a small marginal company around which opera-
tions could be built. 
A small refining company initially entering exploration meets 
numerous problems. The extensive areas available for drilling 
tend to require geographical departmentation. The necessary 
capital funds discourage large operations. The fact that leases 
to the choice areas have been secured by other companies forces 
the newcomer to drill a large percentage of wells in unknown 
areas. The very nature of the exploratory operations requires 
persons of different skills and attitudes from those in refining 
and marketing. Many companies find that these operations 
can best be performed if the operations are completely separated 
in a different corporation. 
As a means of averaging out some of the risks of drilling, 
Ashland's policy of developing campaigns jointly with inde-
pendent drilling specialists greatly increased the crude supply 
for its refineries. Such an arrangement with producing specialists 
also enabled the company to gain the benefit of experienced 
personnel and an organization that was adapted to the problems 
of exploration. 
In the early part of World War II, independent producers 
who were aided financially through loans by Ashland Oil brought 
in important new production. The company organized offices 
in Henderson, Kentucky, and Grayville, Illinois; later, in 1943, 
it opened an office in Tulsa, Oklahoma. A vice president directed 
the exploration operations. In each office there were at. least a 
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landman/ a geologist, and an engineer. However, company-
owned wells outside the state of Kentucky did not begin to 
produce oil until the fiscal year of 194 3. 
MODERNIZATION AND EXPANSION OF REFINING EQUIPMENT 
Coincident with the development of the new fields in Illinois-
a prerequisite for any enlargement of the refining throughput 
-was the innovation of catalytic cracking. Blazer reacted to 
this drastic technological change by the following comment to 
the board in July, 1938: 
The reason that I prefer not to increase our cracking capacity at this 
time is that I believe there will be revolutionary developments in the 
arts of cracking within the next year or two. Thus the additions 
which we are making at this time should be thought of as being 
somewhat temporary and only for the purpose of carrying us over 
until certain new processes are more fully perfected and made avail-
able to licensees .... As you know, until this year we had neglected 
our refinery in the matter of buying new equipment. Aside from 
buying new storage tanks, pumps, pipe lines, and asphalt-blending 
equipment, we have done no construction of importance for prac-
tically twelve years. The shell stills which will be abandoned at the 
end of this year were built in 1922; the cracking plant was built in 
1926, but appears to be still good for a number of years of profitable 
operations. The shell stills were originally intended to handle 1,000 
barrels per day of crude oil. For some years we have been getting 
through them 4,000 to 4,500 barrels. The cracking plant was designed 
to handle 750 barrels per day. We are running from 2,300 to 2,400 
barrels. We are fortunate in having been able to hold off our 
modernization plan for so many years and still maintain reasonably 
efficient operations and good earnings. 
The industry had experienced a relatively prosperous year in 
1936, but the later 1930's were a time of recession. In spite of 
these conditions and the desire to postpone major capital 
1 A Iandman considers the purchase of new properties and negotiates agree-
ments. 
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expenditures, Blazer began a modernization program in July, 
1938. A 7,000-barrel combination atmospheric-vacuum distilla-
tion unit was ordered at a cost of $222,000. Since the contractor 
had relatively little business at the time, he gave special attention 
to this comparatively small job, and the unit was placed in 
operation in March, 1939. A small polymerization plant was 
added soon thereafter. Blazer reported the company's progress 
to the board: 
As you doubtless know, the greater part of the capital expenditures, 
as listed, is associated with our program of almost doubling our 
refining and transportation facilities. Last May we refined 130,000 
barrels of crude. This month we expect to refine between 235,000 
and 240,000 barrels with another 20,000 available in July. 
In 1939 the octane race started in its full intensity. The new 
Houdry catalytic cracking process promised to accelerate new 
changes. All companies felt the pressure to improve their gaso-
line quality. Blazer wrote the board in January, 1940: 
With all major companies improving their gasoline within the last 
60 days to meet the quality of the new Houdry gasoline, the burden 
upon us, as refiner of Eastern Kentucky crude is so serious as to be 
almost unbearable. We are adding excessive lead and benzol. 
As part answer to this octane race, the old Dubbs thermal 
cracking unit was remodeled, increasing its capacity to 9,000 
barrels per day. These improvements not only increased capacity 
but achieved better balance, decreased the number of shutdowns, 
and improved the quality of gasoline. In addition, the manage-
ment increased its capacity for high-grade gasoline by adding a 
reforming unit capable of 1,500 barrels per day. The old Tri-
State refinery was dismantled and used in the new construction 
at Leach, near Catlettsburg. This utilization of old parts 
decreased the costs of new construction and kept overhead low. 
By 1940 the capacity of the refinery was 10,000 barrels per day; 
by 1942 it had increased to 18,000. This modernization program, 
immediately prior to World War II, had an important effect on 
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future growth, since the operation of a large catalytic cracking 
unit for the account of the government depended upon this 
expansion. Blazer explained these developments in a letter on 
Aprill4, 1942: 
There are comparatively few refineries situated as we are that are 
able to run at full capacity, having adequate supplies of crude oil 
and a ready market for their output. Our unusual position results 
principally because of our water transportation facilities, although 
we are dependent to some extent on tank cars. 
It appears that under war conditions the smaller oil companies 
will suffer more than the large ones. For example, if we were only 
slightly smaller, we would not be in a position to support the pro-
posed new government-financed plant. The program we are entering 
into practically requires that we refine a minimum of 15,000 barrels 
of crude daily .... I am afraid we will be forced to become a larger 
company whether we want to or not. ... I am afraid that in order 
to protect what we now have, it will be necessary for us to continue 
to grow. 
In numerous other letters Blazer had referred to his desire to 
become only as large as technology required. He appeared to 
feel that the well-managed smaller company had many advant-
ages in the industry and that the trouble experienced by other 
small companies was primarily the result of inefficient operation. 
Immediately after the entrance of the United States into 
World War II, Blazer spent a large part of his time in Washing-
ton helping to fit independent refining companies into the war 
program. The Secretary of the Interior appointed him chairman 
of the Refining Committee for District Two of the Petroleum 
Administration for War. Blazer explained to the board at the 
time: "Due to disturbing conditions resulting from the war, 
most oil companies are now being run from Washington. I find 
it necessary to be there most of the time." During his absence 
the subordinate executives had their first chance to work without 
the close supervision of their chief executive. Blazer once 
observed after returning from a trip: "I returned to Ashland 
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today after being away for ten days, and I am glad to report 
that our organization functions smoothly with a minimum of 
supervision from me." 
The final major expansion in refining during the wartime 
period resulted from a contract, dated May 5, 1942, with the 
Defense Plant Corporation. As a result of this agreement, a 
thermofor catalytic cracking unit for manufacturing l 00-octane 
gasoline was built on a sixty-acre plot adjacent to the Leach 
refinery. Ashland operated it for the account of the government. 
In order to obtain this plant, Ashland committed itself to 
capital expenditures of $250,000 to adjust the Leach refinery 
operations to supply feed stock for the new catalytic cracker. 
During 1943, 40 percent of Ashland's capital expenditures went 
into refining. In addition, the government spent more than 
$16,000,000 in the construction of the plant. The unit went 
on stream July 1, 1944, using approximately 9,000 barrels per 
day of the throughput of the company-owned refinery as feed 
stock. 
During 1939-1944, as a result of the war effort, the manage-
ment had expanded from a small refinery of 1926 vintage 
processing 4,500 barrels per day to a large modern plant with 
a capacity of 22,000 barrels per day. Increase in capacity was 
only part of the expansion of the organization, for by 1945 the 
Ashland management was in charge of the operation of the new 
catalytic cracking plant which produced 100-octane gasoline for 
the armed forces. 
The story of these years of expansion is one of a continual 
shifting of emphasis from one branch to another in response to 
changes in the basic industry conditions. Exhibits 7, 13, 16, and 
17 show the fluctuation in the relative importance of capital 
expenditures in the four branches from 1924 to 1957. Marketing 
received a large percentage of capital funds during the 1930's 
as a result of the intense competition of those years. Capital 
expenditures in refining depended primarily upon the tech-
nological developments in the industry. These developments 
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were not periodic, and relatively large sums were required at 
times when improvements were made. Transportation received 
an increased percentage after 1937, because it became necessary 
to transport crude oil from more distant fields. 
EVOLUTION OF THE STAFF SPECIALIST 
For the first fourteen years, the refining company had operated 
with such a small staff of office personnel that the entire home 
office was located on a single floor of a bank building in Ashland. 
On January 15, 1938, the offices were relocated in a six-story 
building purchased and reconditioned in the previous year. The 
original cost of the building was low, and the rents from those 
portions not used by the company paid the operating costs for 
the entire building. 
By 1938 Blazer gradually found additional departmentation 
desirable. Few functional departments (staff specialists) had 
appeared prior to the consolidation in 1936. With the ac-
celerated expansion of operations, Blazer gave morP. attention 
to his organization; however, he continued to deemphasize the 
clear-cut separation of duties. In 1938 a functional personnel 
department was organized, and in 1939 exploration and develop-
ment became a major operating department. 
Managerial responsibility and prestige in the industry increased 
at an even more rapid rate than company sales. The expanded 
company-owned facilities and the large government plant placed 
new problems on the staff of subordinate executives, which was 
held to a minimum number by the wartime shortage of person-
nel. The experience obtained by these men enabled them to 
become adjusted to larger scale operations. The stabilization of 
the industry by governmental control permitted Blazer to 
delegate greater authority to subordinates. Many who had 
previously served in an assistant capacity became functional 
specialists. 
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The rapid growth of executive responsibility increased the 
need for another top executive with broad training. In order to 
meet this need and to provide a possible successor, Blazer 
obtained the services of a relatively young petroleum lawyer, J. 
Howard Marshall, who had served with the Petroleum Adminis-
tration for War. Marshall, who was thirty-nine years of age 
(fifteen years younger than Blazer) , had previous experience in 
academic administration, private legal practice, and govern-
mental administration. As general counsel for the Petroleum 
Administration for War, he had become well known in the 
petroleum industry. He would be especially helpful in dealing 
with the government, since he "knew his way around Washing-
ton." Marshall assumed the presidency of Ashland Oil in 1944, 
a position he held until 19 51, when he left the company. Blazer 
had continued as chief executive with the title of chairman of 
the board. 
POSTWAR TRANSITION IN REFINING 
Immediately at the end of the war, the government closed its 
plant; shortly thereafter, however, Blazer decided to continue 
its operation on a temporary basis. The annual report for 1946 
explained the reason for reopening the plant: 
While our organization of skilled operators was still intact, it appeared 
advisable to give the plant a fair test of its utility for the manufacture 
of high octane automotive gasoline. This operation served a dual 
purpose. It assisted the government and the company in ascertaining 
the value of the plant for commercial use, as well as in determining 
the extent of alterations required for the most economical peace-time 
operation. Although the six-month trial run under varied operating 
conditions, resulted in a financial loss to the company of several 
hundred thousand dollars, it has facilitated a realistic appraisal by the 
company and the government of the use-value of the plant. 
After a prolonged period of adjustment and after government 
attempts to secure other bidders, Ashland Oil purchased the 
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100-octane aviation gasoline plant on December 11, 1947, for 
$2,150,000. The company agreed that it would make improve-
ments costing $650,000. Negotiations preceding this purchase 
emphasized the great advantage that the company had obtained 
when the government first located the plant near Leach. No one 
in the petroleum industry knew the value of the plant as well 
as did Blazer; the properties were adjacent to the Ashland Oil 
refinery; another company which might have purchased the 
plant would have realized major obstacles in crude oil supply 
and marketing organization. The desire on the part of the 
Department of Justice to sell many such plants to independents 
gave an added advantage to Ashland Oil. On the other hand, 
Blazer knew that if another company were to purchase the plant, 
the future development of the Ashland Oil organization would 
be most difficult. He recognized that his refinery would need 
catalytic cracking facilities in order to maintain its competitive 
position after the war. 
With this in mind, Blazer was able to arrive at a price which 
he thought would be favorable to the company but would be 
high enough to buy the plant from the government. He knew 
what other companies had successfully bid for similar plants. 
The assumption that no other company was actively considering 
the purchase was supported by the failure of others to inspect 
the facilities. In spite of the fact that the government made 
special efforts to obtain other bids, Ashland's was the only one 
made. 
The purchase of the government-constructed plant again en-
abled the Ashland Oil management to keep pace with improve-
ments in the industry without undue financial strain. The 
terms of $800,000 in cash and the remainder in 4-percent ten-
year notes secured by a purchase money mortgage were adapted 
to the needs of the small company. The ownership of the plant 
not only gave the company sufficient facilities for production of 
high-octane gasolines, but provided it with enough high-octane 
gasoline to use as blending stock for less modern plants that it 
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might purchase in the future. Referring to this significant action, 
Blazer admitted to the members of the board: "The entire 
program, including the construction and acquisition of the 
aviation gasoline plant, involved many possible pitfalls, and 
looking backward, I am convinced that we got by some of them 
more through good luck than through good management." 
During the negotiations for the "Number 2" refinery, as the 
former government plant was called, Blazer found an opportunity 
to lease and operate another refinery. This time the location 
at Niles, Ohio, was not on a navigable river but on the northern 
edge of Ashland's marketing area. In 1947 the company con-
tracted with Western Reserve Refining Company to lease the 
refinery, and later it exercised an option to purchase it. Although 
this refinery was small and obsolete in design, it was able to make 
large profits during periods of good demand for fuel oil. Its 
relatively low cost of operation resulted from high morale of its 
workers, location near large steel mills which used heavy fuel 
oil, and the knowledge of the Ashland Oil management for 
obtaining the greatest amount of production from old equip-
ment. These factors made possible intermittent profitable 
operations there during the next five years. 
Although the refining units continued to be concentrated 
near Catlettsburg, the company had become a multirefinery 
operation through the addition of two small and obsolete plants 
-the one at Niles, Ohio, and one at Pryse, Kentucky. The 
Pryse refinery had been built in 1917 by Oleum Refining Com-
pany and purchased by Great Southern Refining Company at a 
time when Blazer was in its employment. It was connected to a 
pipeline which Great Southern had constructed from the pro-
ducing properties in the Big Sinking district. The refinery, along 
with important affiliated producing properties, was purchased 
by the Texas Company in 1926. During World War II it had 
been operated at a rate of 1,600 barrels per day, but it had such 
high costs that it was extremely marginal. In 1945 Texas sold 
it to Ashland Oil along with the Kentucky producing properties. 
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Blazer had not planned to operate the Pryse refinery acquired 
by Ashland Oil in the package transaction, but it was extremely 
profitable during the ensuing two years. Several factors made 
possible its efficient operation until 1947: the experience of Ash-
land Oil in handling old refineries enabled the personnel of the 
company to decrease costs and increase throughput; the morale 
of the workers and their desire to make their jobs last as long as 
possible increased labor productivity to such an extent as to 
offset the disadvantage of the old equipment-during the period 
of refinery strikes in 1945, the Pryse plant continued to operate 
at capacity; and a shortage of fuel oil made it possible to obtain 
high realizations from the refined products. The refinery con-
tinued to show excellent profits up to the time it was dismantled. 
The management reasoned, however, that the Leach refinery 
could operate at more efficient levels if it increased throughput 
to supply the products normally produced by the Pryse refinery. 
Parts of the Pryse plant were of use in expansion of the through-
put of the Leach refinery; storage and pumping facilities at the 
Pryse location continued as a part of the crude oil gathering 
system. 
Throughout the war period Blazer planned for a quick adjust-
ment to peace. Funds had been secured on favorable terms from 
a life insurance company during the war in order to finance the 
necessary expansion. In August, 1945, these loans were refunded 
into twenty-year 3-percent sinking fund debenture bonds. The 
company had retired its 5-percent preferred stock in April, 1945, 
and issued shares of 4~-percent cumulative convertible preferred 
stock. In both cases, additional funds were obtained for working 
capital. This entrance into the securities market not only 
increased the amount of working capital but introduced the 
company to many investors on the national market for the first 
time. The financial policy was to maintain a strong cash position 
while building the potential for securing additional funds in the 
future. 
Blazer saw that postwar refining facilities would be greatly 
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different from prewar equipment. The government-built plant 
furnished the company with catalytic cracking equipment and 
workers trained in its operation. Ashland Oil had prepared for 
a continuation of the "octane race." 
Blazer also gave special attention to the potential effect of the 
war on the company's geographical advantage. The "Little and 
Big Inch" pipelines might change the economics of transporta-
tion in the area in which Ashland Oil operated. Blazer took 
the initiative in promoting the use of those pipelines for the 
transportation of natural gas in place of crude oil or refined 
products. This initiative was expressed in the form of testimony 
in congressional hearings and in the acquisition by Ashland Oil 
of promotional stock in the new venture. The localized nature 
of Ashland's marketing territory made the company vulnerable 
to a decrease in competitors' transportation costs into the area. 
Toward the end of the war it was clear that in order to move 
the much larger throughput of gasoline, it would be necessary 
in the postwar period to inaugurate an aggressive sales program 
on an expanded scale. The company made preparations during 
1945 for the program that it carried out during 1946. 
The annual report for the year 1945 explained the situation: 
Our share of the market demand for gasoline has greatly increased 
as compared with the pre-war period. This has been accomplished 
in part by obtaining many additional distributors in the area where 
we have marketed for many years, and also by using our low-cost 
water transportation facilities to increase the radius within which we 
can ship profitably. It is believed, however, that until new cars are 
on the roads in much larger numbers, gasoline consumption will con-
tinue to be disappointing and that we will not have sufficient business 
to permit the most profitable and efficient use of our refinery and 
transportation facilities which were considerably enlarged during the 
war. 
It is believed that our company, heretofore engaged principally in 
refining, transportation and distribution, is now also firmly estab-
lished in the producing branch of the petroleum industry. 
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We believe that we have been successful in attaining our objective, 
as stated in last year's report, of having the company in a strong 
financial position at the close of the war, with investments in trans-
portation, refining, and marketing facilities sufficiently charged off 
to cushion the necessary postwar adjustments. 
ADJUSTMENTS TO POSTWAR MARKET FLUCTUATIONS 
Immediately after the end of World War II, the industry 
generally foresaw a period of weak demand for oil products 
until the automobile companies could produce a large number 
of cars and consumers could convert furnaces to oil. In 1946 
the sales outlook for Ashland Oil was not especially bright. By 
the summer of 1947, however, executives of oil companies could 
foresee that oil products were going to be in short supply, 
especially domestic fuel oil. 
The management of Ashland Oil was able in 1947 to expand 
its manufacture of those products in shortest supply by operation 
of its small, relatively obsolete plants and by use of its refining 
flexibility. Crude oil was obtained by its barges from areas not 
serviced by pipelines. The small, centrally controlled organiza-
tion was able quickly to adjust its operations to increased 
throughput. The emphasis on flexibility which had been in-
doctrinated into each member of the organization paid off 
handsomely. 
In 1947 and early 1948 the supply of crude oil was tight. A 
company which had only slight integration in production was 
on the spot. Yet contrary to the usual generalization by observers 
in the petroleum industry, Ashland Oil was able to obtain ample 
supplies of crude even in this period of exceptionally short 
supply. In order to understand this success, it is necessary to 
understand Blazer's efforts to develop a crude oil supply during 
the preceding ten years. 
The solution to the problem of crude oil supply for a growing 
refining company can be through the ownership of crude oil 
82 
RELUCT ANT ENLARGEMENT 
gathering pipelines, purchase of oil from independent producers 
in the crude oil market, integration backward through the pur-
chase of producing properties, and a long-range program of 
exploration, development, and production. 
Purchase of oil involves either the problem of insuring suf-
ficient crude oil to permit capacity operations of pipelines and 
refineries in times of relatively short supply, as happened in 
1947-1948, or the problem of being caught in a refiner's "price 
squeeze" in times of plentiful crude supply, as happened in 
1948-1949. Prior to the era of prorationing (before 1935) 2 these 
risks were counterbalanced by the maintenance of close working 
arrangements with independent producers and by the ability 
to take advantage of low-priced crude in times of overproduction. 
After 1935, other managements observed that prorationing laws 
make it advantageous for a refiner to integrate backward into 
production. In times of weakness in the prices of refined 
products, the refiner who has been dependent on the crude oil 
market faces a price which lags in any decline. Since the begin-
ning of prorationing, prices have become more stabilized as a 
result of regulatory actions limiting crude production. With 
relatively constant crude oil cost (approximately three-fourths 
of the total cost of a refiner's throughput), any decline in the 
price of refined products has caused a serious decline in refining 
margins and has made stable, profitable operations difficult for 
the nonintegrated refiner. 
In 1938 Blazer felt that a primary problem was to secure an 
adequate supply of crude for his refining operations. Profits 
from the producing operations themselves were only secondary. 
The new Illinois fields encouraged the Ashland Oil management 
to plan refinery improvements based upon the assumption that 
adequate crude oil would be available from independent pro-
ducers. 
In order to expand its supply, the company looked to the 
2 A group of laws was passed for the purpose of conserving crude oil supplies 
and of protecting the property rights of owners in underground reservoirs. 
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improvement of transportation facilities through both pipelines 
and towboats. In the first stages of expansion in the Illinois 
fields, the management emphasized increasing gross rather than 
net production.3 It obtained its greatest security through the 
ownership of gathering pipelines and the collection of oil at 
the wellhead. 
No refiner can be certain of purchasing all of the oil that he 
needs simply by paying the market price. Price adjustments are 
imperfect; price does not perform its rationing function com-
pletely. The crude oil market is based upon a posted price set 
by an important buyer in a particular field. This buyer usually 
states that he will accept oil delivered to him at the posted 
price. The seller is interested in getting the best price that he 
can for his crude oil over a period of time without wasting time 
haggling over each transaction. Nonprice factors are important 
in these relationships. Therefore, the nonintegrated refiner often 
depends on his reputation with the sellers in the field. In times 
of short supply, he may find it necessary to pay a premium in 
order to secure sufficient crude. In times of oversupply, he 
attempts to take all the production of the wells even though 
there is no legal compulsion; he tries to keep his connections 
for protection in the event of another period of short supply. 
Although Ashland Oil owned little net production and tried 
to shift its purchases according to relative price differences, 
under such environmental conditions Blazer found that the 
crude oil supply remained inflexible. Integration might have 
contributed to greater flexibility through closer control over 
volume of production at the wells. 
The fact that a major percentage of the supply of crude oil 
has been owned by integrated companies has minimized the 
amount available to the nonintegrated refiner. Moreover, the 
integrated operator's interest might be more closely related to 
3 Net production refers to oil produced for the account of the company only, 
eliminating any part in which others have interests. Gross production refers to 
all oil produced by wells in which the company has any interest. 
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the interests of the seller of crude oil than to those of the non-
integrated buyers. Since the integrated company stands to gain 
as a producer from price increases of crude oil, the nonintegrated 
refiner finds himself with few other oil interests fighting an 
increase in crude oil prices. 
In the light of these problems of crude oil purchasing, 
Ashland Oil from time to time integrated backward through 
purchases of producing properties. Most acquisitions were 
"stripper" or marginal wells which produced such a small 
quantity of crude oil per day that their out-of-pocket costs 
approached their gross receipts. The price of crude oil, under 
such conditions, has a direct effect on whether the wells are 
worked. 
The refiner who owns a stripper well is closer to the cost 
situation of the refiner who must purchase crude oil on the 
market than he is to that of the owner of a well producing at 
higher volume rates. After a flush well starts to produce oil, 
the out-of-pocket expenses of lifting it to the lease tanks are a 
fraction of the price of the crude oil. In the short run, the 
owner of these larger wells finds his out-of-pocket costs per 
barrel a mere fraction of those of the operators of stripper wells. 
The amount of attention necessary to operate a large number 
of marginal wells makes them unattractive to large producers. 
Ashland Oil expanded its ownership of small wells in the Illinois 
basin in order to operate its gathering facilities at a more 
profitable volume. Properties became available at reasonable 
prices from time to time and offered a means of securing an 
increased supply of crude. The development of newer methods 
of secondary recovery, by water flooding, has made this program 
more attractive in recent years. Ashland Oil has gained valuable 
experience in the unique aspects of profitably operating such 
marginal properties, which have a potential value for secondary 
recovery. 
One example of Ashland's purchase of a group of stripper 
wells was in March, 1945. After brief negotiations with the 
85 
BLAZER AND ASHLAND OIL 
management of the Texas Company, Blazer was able to buy all 
of that company's oil producing properties in eastern Kentucky. 
The primary objective was to secure four hundred wells in the 
Big Sinking district, located near extensive holdings of Ashland 
Oil and serviced by an Ashland Oil pipeline. In addition, as 
previously mentioned, a small refinery at Pryse was included in 
the transaction. 
An intensified program of exploration, development, and 
production was undertaken by Ashland Oil influenced by the 
excess profits tax during World War II. Intangible drilling 
costs which could be charged as expense decreased the effective 
cost of finding new crude oil. The 1944 annual report explained: 
Your company's principal expansion during the past year has been 
in its crude oil producing department and especially in exploratory 
drilling. Expenditures for leases, drilling and the equipment of new 
wells amounted to $1,655,630.76 of which $509,734.73 was charged 
against earnings. Of the 146 wells drilled during the year, 99 proved 
to be productive. That is a more favorable percentage of producing 
wells than ordinarily would be expected. Oil production from wells, 
wholly or partially owned by the company, increased 176 per cent 
during the year from 2,122 barrels per day to 5,865 per day. An 
even larger drilling program is planned for the coming year. There 
is exceedingly keen competition, however, for favorable locations at 
which to drill. Many companies having large earnings subject to 
excess profits taxes are inclined to take greater risks than usual in 
the drilling of "wildcat" wells. Funds, that would otherwise be paid 
in taxes, are being spent to discover new oil fields. The spending of 
such funds for this purpose appears to be in accord with government 
policy to assure adequate supplies of oil both for the war effort and 
future civilian requirements. 
Expanded exploration activities continued through 1948. 
Blazer's observations to the board make it clear that he recog-
nized at this time the advantages of greater crude oil production: 
We are more inclined to be influenced by the fact that we are always 
potentially short of crude oil supply for our operations, although by 
making strenuous efforts our potential shortage never catches up 
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with us. For example, our anticipated refinery throughput of 27,000 
barrels per day for the month of June is almost exactly in balance 
with our anticipated available purchases of crude oil. They are within 
one per cent of each other. 
The company's earnings indicate that it had developed manage-
ment techniques capable of meeting this unusual industrywide 
shortage of crude oil. In spite of success in meeting the problems 
of a partly integrated company, Blazer looked forward in a 
monthly letter to a time of less urgent problems of coordination: 
"Eventually we expect our production to be our most profitable 
department, since it represents a net investment of more than 
four and one-half million dollars out of a total of eight million." 
An example of the type of difficulty faced by a firm with very 
little company-owned crude oil production appears in another 
letter from Blazer: 
Superior Oil Company which has been supplying us with approxi-
mately 3,000 barrels per day of crude oil, constituting our most 
important single source of supply, cut us off entirely last week be-
cause we were unwilling to go along with them in their frank effort 
to force an increase in the posted market for crude oil in the 
Illinois basin .... They gave our oil to Standard Oil Company (Ohio) 
without any financial inducement, this being handled in much the 
same way that they took 2,500 barrels of oil per day away from Aetna 
a year or so ago and gave it to us. 
Exploration and development continued after the end of 
World War II, making possible an increase in gross production 
from 6,636 barrels per day in 1945 to 9,438 barrels per day in 
1946. Net production increased in the same period from 3,197 
barrels per day to 5,723 barrels per day. In spite of continued 
emphasis on this phase in the next two years, gross production 
increased only to 10,124 barrels per day by 1948. Shortage of 
steel and of good drilling areas prevented a greater increase. 
In 1947 it was mandatory for Ashland Oil to obtain as much 
security of its crude supply as possible. The company empha-
sized increasing its gross production from oil wells in which it 
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had only a partial working interest. The extra time and expense 
required to increase net production discouraged the company 
from stressing ownership of the total working interests. The 
management felt that the large amounts of funds needed in the 
producing branch required the spreading of risks of exploration. 
The annual report for 1948 explained the policy that had 
developed: 
The average share owned by the company in this increased number 
of wells decreased from approximately 61% to 46%. This was in 
accordance with our policies of spreading our risks and developing an 
increasing number of independent-producer relationships. 
The large increase in available supplies of crude oil has been 
achieved principally by cooperating with independent producers and 
assisting them in finding, developing, equipping, operating, and 
financing producing properties. 
Blazer illustrated again in a letter to the board that at such a 
time, integration in production appeared to be advisable: "Over 
the past few years, it has been our purpose to invest our large 
refinery and transportation earnings in crude oil exploration, 
recognizing that our crude oil supply has been the weakest point 
in our set-up." 
Following this renewed interest in additional crude oil produc-
tion, the company in 1947 looked to the Middle East for crude 
oil. Because of the large expenditures required and the risks 
involved, some of the independent oil firms organized American 
Independent Oil Company. Ashland Oil held 12.69 percent of 
the common stock. Broad powers were given the officers of 
American Independent, which searched in vain for a new field 
in its concession for six years before it finally discovered the 
Wafra field in the Kuwait-Saudi Arabia Neutral Zone in 1953. 
Several of the stockholder firms became dissatisfied with the 
management of the company, and litigation extending over a 
number of years resulted. Just prior to the discovery in 1953, 
Ashland Oil was asked to provide additional funds as a loan to 
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"Aminoil." The funds were advanced, but it was clear that 
Blazer was discouraged. 
After the slow start, American Independent finally began to 
produce crude oil in profitable amounts-22,000 barrels per day 
just prior to the Suez emergency in 1956. The loans were 
ultimately paid off, and by 1957 it was evident that this venture 
would be successful. Ashland Oil by this time had begun to 
search in other foreign countries for crude oil: it joined a 
syndicate to explore in Venezuela and organized Ashland Guate-
mala Company to acquire leases in Guatamala. 
COMPARISON WITH SOHIO'S EXPLORATION ACTIVITIES 
The Standard Oil Company (Ohio) offers a useful comparison 
with Ashland Oil's producing activities. An important competi-
tor, by 1950 it was only slightly larger as measured by refinery 
runs and sales. The Standard company had never owned any 
significant crude oil production; therefore, when it made its 
decision in 1942 to move into that branch, it was necessary to 
start at the very bottom. Its success in the other three branches 
had provided funds to support a major effort in production. The 
excess profits tax was also a primary reason for integrating 
backward. 
The decision of Sohio's management to increase the amount 
of its net production was vigorously carried out. It developed 
exploration activities and purchased a number of small produc-
ing companies. After the outbreak of World War II, the small 
producers were especially willing to sell: crude oil prices were 
frozen; income tax rates were high, and a sale would make their 
receipts capital gains, thus lowering their taxes; the scarcity 
of supplies made it more complicated for the small producer 
to operate economically. In the opinion of the executive in 
charge of Sohio's producing operations at that time, the primary 
mistake during those years was that the company did not buy 
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even more small producers while the opportunity was good. 
By 1953 Sohio's net production had increased to 23 percent of 
its refinery runs, while Ashland's had dropped to less than 10 
percent. 
Sohio's exploration plans extended over a five-year period. 
Its management reasoned that expanded exploration over short 
periods would not show sufficient returns to cover the large 
expenditures that were necessary. If a short-term viewpoint were 
taken, operations might be curtailed before their full returns had 
been realized. The cash income generated from past production 
proved insufficient to cover the new operations for the first five 
to six years of continued efforts. Only after such a long period 
could the realization from crude oil begin to cover the necessary 
large expenditures. 
During World War II both Ashland Oil and Sohio turned to 
production of crude oil because of the effects of the excess 
profits tax. Ashland Oil started with some production; Sohio 
started with none. Sohio had sufficient financial resources to 
plunge heavily into production, but Ashland Oil had limited 
funds for production because it was growing rapidly in trans-
portation and refining as well. Sohio committed a relatively 
constant amount of capital expenditures yearly to production; 
Ashland Oil adjusted its actions to changing situations. 
DEEMPHASIS OF EXPLORATION AND DEVELOPMENT 
Following the extreme shortages of 1947-1948, the oil industry 
experienced a sharp and rapid change in its prospects. By the 
middle of 1949 the market had so weakened for residual and 
heavy fuel oils that the problem had changed to one of too 
much crude oil; the excess profits tax was no longer a factor. 
As a result of these changes, Blazer's 1949 letters to the board 
emphasized flexibility as more important than consistency with 
previously quoted comments: 
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It appears that these operations [crude production] for the past four 
years prior to this year have shown a net loss of more than a million 
dollars .... It is my impression that with the prospect of being able, 
for some time, to purchase from others all of the oil we need for 
refining requirements, there is little advantage to be derived from our 
present efforts to find crude oil production. Apparently we have not 
been able to put together a successful crude oil finding organization. 
I am confident that we can purchase crude oil reserves on a much 
more favorable basis than it has cost us to find them .... Our invest-
ment in that part of our business is so substantial that I believe we 
should not continue to expand in that direction in the absence of a 
profitable return .... With prospect of further shrinkage in refining 
and transportation profits, we won't have the "cushion" in the future 
that we have had in the past. We will be confronted with the neces-
sity of making every department "stand on its own legs" yielding a 
fair return on the investment. 
Following this policy, three western offices were consolidated 
into one. Blazer felt that if any phase did not yield returns 
comparable to the other branches, the only alternative was the 
reduction of activity in that branch. Integration of itself was 
not essential; profits must be relative to the funds invested in 
the separate stages. 
Retrenchment in 1949 was based upon the assumption that 
the production department's profits should be computed for 
the same time period as other departments' profits. The idea 
was that the concept of flexibility and adaptability found to be 
important in the other branches could be applied in the same 
degree to the production branch. 
The expansion in exploration in 194 2-1948 was caused almost 
entirely by the effects of the excess profits tax. Reasons advanced 
by other managements supporting their integration into produc-
tion may have been considered but were not of major significance 
in Blazer's decisions. Prospects for profits from crude oil did 
not appear as attractive to the Ashland Oil management as 
prospects in the other branches, especially in refining and trans-
portation. Although the crude oil supply had been considered 
important by other managements, Blazer felt that he had never 
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had trouble ultimately in securing enough crude oil even in times 
of extreme shortage ( 1948, for example). The fluctuations in 
refining margins continued to be difficult for the nonintegrated 
refiner, but Blazer felt that there were means of combating this 
problem over the long run. 
Blazer considered flexibility the important counterbalancing 
force. He thought that the difficulties of the nonintegrated 
refiner could be met through several defensive measures: the 
refiner could shift purchases of crude oil to those grades more 
economically located for his operations; he could shift the refined 
products yield to those products whose prices were under the 
least downward pressure; he could pay closer attention to refining 
costs as a means of compensating for any unfavorable differential 
in the purchase price of crude. All of these measures placed a 
special emphasis upon a flexible organization, a flexible refinery, 
and a flexible transportation system. 
With these ideas and the foundation in refining laid during 
the period 19 36-194 7, Blazer and Ashland Oil were on the 
threshold of a period of extremely rapid growth. 
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The Transformation to Large-Scale Operations 
PROBABLY THE most astounding period in the history 
of Ashland Oil was the time of its rapid growth from 1948 to 
1950. In this short period, as Exhibit 14 shows, the company's 
assets increased from $24,000,000 to $104,000,000. Although, as 
the previous discussion implies, Blazer had built a firm founda-
tion for future growth, this expansion was not the result of a 
conscious program. In fact, in numerous comments through 
the years after 1938, he seemed to apologize for becoming larger. 
The 1947 annual report included one example of such a com-
ment: "Growth, as such, is not an objective but because 
petroleum is an expanding industry, growth is almost unavoid-
able." 
McLean and Haigh have stated in their study that the series. 
of mergers by Ashland Oil was a part of a "major expansion 
program."1 If by a program one means a formally organized 
emphasis upon expansion by purchase, the series of mergers did 
not result from such long-run rational planning. If one means. 
that the management remained in a position to take advantage 
of a favorable proposition whenever it might occur, such a pro-
gram existed throughout the history of the company. Many of 
1 McLean and Haigh, The Growth of Integrated Oil Companies, 641. 
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the mergers which did take place were in the stage of informal 
discussion for many years. Others were the result of a number 
of factors which suddenly directed the managements toward 
merger. 
The impact of these mergers was so great on the development 
of the Ashland Oil organization that it will be most important 
to understand the background facts of each merger, the reason 
that each party desired consolidation, and the informal process 
used to achieve agreement. In the case of each of the four 
principal mergers which took place between 1948 and 1950, 
expansion in marketing of refined products was Blazer's primary 
objective. The fact that each of the companies owned a refinery 
at the time was of minor importance. The addition of these 
refineries, however, resulted in a fundamental change in Ash-
land's refining operations during the 1950's. 
THE MERGER WITH ALLIED OIL COMPANY 
The most spectacular of the mergers involved the agreement 
with the owners of Allied Oil Company of Cleveland, Ohio. 
Blazer had been in close contact with the owners and manage-
ment of Allied from the beginning of both companies. After 
Allied had started operations from Cleveland as a fuel oil 
marketer in 1925, it secured some of its first fuel oil from Ash-
land's Leach refinery. Blazer kept in touch with Allied's owners, 
W. W. Vandeveer and F. R. Newman, by continued business 
and social contacts. This friendship was responsible for Allied's 
hiring Paul Blazer's nephew, Rexford S. Blazer, upon his gradua-
tion from college in 1928. Rex subsequently rose to the position 
of vice president and sales manager with Allied. 
The first written indication that there was serious thought 
of a merger was in March, 1937. At that time one of Allied's 
owners was interested in a consolidation in order to expand the 
operations and to enable him to take some money out of the 
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business, but the other owner was cool to the idea and indicated 
that he was too busy at the time to discuss the consolidation. 
Talks were renewed from time to time at petroleum meetings, 
but they did not become serious again until around 1944. Formal 
negotiations began in July, 1946. Allied was mainly a heavy 
fuel oil marketer; Ashland Oil was chiefly a refiner which pro-
duced heavy fuel oil. After 1940 Ashland Oil had been expand-
ing its market territory to the upper part of the Ohio River, 
using towboats and barges as the basic means of transportation. 
A merger with Allied fitted in with Ashland's river system of 
transportation and connected with a market area served by the 
lake tanker fleet owned by Allied. In general the two companies 
seemed to be complementary. 
Allied Oil Company had been organized on June 6, 1925, by 
Vandeveer and Newman. A temporary majority ownership was 
held by M. Bond, who supplied the additional necessary funds 
to start operations. The primary objective of the company was 
the buying and selling of industrial fuel oil in tank car lots. Its 
rapid rate of growth was chiefly the result of its specialization 
in the unique problems of supplying industrial firms with a 
commodity normally considered a byproduct by large integrated 
oil companies. 
Promotion of this specialty business resulted in a type of 
contract which offered security of supply to the purchaser while 
making it possible for him to buy at as low a cost as the spot 
market would offer. Allied also developed efficient means of 
transporting and handling heavy industrial oil. It kept the 
highly viscous residual oil heated through much of its transporta-
tion to avoid the necessity of reheating at exchange points. The 
low value of this oil, its high viscosity, and the "dirty" char-
acteristic of the equipment used for its transportation made it 
desirable to use water transportation and specialized handling 
equipment at terminals. Since residual oil could not be trans-
ported by pipeline, river and lake boats were the logical means. 
After purchase of its first lake tanker and construction of a 
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terminal at Cleveland in 1929, Allied increased its lake tanker 
fleet to six ships, with an aggregate capacity of 200,000 barrels. 
Demand for transportation services from other companies en-
couraged expansion into light petroleum products. By the time 
of the Ashland Oil merger, 90 percent of the oil carried was by 
contract for the account of other oil firms. 
Allied used the Ohio River for barge movements. At the time 
of the merger, it marketed fuel oil in Ohio, Indiana, Illinois, 
Wisconsin, western Pennsylvania, western New York, and West 
Virginia. 
In addition to its industrial fuel oil and transportation busi-
ness, Allied marketed domestic fuel oil in Cleveland and Akron. 
To avoid a credit loss, the company entered the refining branch 
through purchase of a refinery at Canton. This plant, built in 
1930 with a capacity of 1,800 barrels per day, operated until 
1933 but remained closed for three years thereafter. Then it was 
leased for a year until the lessor failed; Allied was the primary 
creditor. Subsequently, Allied leased the refinery in December, 
1937, and purchased it in April, 1940. Operations became very 
profitable as a result of the newly discovered wells in Illinois. By 
the time of the merger, the refinery had increased its crude oil 
capacity to 10,000 barrels per day and its thermal cracking 
capacity to 2,000 barrels. 
Soon after beginning operations, Allied expanded its activities 
by purchasing crude oil from independent producers through 
Central Pipe Line Company, which gathered oil in the Illinois 
fields. At the time of the merger, Allied operated 170 miles of 
gathering lines. 
As a means of supplying crude oil to its refinery, Allied ex-
tended its operations into the producing branch. Net produc-
tion in 1947 was 567,191 barrels as compared with Ashland's 
1,703,466 barrels; gross production was 1,131,274 barrels for 
Allied and 2,836,930 barrels for Ashland Oil. 
Prior to the merger in August, 1948, Allied and Ashland Oil 
had developed two joint operations. In 1947 both companies 
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had participated in the organization of American Independent 
Oil Company, each owning more than 6 percent of the common 
stock. A second joint venture was Allied-Ashland Tankers, Inc., 
which owned two oceangoing tankers with total cargo capacity 
of 262,000 barrels of crude oil. 
Several previous studies have pointed out a number of factors 
making merger desirable for Allied. Also, Vandeveer of Allied 
published his interpretation of the reasons for the merger. These 
publications emphasized the uncertainty of the financial status 
of the company in the event of the death of one owner. Since 
both owners of Allied had most of their wealth invested in the 
oil company, a serious problem of liquidity would have developed 
in the payment of a large inheritance tax. Because the stock of 
the firm was not listed on an organized exchange, there would 
have been a question as to the valuation which would be placed 
on the assets. Vandeveer summarized this viewpoint in a 
privately printed pamphlet: 
There was no monopolistic grabbing of our facilities. We had done 
pretty well in competition with the largest oil companies in our 
marketing area and, given freedom, I have no fears for little business 
men in competition with their big competitors. No competitor 
bought us out to rid themselves of a troublesome rival. There was 
no threat of reprisal by any business man or corporation if we didn't 
sell. . . . The economic pressure-the economic necessity-was of 
government origin .... We would still be in business except for the 
unrealistic tax laws that forced us to sell our company.2 
Butters, Lintner, and Cary concurred in this opinion: "In the 
absence of tax motivation to sell, the Allied owners clearly 
would have retained the ownership of their business beyond 
1948. Quite apart from tax motivations, however, they might 
have decided to sell within the next decade or so, when they 
would have faced the necessity of retiring."3 
2 W. W. Vandeveer, Mergeritis (n.p., n.d.). 
3 J. Keith Butters, John Lintner, and William L. Cary, Effects of Taxation on 
Corporate Mergers (Boston, Harvard University Graduate School of Business 
Administration, 1951), 45. 
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Undoubtedly taxes were important in the decision of the 
owners of Allied to merge. But to find all of the fundamental 
reasons, one must look still further. One owner had been in 
favor of a merger with Ashland Oil in 1937, before the in-
heritance tax was so important. Furthermore, by 1948 large 
sums of money were required to modernize the Canton refinery. 
Allied had always had a serious problem of raising sufficient funds 
to continue its rapid expansion. After 193 3 its current ratio was 
often less than two to one. It is not surprising, therefore, that 
an offer of $11,500,000 would be accepted by Allied's owners 
for an equity stated on Allied's books at $9,873,593. Additional 
advantages from association with a larger and more secure opera-
tion, potential appreciation from Ashland's stock, and diversifica-
tion of holdings were reinforcing reasons to merge. 
Once the Allied owners had decided to merge, there were 
many reasons why Ashland Oil should be a logical purchaser: 
the two managements had been in close contact since their 
organization; few larger companies were interested in Allied's 
type of business, while Allied's territory complemented Ashland's 
operations; the government's attitude from the standpoint of 
antitrust policy would be more favorable to a merger of Allied 
with a small concern such as Ashland Oil than with a larger 
company; and Ashland Oil was not so large that the Allied 
organization would be "lost" -the owners of Allied wanted to 
keep their organization intact. 
The comparison of the development of Allied and Ashland Oil 
over the same period of years in an overlapping marketing ter-
ritory yields several interesting differences between the com-
panies. Allied was continually in "tight" financial condition in 
spite of large earnings; Ashland Oil placed an emphasis upon 
maintaining large working capital in order to add financial flexi-
bility to its operations and expansions. Allied remained a com-
pletely closed corporation; Ashland Oil was publicly owned from 
its beginning and continued to seek additional funds from the 
capital markets, often even when it did not need them. Allied 
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RELATIVE FINANCIAL STATUS AT TIME OF MERGER, 
AsHLAND OIL & REFINING CoMPANY AND ALLIED OIL CoMPANY 
ASHLAND ALLIED 
47°/o 53°/o 
ASSETS 
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Source: Prospectus of Ashland Oil & Refining Company, August, 1948. Net 
income and sales are based on a pro forma statement for six months prior to 
March 31, 1948. 
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specialized in marketing; Ashland Oil specialized in refining. 
Allied based its sales program upon continuous relations with 
its customers by long-term contracts which might not yield a 
maximum return in the short run; Ashland Oil based its sales 
program upon developing market flexibility so that it might 
shift from one type of customer to another as conditions made it 
possible to increase profits from sales of the moment. Allied 
had used extreme departmentation in its later years; Ashland Oil 
had always emphasized the integrated character of its operations 
to such a degree that it was difficult to distinguish between 
branches. Allied's management had used a technique of staff 
meetings to gain coordination; Ashland Oil had used a bilateral 
method. 
The merger of Allied was somewhat different from later 
mergers involving Ashland Oil. Allied was a successful company 
with large past profits, with high expectations for the future, and 
with no pressing operational reason for merging at the particular 
time (a period of prosperity in the oil industry). Moreover, 
Allied's size approached that of Ashland Oil, as Exhibit 15 
illustrates. 
The Allied-Ashland Oil merger on August 9, 1948, resulted 
in an expanded organization which was much larger than before. 
By this merger Ashland Oil suddenly faced problems of a large 
firm, thus requiring a change in its managerial techniques. The 
merger provided a number of new executives who had not grown 
up in the management of Ashland Oil. It offered an exceptional 
challenge to Blazer's managerial philosophy. 
POSTWAR RECESSION IN REFINING 
Soon after the Allied-Ashland Oil merger, the petroleum indus-
try experienced a sudden change. In the fall of 1948 there was 
much uncertainty in the minds of executives of all companies 
as to whether the problems of the next six months would be 
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ones of oversupply or undersupply. For example, in September, 
1948, Phillips attempted to increase the posted price of crude 
by 35 cents per barrel. But the industry failed to follow the 
increase in price during the winter of 1948-1949, which turned 
out to be a relatively mild one. Companies found their inven-
tories were too high, and some firms ran into financial difficulty. 
During this sharp readjustment in the oil industry, Blazer 
considered numerous possible mergers. In his letter of January 
28, 1949, he explained to the board: 
Many of the smaller refineries are curtailing their operations because 
of reduced margins of profit and some of them are shutting down. 
As you know, numerous companies are attempting to sell to us or to 
merge. Prospects for most small refineries are not encouraging. . . . 
It is principally because of their shortages of cash that they are 
forced to make some kind of deal. ... It appears, however, that at 
least for the next few months our Catlettsburg refinery will not be 
seriously affected and earnings in some of the departments of the 
company may improve. 
The pressures on the Ashland Oil management during the 
fiscal year, October, 1948, to September, 1949, were exceedingly 
great. The entire industry was going through a sharp readjust-
ment period. In addition, the Allied organization was in the 
process of being taken into the Ashland Oil operation. Blazer 
gradually was redesigning operational and managerial techniques 
to accommodate the consolidation. The personnel of Allied Oil 
Company were approximately of the same age and experience 
as were those of Ashland Oil, but by degrees many of the key 
executives were absorbed by the home office at Ashland. Blazer 
observed at this time in a letter: 
I am working closely with Rex Blazer [Allied's new chief] in the 
operations of Allied and Captain [L. M.] Jonassen [chief of Allied's 
lake tanker fleet] is reporting to me on his tanker operations, 
although for all practical purposes, he and Rex are running their 
respective businesses. So far as their organization and their customers 
are concerned, we are taking no part in their operations. 
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In spite of these pressures, Blazer recognized that numerous 
opportunities were literally knocking at his door. Starting in 
January, 1949, much of the time of management was spent 
investigating companies which were interested in merging with 
Ashland Oil. It was at this time that serious study of Aetna Oil 
Company and Frontier Oil Refining Corporation was intensified. 
In addition, staff reports were made on at least three other com-
panies, although no mergers resulted. 
Probably the summer of 1949 provided challenges to Blazer's 
management techniques greater than any other time in the 
company's history. While other independent refineries were 
faced with critical situations, Ashland Oil continued to show 
large profits. The situation was summarized by Blazer in a letter 
to the board on June 29, 1949: 
Gasoline prices appear to be holding steady. Heavy fuel oil prices 
probably will not go much lower but there may be some further 
reduction in the prices of light fuel oils and other distillates. We 
now have practically no production of heavy fuel oil at our 
Catlettsburg refinery and relatively small yields of distillates. Thus, 
keeping in mind that we are coming into the asphalt season, our 
return on the products from a barrel of crude oil at our Catlettsburg 
refinery appears to be well stabilized. Our profit last month of 
approximately 33c per barrel would be considered by most refiners 
a good profit under normal conditions. Conditions in the refining 
branch of the industry, however, are far less favorable than normal 
and I am told that most companies are realizing little or no earnings 
from their current refinery operations .... Earnings to be reported 
for the third quarter of the fiscal year will be disappointing. I antici-
pate they will show less than 70c per share on the common stock, 
giving a profit for the nine months period ending June 30 of about 
$4.00 per share. Assuming there is no change in the price of crude 
oil, I believe we should earn during the fourth quarter close to $1.00 
per share, which would permit us to end our fiscal year with a net 
profit of about $8,750,000. If the price of crude oil should break, 
it might affect our current earnings, but over a period it would be 
advantageous to us. The relationship between crude oil prices and 
refined product prices is extremely unfavorable for refining; our 
refinery profits would be much lower except for our favorable trans-
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portation setup. Since the amount of oil we are now refining is 
about six times as great as our net crude oil production, we are at a 
disadvantage in this kind of a market when refined products, 
selling in a free market, have declined sharply, whereas crude oil 
prices have been maintained by means of proration. Except for the 
pressure of our crude oil supplies we could cut our refinery crude oil 
runs to less than 30,000 barrels per day and continue to make almost 
as much gasoline with a larger profit per barrel of oil refined. 
These profitable operations by Ashland Oil placed Blazer in 
an exceptionally strong bargaining position in discussions with 
other companies. The mergers following the one with Allied 
were therefore in a greatly different setting, even though they 
occurred within twenty months. 
THE MERGER WITH AETNA OIL COMPANY 
By the end of 1949, agreement was reached with the stockholders 
of Aetna Oil Company-45.53 percent of Aetna's stock was pur-
chased with cash and the remainder was exchanged for common 
and preferred stock of Ashland Oil. Again the chief strength 
of the merged company was marketing; Aetna controlled a well-
accepted brand of gasoline in Louisville and the adjoining areas. 
A notice to the stockholders of the annual meeting of January 
16, 1950, explained the valuable assets of Aetna: 
Aetna has specialized in the field of retail marketing of petroleum 
products under its own brand name. Its principal retail marketing 
territory embraces Central and Western Kentucky, Louisville, and 
Southern Indiana. 
Distribution is effected largely through 39 bulk stations, from 
which 220 company-owned or leased service stations, some 580 
dealers and approximately 2,000 consumer accounts are served. 
Where it does not have bulk plant representation in its territory, it 
has jobbers who purchase their requirements from Aetna and sell 
them in their markets under Aetna's brand name. Such jobbers, 
numbering 15 at the present time, serve 75 owned or leased service 
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stations, 200 dealers and some 500 consumer accounts. Its direct 
and jobber distribution under its own brand name normally accounts 
for around 75% of its refinery gasoline output. 
Using funds supplied by Commodore E. C. Benedict, James 
Duffy had organized Aetna Refining Company in 1917 and had 
built a refinery in Louisville. After Benedict's death, the com-
pany went into bankruptcy in July, 1921. Administrators of the 
Benedict estate purchased the company for the book value of 
the bonds and preferred stock and recapitalized it in the name 
of Louisa Company. In 1927 the name was changed to Aetna 
Oil Service, Inc. 
As a result of a critical financial condition in January, 1932, 
the administrators of the Benedict estate gave operating control 
to Walter Abbott, a geologist, and Walton T. Davis, a chemical 
engineer. Abbott had first joined the company in 192 3; Davis, 
in 1924. In 1936, by borrowing heavily, these two men bought 
controlling interest in the company. Throughout the decade of 
the 1930's Abbott and Davis carried the full weight of top and 
middle management. By 1939, after Davis had fallen ill because 
of overwork, the owners expanded the management group by 
adding three vice presidents: C. M. Alexander supervised refining 
and transportation; A. J. Brewer became the accountant; and 
J. B. Hutchinson directed sales activities. Abbott devoted most 
of his time to crude oil exploration and production in western 
Kentucky and Illinois, since the newly discovered Illinois fields 
offered an area in which the company could integrate into pro-
duction. In May of 1941, Abbott died and Davis assumed the 
presidency of the company. By this time the refinery had a 
capacity of 8,000 barrels per day and Aetna's marketing territory 
had expanded to Cincinnati. 
Soon after becoming president of the company, Davis volun-
teered for the armed forces. As a result, the operating manage-
ment of the company during the wartime period was left to a 
committee of the three vice presidents. After the war, Davis 
returned to operating control and directed the company through 
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the profitable period of 1947-1948. On June 26, 1948, however, 
the refinery suffered a serious fire which curtailed operations. 
The drop in prices of some of the fractions of crude oil in 1949 
caused extra problems. Net income dropped from $661,903 in 
1948 to $172,000 for the first eleven months of 1949. 
Several factors made a merger with Aetna attractive to Blazer. 
Aetna's operations were complementary with those of Ashland 
Oil. Its refinery was accessible to Ashland's barge system, so 
that high-octane blending stocks could be transported from the 
Leach refinery to supplement the quality of Aetna's gasoline. 
Further, Ashland Oil could increase its intensity of integration 
forward by Aetna's company-owned sales outlets; few accounts 
overlapped. 
Equally good reasons for merger existed for the owners of 
Aetna. Staggering capital outlays on the refinery were needed, 
and the problem of funding a new pension plan for employees 
would involve further large expenditures. The chief owner, 
Davis, had been under continued strain; his personal wishes 
were to lighten his load. As in the other mergers, tax was a 
factor. Net production of crude oil had never been over 15 
percent of refinery runs; in the shortage after World War II, 
the pressure to secure sufficient crude oil was great. Other short-
run problems were added by the serious refinery fire in 1948. 
Finally, the administrator of Abbott's estate had negotiated to 
sell the beneficiaries' interest to Ashland Oil; Davis faced the 
possibility that his 42 percent ownership would be a minority 
interest and he recognized that his position could be made more 
difficult in the event that his ideas differed from the strong 
management of the Ashland Oil organization. 
THE MERGER WITH FREEDOM-VALVOLINE OIL COMPANY 
At the time of the Aetna negotiations, another opportunity 
developed suddenly and was consummated within a period of a 
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month. Freedom-Valvoline Oil Company was merged under 
the same financial arrangements developed for Aetna. It had 
been in the owners' minds for a period of years, but the fact that 
financing could be expedited if action were taken at the time 
of the Aetna merger encouraged all parties to negotiate without 
delay. 
Final decisions relating to the Freedom-Valvoline merger were 
rapid. After contacting the owners by telephone on a Thursday 
afternoon in November, 1949, Blazer, accompanied by his con-
troller, visited Pittsburgh on the next Saturday. The parties 
reached agreement on the following Tuesday. Total actual time 
of negotiations was not more than five days. 
Freedom-Valvoline had had a long and colorful history. 
Studies sponsored by Ethyl Corporation have compiled many 
of the facts. The roots of Valvoline were in Continuous Oil 
Refining Company, an organization formed by Dr. John Ellis 
in 1866. Two years later the company's oil, recommended by 
George Corliss, the maker of the Corliss steam engine, was 
called "Valvoline." The trademark "Valvoline" was obtained 
in 1873, and in 1902 the company took the name of its nationally 
famous product. 
The son of John Ellis remained active in the management 
of the company until 1930, at which time E. W. Edwards, a 
steel executive of Cincinnati, purchased control. A year later, 
Valvoline Oil Company purchased Galena Oil Corporation of 
Franklin, Pennsylvania, which had previously bought Signal Oil 
Company. 
Freedom Oil Works Company in its own right had a history 
dating back to 1879, at which time a refinery was built. In 1889 
J. W. Craig and A. J. Minke organized the company and par-
ticipated in its management until 1912. Craig's nephew, Percy 
L. Craig, continued in active management until his death in 
1929, when his son, Earle M. Craig, who was one of the owners 
at the time of the Ashland Oil merger, assumed managerial 
control. In 19 38 part of the marketing facilities of the company 
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were sold to Socony-Vacuum Oil Company. William G. Bech-
man bought part ownership in the company on January 1, 1939, 
and the name was changed to Freedom Oil Company. In June, 
1944, Freedom Oil Company purchased Valvoline Oil Company 
and late in 1945 formed Freedom-Valvoline Oil Company. 
At the time of the merger, Earle Craig and W. G. Bechman 
were the principal owners of the firm; Craig owned majority 
interest and was the chief executive officer. The company manu-
factured lubricating oils from Pennsylvania-grade crude gathered 
through a 1,400-mile pipeline system in western Pennsylvania, 
West Virginia, and southern Ohio, and through common carrier 
pipelines which terminated at the refinery on the Ohio River at 
Freedom, Pennsylvania. This refinery had a small thermal crack-
ing unit, a vacuum unit, and a crude oil capacity of 4,000 barrels 
per day. Although operated principally for the manufacture of 
lubricating oils, it also produced a low-quality gasoline. 
Until the time of this merger, Ashland Oil & Refining Com-
pany had specialized in a regional marketing area with 110 product 
being distributed nationally. Nor did it have a lubricating oil 
of its own manufacture. The importance of the merger to Ash-
land Oil was that it achieved a nationally advertised lubricating 
oil in the transaction. Facilities located on the Ohio River 
fitted in with servicing by the Ashland Oil barge system. The 
high-octane gasoline from the Leach refinery could be shipped 
economically for blending with the low-quality gasoline produced 
at Freedom. 
Both owners of Freedom-Valvoline had entertained the idea 
of merging with another company; they had discussed it with 
several smaller companies but had taken no action. They had 
several reasons for their interest in merger with Ashland Oil. 
The stock of Freedom-Valvoline was not easily marketable, but 
Ashland's shares were listed on an organized exchange with a 
relatively broad market, a fact which would permit Craig and 
Bechman to diversify their investments, as they desired. The 
effect of high inheritance taxes contributed to the final decision. 
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Craig made a statement for the press at the time of the merger 
explaining: 
Higher and higher inheritance taxes, as well as income taxes, has 
meant that a business, developed by an individual or a small group 
of individuals, cannot be passed on to a second generation. 
It becomes necessary, in instances, during the lives of the prin-
cipals who have developed the business to merge it with some larger 
company for whose securities there is a ready market. . . . Our 
representatives in Congress advocate help for small business itself, 
but they fail to realize that the tremendous taxes hurt small business 
more than big-and cause bigness. 
The declining production of the Pennsylvania oilfields caused 
the cost of gathering crude oil to be very high. In addition, the 
development of good lubricating oils manufactured from other 
than Pennsylvania-grade was seriously affecting the profitability 
of the Pennsylvania refiners. Failure to obtain sufficient oil 
loomed as a long-run problem, and the owners felt that such a 
risk could better be assumed by a larger operator. 
The agreements finally reached enabled both former owners 
of Freedom-Valvoline to satisfy their desires to remain interested 
in the oil business but to shift responsibility to another's shoul-
ders. Bechman became a member of the board of directors of 
Ashland Oil. Although Craig did not become a member of the 
board, he remained an important adviser to the newly formed 
division of Ashland Oil. The informal structure of Ashland's 
organization permitted action to be taken in individual cases to 
fit the unique desires of each former owner. 
THE MERGER WITH FRONTIER OIL REFINING CORPORATION 
Even before the mergers with Aetna and Freedom-Valvoline 
were completed, Blazer was negotiating with still another com-
pany. This time it was Frontier Oil Refining Corporation in 
Buffalo, New York. Again the company was a closed corporation 
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owned by two men, who had organized and managed it from 
its beginning to the date of the merger. 
James F. Breuil and W. H. Bennett became acquainted 
through competitive relationships in the same sales territory 
while representing different major oil companies. When it 
became possible to purchase bulk facilities at Buffalo, the two 
salesmen organized Frontier Oil Works, Inc., on October 29, 
1929. The company made little profit, and in 1933 the owners 
sold the physical assets to the Texas Company. Immediately, 
however, the two men purchased land in nearby Tonawanda, 
with cash from the sale and constructed new facilities at this 
location, which they still occupied on the date of the Ashland 
Oil merger. 
The firm entered the domestic fuel oil business and through 
aggressive actions established the name "Frontier." Develop-
ment of a burner division for domestic fuel oil was important 
in the growth of the firm, as service performed by the company 
on oil burners increased sales for domestic heating. The goodwill 
developed through this operation firmly established the company 
in the oil business in the minds of consumers of western New 
York. 
Later the company entered industrial fuel oil marketing and 
in 1937 constructed a small crude oil distillation plant with a 
capacity of 2,000 barrels per day. Newly discovered crude oil in 
Michigan and Illinois provided a supply of raw material which 
could be handled economically on the Great Lakes. Soon after 
the entry into refining in 1938, the Frontier name, well known 
in the Buffalo area through the sale of fuel oil, became identified 
also with branded gasoline. 
Immediately preceding World War II, the company increased 
refining capacity to 4,500 barrels per day and installed a thermal 
reforming unit. A 22-mile pipeline was built from the refinery 
to a connection with the National Transit crude oil line. 
Drilling operations in Illinois enabled the company to integrate 
backward into production. 
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In 1945 the name was changed to Frontier Oil Refining 
Corporation, and two years later the refining capacity was in-
creased to 8,000 barrels per day. In 1949 the company was 
divided into two corporations: one a producing company under 
the name of Breuil Petroleum Company, and the other under 
the name of Frontier Oil Refining Corporation. The former 
company was not involved in the merger with Ashland Oil. 
The thought of possible merger arose as a result of similar 
conditions which had prevailed in the cases of Aetna and 
Freedom-Valvoline: there had been pressure on the refining 
business in 1949; need for capital expenditures was clear; the 
Frontier owners saw a good opportunity to expand but did not 
see how a closed corporation could raise sufficient funds. More-
over, one of the owners had been in poor health and desired to 
lighten his responsibilities. 
The managements had known each other for many years. 
At the time of the Allied-Ashland Oil merger the thought of a 
possible consolidation first developed. In preliminary meetings 
in 1949 the desirability of a merger was recognized. Blazer visited 
Buffalo in January, 1949, and looked over the refinery. At this 
stage the bargaining ranged between $3,000,000 and $4,500,000. 
The actual transaction was at a figure even lower than the 
original offering price. 
In informal discussions a proposal of a statutory merger was 
the most attractive. The tax advantage of the stock transfer, the 
minimum amount of cash needed by Ashland Oil in the pur-
chase, and the ability of the owners to sell a portion of the 
Ashland Oil stock made such a consolidation desirable for all 
parties concerned. 
From Ashland's viewpoint, the location of Frontier's refinery 
on the Great Lakes fitted the transportation facilities acquired 
with the Allied merger. Allied tankers could move fuel oil into 
the Buffalo area on a favorable basis. Ashland's marketing ter-
ritory would continue to be contiguous, still relatively compact, 
and on the "economic ridge." 
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Refining and marketing operations were acquired with no 
increase in net production of crude oil, for although the crude 
oil properties of Frontier were owned by the same parties, 
they were held by a different corporation not included in the 
merger. 
ACQUISITION OF OTHER PROPERTIES 
The Frontier merger-the last of the four major consolidations-
became effective on April 1, 1950, but the expansion of Ashland 
Oil did not stop. The next acquisition was explained in the 
annual report for 1950: 
In April of 1950, your Company bought a substantial inventory of 
petroleum products owned by the operator of the old National 
Refining Company plant at Findlay, Ohio, on a basis which per-
mitted this plant to be acquired at a nominal cost. This plant with 
a rated capacity of approximately 10,000 barrels of crude oil per day 
and facilities for manufacturing and packaging automotive and in-
dustrial lubricants, asphalts, and other products, had been shut down 
prior to the time it was acquired. After some alterations, it was 
reopened on a profitable basis .... In addition to the refinery, the 
sales organization and the brands of the old National Refining Com-
pany were acquired with this purchase, including well-known "White 
Rose" gasoline and "Enarco" motor oils and lubricants. 
This purchase is another case in which Blazer was able to 
purchase a large amount of obsolete equipment along with 
valuable goodwill and business connections at practically no cost 
to the company. National had been declining for twenty years, 
and the refinery had lost money. 
National Refining Company dated back to the nineteenth 
century. It had been one of the leading independents that had 
pressed the fight against the original Standard Oil interests. 
The company had operated refineries at Cleveland, Marietta, 
and Findlay, Ohio, and Coffeyville, Kansas. Early in the present 
century it had acquired a Canadian interest that became very 
valuable and was ultimately sold in 1936. 
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In the 1930's the company began to deteriorate. An outside 
group finally gained control, ousted the president, and offered 
the position to Blazer. Upon Blazer's refusal, Paul Ryan became 
president and attempted to build the company through an 
aggressive promotional campaign. Ryan, after a serious airplane 
crash, resigned, and the period that followed became known in 
the company as "the march of the presidents." On one day the 
company had three. One of these executives began to liquidate 
the various assets. 
In 1946 Midwest Refineries bought the wholesale portion of 
the business and the brand names. The refinery and related 
departments were rented. Later, after the refinery suffered a 
serious fire, the company began to fail to cover operating 
expenses and closed down. 
The condition of the company in 1950 was explained by 
Blazer to the board in a letter: 
National has large inventories carried on their books at approximately 
$600,000 under current market values. We are to take over the 
inventories at the prices carried on their books and are to pay 
$600,000 for the refinery. Theoretically, we will make enough off of 
the inventories to get the refinery and goodwill for our efforts .... 
We got into this situation through the fact that we have been 
supplying their crude oil requirements. Their contract had a few 
months to run, but they came to us recently asking for a cancellation 
advising that they were losing so much in the refinery that they 
would have to close down .... Although we have said that we attach 
no importance to the refinery, except for its value as scrap, I suspect 
that occasionally there might be a market on which we could 
operate profitably. 
During the next four years the refinery actually remained 
on stream, except for maintenance, and operated profitably. 
After the insecurity of ten years and with the assurance of con-
tinued operations, the National organization was able to increase 
its business by 300 percent. Its standing in the industrial and 
railroad lubrication field remained high. The location at Findlay 
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took on added advantages after Blazer was able to obtain space 
in several pipelines linking the refinery to Detroit. The primary 
reason that Findlay did not remain one of Ashland's most 
important refineries was due to its nearness to the Canton plant. 
A second small refinery was purchased late in 1950. This was 
another plant which was obsolete and unwanted by other com~ 
panies. In fact, word of the possibility of purchase came from 
an executive of a competitor who could not interest his manage~ 
ment in its purchase. This refinery was located at St. Elmo, 
Illinois, near the Illinois oilfields. Its chief attractive character~ 
istic was its storage facilities, which would be valuable even if 
the refinery were closed. It was close enough to St. Louis to 
provide terminal facilities in that area. After the acquisition 
Ashland Oil kept the small refinery in operating condition for 
several years and ran it intermittently whenever the market for 
its products appeared to be favorable. It was dismantled in 
19 53, but continued to be used for products distribution. 
Blazer's negotiations for new properties came to an unforeseen 
end in 19 50. Just after he had completed the last of the trans~ 
actions mentioned above, he suffered a very serious heart attack 
while in California. He remained inactive for more than six 
months, although he resumed his letters to the board after four 
months. During this period the major department heads began 
to write lengthy letters to the board to substitute for the letters 
from the chairman. After Blazer began again to write his 
letters, he continued to enclose the letters from the major heads. 
THE EFFECT OF THE MERGERS 
All of the major acquisitions in less than two years formed a 
pattern with common characteristics. Each was interesting to 
Ashland Oil because of its marketing strength. Each brought 
an additional refinery into the Ashland Oil system as a by~ 
product. Each was owned primarily by two parties who had a 
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major investment in the venture. All were affected by tax con-
siderations. All had operations complementary to Ashland's. 
All owners had had numerous contacts with Blazer over a long 
period of time through sales operations and industry meetings. 
Three of the four companies were of approximately the same 
age. None had any securities listed on an organized exchange. 
In each merger the tax-free stock exchange of securities was the 
mechanism through which the previous owners relinquished 
control and obtained stock interest in Ashland Oil. In each case 
the company's status in national financial circles made it possible 
for the former owners to obtain cash through marketability of 
Ashland Oil stock even though little cash was involved in the 
immediate merger transaction. 
Blazer in his annual report to stockholders in 1950 summarized 
the place of these additions in the Ashland Oil system: 
All of the foregoing additions to the properties of your Company 
are directly related to serving a compact and concentrated industrial 
and domestic market for petroleum products bounded by the Ap-
palachian Mountains on the east, the Great Lakes on the north, the 
Mississippi River on the west and Central Tennessee on the south. 
A network of common carrier pipe lines and the company's own 
lake tankers and river transportation equipment tie these refining 
and marketing properties together to provide the flexibility necessary 
to meet constantly shifting demands for different kinds, quantities, 
and qualities of petroleum products. 
In a sense, Blazer was opportunistic in his acquisitions during 
this two-year period of rapid growth through mergers. Yet the 
common characteristics did form a pattern. Furthermore, the 
marketing differences among these companies made them fit 
together in a complementary manner: Allied had an organization 
for heavy fuel oil; Frontier specialized in domestic fuel oils; 
Freedom-Valvoline and National brought a strong organization 
in lubricating oils; and Aetna provided additional channels for 
gasoline. 
The rapid growth presented a great challenge to the Ashland 
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Oil management. Blazer in his speech to the Newcomen Society 
in 1956 looked back and made the following observation con-
cerning the problems to management. 
Mergers must not result in stepchildren . . . mergers frequently 
require the reconciling of different philosophies of business. Planning 
and patience are necessary in order to avoid inequities to individuals 
and to protect personal pride. It is not easy to bring two groups of 
people, who have been trained differently, into a smoothly function-
ing team under a consolidated leadership. The acceptance of a 
certain amount of entrenched inefficiency may be necessary; likewise 
new talent must be recognized and rewarded. A period of months 
may be required in which to relocate people into positions where 
their abilities may be better utilized and their shortcomings mini-
mized. 
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PIPELINES AND TOWBOATS 
The Transportation of Oil and Its Products 
THE SERIES OF mergers in 1948-1950 not only quadrupled 
the value of Ashland's assets, but broadened its marketing 
territory from a circle extending roughly 200 miles from 
the city of Ashland to include all of the Ohio Valley and a 
substantial part of the Great Lakes area. This geographical 
expansion brought with it an increased problem in transporting 
crude oil and finished products. 
The Ohio River remained the key to Ashland's transportation 
system, and towboats with oil barges now extended their trips 
upstream to Freedom and downstream to the Mississippi, which 
they plied from Louisiana to Illinois. On the Great Lakes, 
Ashland Oil became the owner of two tanker fleets, which 
served to connect the new acquisitions at Toledo, Cleveland, 
and Buffalo. No convenient north-south waterway, however, 
existed to join the upper tier of plants with the lower. 
THE ECONOMICS OF OIL TRANSPORTATION 
In the United States the major production of crude oil is located 
at some distance from the regions of greatest consumption. 
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A company's location of refineries and marketing activities is 
dependent upon the means available to provide the refined 
products to an area. 
Transportation in the industry has two aspects: movement of 
crude oil from the fields to the refinery, and distribution of 
refined products from the refinery to the consumer. Both are 
affected by the nature of the product. Frankel stresses this 
unique nature: "The main consequence of the liquid state of 
petroleum is that it requires specialized equipment ... specially 
designed for a liquid and is thus no good for anything else. 
The consequences are (I) the oil industry has always had to 
consid~r transport as being a major problem to be solved within 
its own orbit . . . ( 2) it is a constituent factor which has con-
siderably influenced the structure of the industry. As a matter 
of fact, the development of oil economics can best be describe~ 
in terms of transport."1 
The principal methods of transportation include railroad tank 
cars, pipelines, ocean and lake tankers, barges, and tank trucks 
and wagons. Development of efficient pipelines and waterway 
carriers has made long hauls by railroad economically prohibitive 
as a primary means of transportation. In the early development 
of the industry the tank car was the basis for negotiations 
through the operation of a modified multiple-basing-point system 
(for example, Group Three, Gulf Coast); however, in the last 
twenty years the pipeline has been the primary overland reference 
method. 
The economics of pipeline operations has had a strong impact 
upon the managerial decisions of oil company executives. Prod-
ucts move through pipelines in one direction and require no 
returned empties; their viscosity must be low enough to permit 
easy flow; a large quantity must be available at a fixed location 
from which the product can be pumped to a fixed destination. 
The unit cost of operating the line is especially responsive to 
the size of the line and the percentage of capacity at which it 
1 Frankel, Essentials of Petroleum, 33-34. 
118 
PIPELINES AND TOWBOATS 
can operate. Most oil pipelines have been owned by oil com-
panies themselves, since for an independent firm the risk of 
supply and distribution has been great. The nature of the 
operation requires that transportation be very closely coordinated 
with producing, refining, and marketing. Because economical 
use of the line is a function of the number of barrels moved, 
the value of the pipeline decreases rapidly when the importance 
of oilfields declines or markets shift. The scrap value of the 
pipe usually approximates the cost of salvage and makes shifting 
of pipeline operations undesirable. 
Construction of pipelines requires great financial resources. 
As the scale of the line increases, the unit cost of additional 
capacity decreases. McLean and Haigh show that a 10-inch 
line will carry 45,000 barrels of oil per day at a rate of 37 cents 
per barrel for a 1,000-mile haul; a 30-inch line will carry 350,000 
barrels of oil per day for the 1,000-mile haul at a rate of 10 cents 
per barreJ.2 This economy of scale is a major obstacle to the 
private use of pipelines by smaller companies. 
In its early history Ashland Oil was not at a disadvantage as 
a result of these large-scale economies, primarily because it was 
filling a niche in a local and protected market near a crude oil 
supply. As the company expanded its marketing area, it began 
to experience competition from large operators which had im-
portant advantages. In such expansion it had five possible 
choices pertaining to transportation: to cooperate with others 
and to build and operate jointly a "large-inch" pipeline, to ex-
pand the total volume within a restricted market area in order 
to be able to operate efficiently a pipeline of its own, to find 
some other means of transportation that would enable it to 
enter a market on a competitive basis with oil transported by 
pipeline, to use common carrier pipelines, or to specialize in 
refined products not adaptable to mass transportation by pipe-
lines. 
Ashland's management used several of these possibilities, but 
2 McLean and Haigh, The Growth of Integrated Oil Companies, 186. 
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most important, the Ohio River gave the company the oppor-
tunity to operate a barge fleet. There have been many estimates 
as to the relative costs of the various means of transportation. 
The answer depends upon a number of factors; however, an 
example offered by McLean and Haigh will give a general picture 
of the condition in January, 1952: from the Gulf Coast to 
Bayway, New Jersey, by railroad-$2.83 per barrel; by pipeline-
$0.78 per barrel; by ocean tanker-$0.655.3 The pipeline and 
ocean tanker rates declined significantly during the 1950's. 
Modern barge transportation on the Ohio and Mississippi rivers 
would compare approximately with the costs by ocean tanker 
and pipeline. 
In a speech in 1949 Howard Marshall, president of Ashland 
Oil, emphasized the strategic importance of barge transportation 
to a small company such as his: 
Without the rivers, we see two great oil producing and refining areas 
-the Mid-Continent and the Gulf Coast, each widely separated 
from the big consuming markets of the East and Middle West. With 
no inland waterways as a competitive transportation factor, only rail-
roads and pipelines available, the rails cannot compete, so far as 
costs are concerned. But the building of a pipeline is a major 
financial undertaking and the line must be operated continuously 
at high volume in order to remain economical. Only the largest 
shippers can qualify, since only they command both the large 
capital resources and large volume required. 
As contrasted with this large expenditure, it is possible here in 
Cincinnati for an independent marketer of gasoline to buy gasoline 
at Baton Rouge, Louisiana, and have as little as a few barges a year 
delivered to him by commercial barge line-all at a transportation 
cost of approximately that of his largest competitor. 
Ashland's strategic use of barges after 1938 offered certain 
advantages over pipelines: the relatively high initial cost of pipe-
lines could be avoided through the use of barges and towboats; 
barges could be shifted from one oilfield to another, dependent 
3 McLean and Haigh, 184. 
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only on the course of the river, whereas the pipeline demanded 
a fixed flow for a long period of time-this flexibility allowed 
the company to purchase crude oil in those areas not serviced 
by pipelines and to sell small quantities in areas which might 
temporarily yield higher netbacks; and the motive force in barge 
operations was separate from the cargo-carrying space and made 
it possible to move both crude and finished products with the 
same equipment by merely shifting from "dirty" to "clean" 
barges and vice versa. 
Disadvantages of barge transportation tend to balance these 
advantages. As larger pipelines have entered the area, the cost 
advantage of the barges has become neutralized. Increased 
efficiency of barge transportation has depended upon govern-
mental action in the construction of high-level dams and larger 
locks on the inland waterways. The use of barge equipment 
has required a constant effort on the part of the company to 
eliminate lost time waiting at locks. The barge system has 
been adversely affected by weather factors. Ice on rivers has 
halted traffic; low rainfall has made the maintenance of channels 
difficult; too much rainfall has caused the flooding of terminals 
and made clearances under bridges impossible. Coordination 
of inventories and scheduling of shipments, even under the best 
conditions, present a major problem. 
It has been explained that the decision to locate the refinery at 
Leach, Kentucky, in 1924 was based upon its transportation 
advantage. This advantage resulted from the following char-
acteristics of the location (probably in order of their importance 
at that time) : the Cumberland pipeline, which operated as a 
common carrier, could deliver eastern Kentucky crude oil to the 
refinery at reasonable costs and in adequate quantity for the 
size of operations then considered; refined products could be 
shipped over two railroads; and the location on the Big Sandy 
River enabled the management to use a small barge to deliver 
refined products to customers in the immediate vicinity. 
Traffic functions were among the first service activities in the 
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Ashland Oil organization. In 1931, upon the death of the 
traffic manager, Stokely Rion, legal and claims aspects of his 
functions were separated from line supervision of company-
owned transportation facilities. This reorganization resulted 
primarily from Blazer's idea of tailoring responsibility to the 
capacities of available men. Such actions have had a lasting 
effect on the company's organization. In this instance, the 
transportation functions were never again centralized. Railroad 
traffic, river transportation, and pipelines thereafter were super-
vised by different superintendents, each of whom reported to the 
chief executive. 
EXPERIMENTATION WITH RIVER TOWBOATS AND BARGES 
Great Eastern Refining Company had used barge delivery on 
a limited scale from the Leach refinery. In his first year of 
operation of this plant, Blazer reported to Swiss the expansion 
of this means of transportation: 
Our river transportation has shown a profit of $6,158.13 and we 
expect to further strengthen this department as it offers an excellent 
opportunity for profit in addition to extending our sales market. 
Our predecessors had only six points for water delivery of gasoline 
and kerosene-Today, we have twenty-one points of delivery and at 
Ashland we serve seven different customers through one river 
storage tank. Twelve of our customers are unable to receive delivery 
except by water and are entirely dependent upon us for their supply. 
The river transportation equipment initially consisted of a 
small boat named the Colonel. It pushed one barge with five 
tanks mounted in the hull. Having low horsepower, it operated 
no farther on the Ohio River than Ironton, Ohio, and Hunt-
ington, West Virginia. The company added the Scout in 1926 
and the Ruth Ann in 1930. The latter boat made river opera-
tions possible as far as Cincinnati and Charleston, West Virginia. 
With greatly increased business in the Cincinnati area, Blazer 
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decided in 1935 to construct a more powerful towboat. Until 
that time a large percentage of the gasoline sold in the Ohio 
city had been supplied through exchanges with companies own-
ing refineries in that vicinity. Blazer explained to the board in 
October, 1935: 
It is largely a matter of having the tonnage to keep a large unit busy, 
but each time we perfect an arrangement for exchange of gasoline 
with some major oil company that operates in this territory, we are 
placed in a position to transport gasoline for their account from our 
refinery to their storage plants which very often in this area are 
located on the Ohio River and its tributaries. Also, the having of 
facilities for economical transportation from our refinery makes it 
easier for us to work out exchange arrangements. 
The last sentence represents reasoning that often appeared in 
Blazer's letters. The idea of maintaining bargaining power with 
other companies was always considered. 
In 1936 Ashland Oil completed the Senator Combs, the first 
towboat constructed specifically for its use. With its 300 horse-
power the Senator Combs was one of the finest towboats on the 
inland waterways. In 1938 it pushed its first cargo-type barges 
(in place of hulls with deck tanks) with 380,000 gallons capacity. 
The successful experiment with the Senator Combs prompted 
Blazer to look ahead to more rapid expansion in July, 1938, when 
he advised the board: 
When we bought our 300 horsepower boat about two years ago, we 
were counting on down-stream towing. Because we now have loads 
in both directions and almost three times as much tonnage as 
expected, we find we need a boat having 750-1000 horsepower. We 
have no plans for purchasing such a boat in the immediate future, 
but it is something that should receive consideration as soon as we 
have the money available. 
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Untill938 the Ohio River had served only as an auxiliary means 
of low-cost transportation and as a basis for possible future expan-
sion. With the success of the Senator Combs and the discovery 
in 1937 of new fields of crude oil in Illinois, the river took on a 
role of major importance in the operations of Ashland Oil. Until 
that time, most of the crude oil supply for the refinery had 
come through the pipeline from eastern Kentucky. Starting in 
1935, crude oil came from western Kentucky, but not in im-
portant quantities. In early 1939 the management looked to 
the Illinois basin for additional supplies. 
Blazer negotiated with Illinois Pipe Line Company for a 
system which carried crude oil from wells in western Kentucky 
to the river at Owensboro. In preliminary negotiations, the 
Standard Oil Company (Ohio) showed interest in a joint pur-
chase. Blazer decided to act independently when the Standard 
management did not make a decision promptly. He explained 
to the board the reason for this quick action: 
I had planned to make a proposal to the Standard Oil Company 
to combine the operations of their line with the one we are pur-
chasing, but I recognized that it would put us in a much better 
trading position to own the line and then negotiate with them than 
to have to negotiate with them in advance, since if we should fail 
to come to an agreement as to the value of the SOHIO line, they 
could leave us out entirely. Obviously, Illinois Pipe Line Company, 
a part of the original Standard Oil group, would give preference to 
Standard Oil Company (Ohio), as compared with us. 
In March, 1939, Owensboro-Ashland Company began to 
operate the newly purchased pipeline. Later, 50 percent of the 
stock of this company was acquired by the Standard Oil Com-
pany (Ohio), and their Fordville system was placed in the 
jointly owned company. Blazer indicated the relation of this 
purchase to the increase in river equipment: "The acquisition 
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of the Owensboro Pipe Line argues in favor of our reviving our 
interest in the early purchase of a larger towboat." 
Increased use of the Ohio River during 1939 made it advisable 
to purchase a number of new barges to replace those which had 
been chartered from other companies. The Senator Combs was 
proving a valuable asset, but by this time it was towing only 
approximately 40 percent of the total tonnage transported on 
the river by the company; the remainder was handled on a 
contract basis. 
Blazer's decision to place large sums into capital equipment 
for river transportation had a fundamental effect on future 
growth. Other companies were using the river at an increasing 
rate, but many were leasing rather than buying their equipment. 
Allied Oil Company and Aetna Oil Company had used the 
river, but neither had developed an integrated river transporta-
tion operation. 
Its success with the Senator Combs had convinced the Ash-
land Oil management that it could operate its own fleet, tailored 
to its needs, at a much lower cost than if the work were done 
by contract carriers at the average rates. In August, 1939, 
Blazer summarized the position of the company to the board 
of directors: 
Steadily over the past few years, we have been losing some of our 
geographical advantage. Pipe lines have come into our territory both 
from the East and from the West and the advantages of water trans-
portation are being used more extensively by the larger companies 
to get their products into this immediate area. At times I can look 
out of my office window and see barges moving down the Ohio to 
Cincinnati carrying gasoline which originated at refineries on the 
Atlantic Seaboard and also see barges moving up the river carrying 
gasoline from points on the :Mississippi River as far south as Baton 
Rouge, Louisiana. In fact, some gasoline from Gulf Coast points 
moves as far north as Pittsburgh. 
Of even more competitive significance is the increased number of 
exchanges of gasoline by major oil companies. Many companies 
which shipped into this territory from far distant refineries now 
receive their supplies from the Pure Oil Company plant at Charles-
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ton, West Virginia, or the Standard Oil at Latonia [Kentucky] or 
Gulf Refining Company in the Cincinnati district. 
We are continuing to show larger earnings on our investment than 
our larger competitors, but I am not sure that we can continue to do 
so. The time may not be far distant when we are down to a return 
of 5% instead of our earnings for recent years which averaged 
between 10% and 15%. As you probably know, most of the major 
oil companies, over the past few years, have earned between 3% and 
5% per year. I can perceive many competitive conditions which will 
tend to encroach further on the favorable situation which we have 
been able to enjoy for a number of years past. In fact, already we 
have been forced to give up some of the advantages on which we 
have capitalized, but usually we have found some other way to 
compensate for what we have lost; this past year it has been our 
increased volume of business. I do not feel that we can continue, 
indefinitely, to do that. On the other hand, I am not in the least 
discouraged concerning our prospects, as I see no reason why we 
should not be able to continue to do as well as our competitors. 
The first more powerful diesel towboat added to the fleet 
was the Jim Martin, in May, 1940. Three additional boats of 
still greater horsepower ( 1,600) went into operation in rapid 
order: the Ashland in May, 1941, the Paul Blazer in December, 
1941, and the Tri-State in Aprill942. Each of these three boats 
cost approximately $300,000, not including the necessary new 
barges. The decision to add the Tri-State was based upon possi-
ble future need rather than upon present requirements. Blazer 
commented to the board in 1941: 
Although I cannot see the definite need for such an investment, 
my judgment tells me that we should build still another towboat and 
barges to accompany same. We have a verbal option, good for 
another week, on another boat [Tri-State] at the same price as the one 
now under construction. . . . River equipment, such as we are 
buying, could be leased out today on a rental basis which would 
pay out in thirty months. 
Thus it will be seen that immediately preceding World War 
II, Ashland Oil increased its capital expenditures in transporta-
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tion. Exhibit 16 graphically shows Blazer's idea of quickly 
adjusting to new circumstances. During this period he made 
maximum use of his authority to decide issues on the spot that 
might easily have become entangled in channels of correspond-
ence and committee meetings in a more formally organized 
structure. 
Additional terminals were included in these expenditures on 
transportation. Terminals served important functions for a sys-
tem of the type that Ashland Oil operated. Uncertainty of 
arrival of boats because of bad weather or poor river conditions 
necessitated having terminals sufficiently large to handle reserve 
stocks of crude and products to maintain a continuous flow to 
the other operations. Poor coordination at this critical point 
would have caused serious problems for the entire company. 
Terminals also operated as a decentralized storage section of the 
refinery and served in lieu of bulk stations as a means of decreas-
ing the marketing costs of refined products. Further, they pro-
vided the link at which the means of transportation was changed. 
Delivery by river barge and tank truck required terminals at 
the point of transshipment. 
During the first six years, the company's only terminal was 
located at Leach. Later, Tri-State provided terminal facilities on 
the Ohio River even after the refinery was dismantled. In several 
other instances, purchases of refineries were made primarily in 
order to acquire favorably located terminals. 
In 1939 the operation of all river terminals was placed under 
the transportation department. Although the expanded use of 
such facilities constituted functions closely similar to refining 
and marketing functions, the coordination of this nerve center 
remained in transportation. Until a new functional department 
was organized in 1954, the transportation department coordi-
nated production planning and control for the entire company. 
The importance of the new investment in transportation was 
stressed by Blazer in a number of letters to the board of directors. 
A sample, written in 1940, follows: 
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I anticipate that this boat [Jim Martin] which represents less than 
4 per cent of our total investment, will account for approximately 
20 per cent of our company's operating profits for the coming year . 
. . . If we avoid being in the red, it will be only because our trans-
portation profits are large enough to offset our refining losses. 
In addition to these offensive steps through the construction 
of new towboats and barges, the Ashland management used 
defensive measures for its river equipment through its opposition 
to refined products pipelines. The federal government con-
sidered the construction of large-diameter crude and products 
lines running from the Texas coast to the eastern seaboard. 
During this period Blazer was a leader in opposing the route for 
these lines through the Ohio Valley, favoring, instead, the 
shorter route through Georgia and the Carolinas. The final 
decision of the Petroleum Administration was in favor of the 
northern route. 
Later during the war, the "Big Inch" and "Little Inch" pipe-
lines caused the Ashland management to consider their potential 
effects on the competitive picture after the war. In 1943 Blazer 
commented to the board: 
In addition to the 24 inch pipe line now being built from Texas to 
the East Coast which we consider a serious threat to the profitability 
of our postwar operation, it now appears that the same group will 
construct for the account of the Defense Plant Corporation a 20 inch 
line from the vicinity of Houston on the Gulf Coast to the Eastern 
Seaboard. There is considerable controversy between the major 
companies who are sponsoring the line as to whether it will parallel 
the first or come up through Tennessee, Kentucky, and West 
Virginia passing within five miles of our plant. ... The seriousness 
of this threat will be realized when it is explained that the new line 
will transport gasoline from Texas into this area at a cost of not 
exceeding 1,;4 cents a gallon whereas the present prevailing price at 
Texas refineries is approximately Biz cents a gallon lower than the 
price f.o.b. our refinery. It is easily conceivable that this pipe line 
built at government expense may completely destroy the refining 
industry in this general area after the war. Texas has large reserves of 
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crude oil which can be produced at lower cost than can be produced 
in any other area. I have no solution for the problem confronting 
us which you can be assured will be the most important factor 
determining our plans for the future. 
The importance of these actions in the transportation branch 
cannot be overemphasized. The river equipment available to 
Ashland Oil during the wartime period permitted the company 
to continue to obtain crude supplies at a time when other 
independent oil companies were operating at less than capacity 
for lack of sufficient crude oil. The acquisition of large towboats 
and barges provided critically needed transportation. It can be 
assumed that if the crude oil supply had not been clearly avail-
able, the government later would not have constructed its large 
high-octane plant at Leach; without the Leach "refinery No. 2," 
the later expansion by merger would have been less probable. 
EXTENSION OF TRANSPORTATION THROUGH MERGERS 
No new river towboats were added immediately after the war; 
however, the existing boats were supercharged and modified to 
carry much greater payloads. Additional terminals to strengthen 
the company's marketing position were the primary postwar 
transportation efforts. 
In April, 1948, Ashland Oil purchased controlling (one-third) 
interest in Southern Pipe Line Company at a cost of $150,000. 
Although this 200 miles of trunk pipeline which extended west 
through Pennsylvania from the eastern seaboard was not very 
useful to the company at the time, Blazer decided to buy it, he 
explained in a letter, because of the potential use of the line at 
some future date in the event that foreign crude became avail-
able at economical prices for use by the Ashland Oil refineries. 
In further preparation for the future, Ashland Oil purchased 
jointly with Allied Oil Company two oceangoing tankships to 
be operated by a separate corporation, Allied-Ashland Tankers, 
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Inc. This joint purchase took place during the middle stages of 
the merger negotiations between Allied and Ashland Oil. 
The merger with Allied expanded Ashland's transportation 
system significantly. Allied's subsidiary, Central Pipe Line Com-
pany, which operated 170 miles of gathering lines principally in 
Illinois, increased the security of Ashland's crude oil supply. 
Allied also owned two tanker fleets on the Great Lakes. Cleve-
land Tankers, Inc., had four ships, and Lakeland Tankers Ltd. 
(Toronto) two. These six tankers operated for Allied's account 
between company-owned products terminals at Cleveland and 
Erie and a crude oil terminal at Toledo, and between refineries 
and terminals of others. Allied had built a heavy fuel oil river 
terminal at Follansbee, West Virginia, and this, too, fitted into 
Ashland's existing river fleet. 
In the Aetna merger, Ashland Oil acquired 93 miles of 
gathering lines in the Illinois basin, 3 3 railroad tank cars, and 
a number of tank trucks. With the Freedom-Valvoline merger, 
the company secured 1,400 miles of pipelines for gathering Penn-
sylvania-grade crude oil. With the Frontier merger, it obtained 
a large fleet of tank trucks and a crude gathering system in the 
Illinois oilfields. 
In all of the mergers, Ashland's transportation system formed 
the flexible bond around which the other companies were 
developed into a well-balanced, unified operation. The trans-
portation system enabled the sales organization to expand the 
market territory to include most of the area shown in Exhibit 5. 
By July 31, 1951, Ashland's transportation system had grown 
to such an extent that the net investments in transportation 
facilities were greater than the net investments in any one of 
the other three branches. Net fixed assets, July 31, 19 51, as 
obtained from the prospectus of the company dated October 1, 
1951, showed 
Production ................................ $13,309,074 
Transportation ........................ 17,881,838 
Refining .................................... 11,848,938 
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Marketing ................................ 5,375,716 
Miscellaneous .......................... 3,179,680 
$51,595,246 
The company's total assets in transportation included all facili-
ties with the exception of Owensboro-Ashland Company, which 
appeared only as the net amount invested in the company. Any 
comparisons with larger companies as to the percentage of 
transportation assets owned would be misleading, since many 
pipeline companies are jointly and equally held by two oil com-
panies and are not consolidated on the books of either owner. 
PERIOD OF REEMPHASIS ON EXPLORATION AND DEVELOPMENT 
The Korean War in 19 50 changed the outlook for crude oil 
and again introduced the factor of the excess profits tax. Blazer 
decided once more to expand Ashland's exploration department 
and to make adjustments in its organization to meet the new 
situation. This time a new oilfield in west Texas appeared to 
promise a real opportunity for the company. The annual report 
of 1951 explained: 
Of primary importance in the further expansion of the company 
into the producing branch of the oil industry has been the acquisition 
of slightly less than one-half of the operating interest in leases 
covering some 19,400 semi-proven gross acres in the Spraberry area 
in West Texas. These large undeveloped holdings are believed to 
provide the Company, for the first time, a favorable opportunity to 
invest over a period of years, a substantial part of its gross profits in 
the development of crude oil reserves. 
This Spraberry project was a major effort on the part of 
Ashland Oil to integrate into production. It absorbed approxi-
mately $15,000,000 over the years 1951 and 1952. Difficulties 
in bringing the expected volume of oil to the surface, however, 
necessitated a writedown of assets by $8,500,000 at the end of 
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1952 and reduced retained earnings by which expansion could 
be maintained. This was the first of several factors which 
ushered in a period of retrenchment in 1953. 
Interest in the Spraberry area encouraged Blazer to take part in 
the construction of the Tex Harvey pipeline system to transport 
oil economically from the producing wells to common carrier 
lines. This pipeline, too, turned out to be a financial headache 
because of the rapid decline in production from Spraberry wells. 
The company extended its exploratory operations into the 
Denver basin and other areas in the West through cooperative 
efforts with producing partners. In November, 1951, Murphy 
Corporation of El Dorado, Arkansas, and Ashland Oil joined 
in the formation of an exploration company, Amurex Oil 
Development Company, which acquired extensive leases in 
western Canada and provided Ashland Oil with a new means 
of increasing its interest in producing properties. Ashland Oil 
held 40 percent of the class-B common stock with an option to 
convert to class-A stock in the event of important oil discoveries. 
In this way the company made use of the executive talent of a 
producing specialist, secured additional funds from the public, 
and continued to expand its exploratory operations. Amurex 
and American Independent represented the two early instances 
in which Ashland Oil looked to foreign oil in its expansion. 
Amurex failed to discover much oil, but American Independent 
was successful. 
During these years Blazer's policy was to purchase crude oil in 
excess of current requirements. Often Ashland's efficient barge 
system earned a good profit by moving crude oil from areas of 
large supply to areas in which the oil was more valuable. The 
ever-present threat of inability to secure a sufficient supply of 
crude oil made it desirable to maintain excess supplies. As a 
result, the company acted as a seller of crude oil on many 
occasions. 
By the end of 1952 the production department had built an 
organizational structure for a long-range exploration program. 
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Disappointments of major proportions, however, caused a change 
once again in the manner in which these plans were actually 
carried out. 
PERIOD OF DEEMPHASIS ON EXPLORATION AND DEVELOPMENT 
During January, 1953, reports of the recovery of crude oil in 
the Spraberry area caused a fundamental change in the actions 
of the management. The annual report of 1953 explained the 
1952 effort to place exploration on a long-run basis: 
Until recently, the company's crude oil producing operations had 
been conducted on a somewhat opportunist basis with particular 
regard for tax benefits. During 195 3 the company reorganized and 
strengthened its crude oil exploration and production department 
and gave greater emphasis to a long-range program. 
However, after this long-term program was set up, Blazer re-
ported to the directors in December, 1953: 
I am concerned about the continued losses in our producing depart-
ment. These more than offset the profits that are accruing currently 
as a result of improved showing in the Spraberry area and substantial 
water-flooding in Illinois. I am afraid that we can't afford to continue 
to subsidize our producing operations, since it appears that refinery 
profits are going to be smaller. I am sure that we are better organized 
in our producing department and that Roy Ralston [production 
manager] has better control of what is going on, but that doesn't 
help much if our production continues to decline in the face of 
increased expenditures. The current accumulation of wildcat acreage 
and geological data may pay off eventually, but we can't afford to 
carry our division offices that long at a loss. We may find we have 
to spend our money where we can obtain returns more quickly. 
Crude oil became so plentiful at this time that the Texas 
Railroad Commission placed additional restrictions on its pro-
duction. Ashland Oil had a crude supply sufficient for the short 
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run; in fact, the large supply had become a problem, as Blazer 
explained in a July, 1954, letter: 
We have a crude oil supply that is so large that it is burdensome. 
It is almost as difficult to cut off crude oil supply as to increase it 
when additional supplies are needed. We buy approximately 65,000 
barrels per day of oil direct from producers on lease division orders. 
Again the facts illustrate that flexibility in crude oil supply was 
hard to maintain, even if the company purchased its major 
portion and owned little net production. The structure of crude 
oil markets makes it very difficult to obtain a supplier again once 
the buyer had refused to purchase the oil. The reputation of the 
purchaser in the oilfields was most important when crude was 
scarce and when that purchaser was dependent for a large share 
of his supply upon independent operators. A company with 
small net production did not control the quantity of crude oil 
brought to the surface and thus could not prevent an over-
supply. Through greater control over production stages, the 
integrated firms probably possessed greater flexibility in the 
adjustment of crude oil supply to refinery needs than noninte-
grated firms. 
In spite of the large supply of crude oil above ground, Blazer 
experimented with water-flooding old wells in the eastern Ken-
tucky fields. This secondary recovery program continued to be 
one encouraging aspect of Ashland's production of crude oil. 
Its objective was to increase production in these fields over a 
long period of time to approximately 7,500 barrels per day, the 
capacity of its pipeline facilities in the area. 
Although new wells began to flow in Oklahoma, the western 
operations did not show profits. The company carried out a 
drilling program that had been planned previously, but gradually 
retrenched in these operations. In February, 1956, Blazer 
observed: 
I am gradually arriving at the conclusion that we are not equipped 
for profitable exploration, except east of the Mississippi River. 
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Apparently, we lack the advantages of small independent operators 
without having the organizational advantages and experienced per-
sonnel of the larger oil companies. 
In August he added: 
It is difficult to get across to our organization that, even though 
we are in a comparatively large company in refining and transporta-
tion, we are just a little company in production and we must engage 
in "poor boy" operations instead of taking on the ways of major oil 
companies. We have less trouble in that respect in the Illinois 
field, where most of the other operators are small independents. 
MODERNIZATION AND CONSOLIDATION OF REFINERIES 
After the rapid acquisition of old refineries, Blazer realized that 
large sums would be required to modernize equipment. Experi-
ence from the past operation, however, enabled the company to 
continue running these small obsolete refineries profitably for 
several years. 
In 1950 Ashland Oil owned only one catalytic cracking plant 
(at Leach). Blazer chose Canton (the former Allied refinery) as 
the first in his program of major capital improvements. By 1952 
the management had increased throughput of the Canton re-
finery to 30,000 barrels per day and had completed a fluid 
catalytic cracking unit. Later, another "cat cracker" was built 
at the Buffalo refinery and went on stream in 1953. 
Modernization was based upon the assumption that a refinery 
of approximately 25,000 barrels per day was the optimum size 
for Ashland Oil to operate.4 Moreover, successive improvements 
in one refinery at a time both suited the financial capacity of the 
company and permitted it to take advantage of technological 
4 McLean and Haigh, 585. "One study revealed that by following certain 
practices ... a small refiner could have built a modern 25,000 barrels per day 
refinery in 1953 and earned a percentage return on his investment approximately 
the same as a large company with different operating practices could have 
realized on a new 100,000 barrels per day plant." 
136 
PIPELINES AND TOWBOATS 
improvements of the moment. The recognition of the tre-
mendous impact of obsolescence in the industry remained im-
portant. McLean and Haigh emphasized this change when they 
observed: "The development of refinery processes has been 
highly dynamic, and the state of the refining art has been under-
going change at a seemingly ever-accelerating pace. It was a 
widely held view among 'refiners' in 1952 that it was impossible 
to build a completely modern refinery. Although all the latest 
developments might be embodied in the design of a new plant, 
the refinery would inevitably be obsolete in some respects before 
it was erected and on stream."5 
By 1954 the Catlettsburg catalytic cracking unit had become 
relatively obsolete and in need of capital expenditures. A new 
catalytic reformer was built to help the company maintain the 
pace of the "octane race." Blazer by this time felt that the 
optimum size of refineries had increased, as he wrote to the 
board in May, 1954: 
I believe that small or what heretofore have been considered medium 
size refineries are reaching the end of their economic life. Approxi-
mately the same number of men are required to operate a small 
processing unit as a large unit. . . . I presume the situation at 
National [Findlay, Ohio, refinery) is not unlike that of Tidewater 
Associated Oil Company at Bayonne where they are abandoning a 
complete refinery of comparatively large capacity because it is prefer-
able to build elsewhere and operate a completely new plant than 
attempt to modernize the present plant with the related manpower 
problems. 
This observation is of particular significance, for it expressed 
an opinion that the past techniques of employing small, old 
refineries would be inadvisable in the future. This fundamental 
change and the fact that the company had become a much 
larger operation demanded a number of alterations in managerial 
and operational techniques. In interviews in April, 1954, Blazer 
recognized that the situation faced by the company required 
modification of past methods. 
5 McLean and Haigh, 537. 
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The Spraberry disappointment started a period of consolida-
tion not only in exploration but also in refining. Weakened 
markets and the increased demand for higher octanes brought a 
reappraisal of all of the company's refineries and consideration 
of the possibilities of closing the less efficient plants. The small 
St. Elmo unit had been dismantled in 1953, and the Niles plant 
was placed on a standby basis for intermittent operations depend-
ing on the steel industry's market for residual fuel oil 
Blazer decided to discontinue operations at the older Leach 
refinery, known as No. 1. Most of the improvements that had 
been made at Leach had been applied to the modern govern-
ment-constructed plant. The fact that some of the oldest 
employees in length of service in the company were affected 
made the decision especially difficult for Blazer, who had 
nursed the equipment for thirty years. He explained to the 
employees that the refinery was inefficient in 1954 and that it 
had not been advisable to make additional investment in the 
plant because of labor difficulties which had developed. He 
alleged that in these years, newer employees had obtained control 
of union negotiations because of apparent apathy on the part of 
the older employees, who had always cooperated with the man-
agement. 
The management continued to study operations of other older 
refineries at Louisville and Findlay. Both had thermal cracking 
but no catalytic cracking facilities. Both had geographical ad-
vantages which permitted them to continue to operate on a 
marginal basis. Findlay was located on a products pipeline to 
Toledo and Detroit; however, the location was so close to the 
newer Canton plant that its area of distribution was limited. 
Louisville was on the Ohio River and in the middle of a good 
marketing area; however, an air pollution campaign by the city 
and the uncertainty of future competition from low-cost, large-
diameter pipelines discouraged any major capital expenditures. 
In October, 195 5, the Louisville refinery was closed down and 
used only as a river terminal. 
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The trend toward production of higher octane gasoline and 
the decrease in the rate of growth of demand for petroleum 
products directed Blazer's attention to decreasing unit refining 
costs in ways other than by increasing throughput. The major 
capital expansion during this period, therefore, was not to aug-
ment greatly the company's throughput but to improve facilities 
for producing higher octane gasoline and to effect economies. 
Refining continued to be the branch which received greatest 
emphasis by Blazer. The idea of maintaining flexibility in 
management and operations was especially valuable in this 
branch. The past success of the company was in no small part 
the result of its efficiency in refining and the adaptability of 
production to consumer demand for multiple products. 
JOINT CONSTRUCTION OF PIPELINES 
The five choices pertaining to transportation, listed earlier in this 
chapter, remained important to the management in the 1950's. 
Competitors were cooperating in the operation of pipelines. 
The construction of the Mid-Valley pipeline, which brought 
crude oil into Ashland's marketing area from the Texas fields, 
had seriously challenged Ashland's low-cost barge transportation. 
Ashland Oil participated with 5 percent interest in the El 
Rancho pipeline, a 24-inch line from west Texas to the Gulf 
Coast, as a means of delivering its expected increased production 
in Spraberry to its water transportation system. 
In 1953 Blazer felt that it was especially difficult for him to 
obtain cooperative undertakings with his competitors because 
of their dislike for Ashland's practice of selling to price marketers. 
Nevertheless, he continued to make efforts to arrive at agree-
ments beneficial to the Ashland Oil transportation system. Al-
though some companies might have desired to cooperate with 
Blazer, the geographical location of Ashland's refineries were 
such that he generally would have wanted the flow in products 
139 
BLAZER AND ASHLAND OIL 
pipelines to be in the opposite direction from that desired by 
the other companies. Ashland Oil had acquired small refineries 
located away from refining centers and close to markets not 
easily supplied from these refining centers. Possibly, other firms 
had not wanted the refineries acquired by Ashland Oil for the 
very reason that they were not at primary centers. The ad-
vantages these refineries had held for a small company were 
slowly becoming disadvantages for large-scale operations. 
By 1956 Ashland Oil had become more generally accepted in 
the petroleum industry as a large company. It had increased 
the capacity throughput of its three main refineries at Canton, 
Buffalo, and Catlettsburg to a total of 140,000 barrels per day. 
This quantity demanded that Ashland's management expand 
its system of crude oil transportation. Everett Wells, shortly 
after becoming president of Ashland Oil in 1957, explained to 
the New York Society of Security Analysts: 
Historically, our Company has been able to acquire, build and 
operate economically crude oil trunk and gathering syster.1s strategic-
ally located to enable us to deliver crude oil to our refineries at 
satisfactory costs. The extent of these pipelines can best be appre-
ciated when you realize that in total mileage of these lines we rank 
among the top ten companies in the petroleum industry. . . . We 
maintain a modern river fleet, consisting of 101 barges and nine tow-
boats ranging from 1150 to 4800 h.p .... This equipment brings in 
85% of the crude oil requirements of our largest refinery at Catletts-
burg and delivers 80 to 85% of the refined products made at 
Catlettsburg. 
In spite of this large system of pipelines and company-owned 
boats, Ashland Oil direly needed to be accepted in some of the 
many joint projects of pipeline construction. But not until 1956 
did Blazer succeed in participating in the construction of a 
large-inch crude pipeline which could serve its refineries. 
The Tecumseh pipeline, organized by Sinclair and the Pure 
Oil Company, each with 40 percent ownership, and Ashland 
Oil, with 20 percent, was a 20-inch line with an initial capacity 
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of 100,000 barrels per day running from Griffin, Indiana, east 
to Cygnet, Ohio. This type of financial arrangement is so com-
mon in the transportation programs of major oil companies that 
the significance in Ashland's growth might be overlooked. It was 
possible in the Tecumseh transaction for Ashland to acquire 
20 percent use and ownership of a pipeline costing more than 
$15,000,000 for the total cash outlay of less than $500,000. In 
order to qualify for inclusion in a group which can secure this 
favorable type of loan, a company must have a secure source 
of crude oil which can be supplied to the pipeline and a stable 
market at the other end. In the past, Ashland's policies and 
scale of operations were not suitable to this type of joint effort, 
but in 1956 the company no longer was "a poor boy" in pipeline 
transportation. 
USE OF THE RIVER AS A SUBSTITUTE FOR PIPELINES 
Even after the company had become larger, towboats and barges 
remained the lifeline for most of Ashland's operations. Crude 
oil came from Louisiana and Illinois via the Mississippi and 
Ohio rivers to refineries at Louisville and Ashland. Even the 
refineries at Canton, Findlay, and Buffalo made indirect use of 
river transportation through the choice of bringing Illinois basin 
crude oil to those refineries through pipelines or of sending it to 
Ohio River refineries by water. 
The greatly increased need for crude oil required additional 
river equipment, both to carry a larger volume and to seek 
supplies from more distant points. In 1954 the company pur-
chased a towboat from the Standard Oil Company (Ohio), 
renaming it the Valvoline. During 1951-1952 it added to its 
river fleet two 4,800-horsepower towboats, then the most power-
ful on the inland waterways. These two boats, the Aetna-Louis-
ville and the Allied-Ashland, increased the total towing capacity 
of the company's system by one-third. All previously owned 
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boats continued in operation with the exception of the Senator 
Combs, which the company had sold in 1949 because it had 
become too small for efficient operations. In 1955 two additional 
diesel towboats, the Winchester and Cherrystone, were acquired. 
By 1956 the company's river fleet had become one of the 
largest on the inland waterways and was carrying 2,500,000,000 
ton-miles of business. It was for this reason that Blazer exhibited 
concern over the proposal by the Hoover Commission to 
initiate user charges on the inland rivers. The commission 
report gave advance warning of possible legislation by Congress, 
and as a result, the Ashland Oil management actively supported 
the gathering of facts and opinions which would provide argu-
ments against any change in the manner in which the waterways 
had been handled for 150 years. The Ohio Valley Improvement 
Association, which had been successful in promoting the build-
ing of several high-level dams on the Ohio River to increase 
greatly the efficiency of water transportation, concentrated oppo-
sition to user tolls. 
The issue became active in 1955 and 1956. At the hearings, 
the railroads through their influential lobby in Washington 
aggressively pushed for passage of legislation. Blazer testified in 
opposition to the tolls, concerning which he commented in a 
letter to the Ashland Oil directors: 
We can't afford to take a position which is antagonistic to them 
[the railroads], although we consider that they will not blame us for 
opposing river tolls which would be so costly to our Company .... 
Our position is that since we use all forms of transportation-rail, 
water, pipe line, truck and air-we are in favor of anything that will 
reduce our transportation costs and opposed to anything which will 
increase our costs. 
USE OF COMMON CARRIER PIPELINES 
The existence of common carrier pipelines can encourage opera-
tions by smaller refiners. In most cases, however, pipelines have 
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been built, operated, and used principally by the owners. The 
question of whether pipelines should be treated legally as com-
mon carriers or as plant facilities has been the subject of much 
legislation and many court decisions. George S. Wolbert has 
summarized the pipeline issue in his thesis: "It will be helpful 
. . . to recognize the fundamental inconsistency of pipe line 
status as plant facility by nature, common carrier by law, and a 
combination of the two in fact." 6 
In the light of the confusion in the status of pipelines, the 
management of Ashland Oil refrained from depending too 
greatly on the common carrier status of any pipeline. Although 
many believed that the problem of the small refiner became less 
critical when a court decision gave him the right to space in 
pipelines, Blazer recognized that many ways remained in which 
a large company could abide by the law but in effect limit the 
usefulness of the line to a refiner who tried to enter. Size of 
tender of oil, detailed specifications of quality, required terminal 
facilities, and other factors were potential discouraging influ-
ences to a small refiner in his attempt to depend upon common 
carrier status. As a result, Blazer for many years placed little 
emphasis on the common carrier status of pipelines. 
With the newly acquired refineries at Canton, Findlay, Buf-
falo, and Freedom, Ashland Oil became more dependent on 
common carrier lines for their crude oil supply. Even in the 
delivery of refined products, common carriers became of greater 
importance after acquisition of these refineries. Common carrier 
lines connected the Findlay refinery with Toledo and Detroit. 
These common carrier lines were connected at Findlay with 
Ashland Oil's products pipeline which extended to Findlay from 
the Freedom refinery on the Ohio River, near Pittsburgh, by 
way of the Canton refinery. The greater part of Ashland Oil's 
products pipeline across Ohio consisted of an old crude oil 
6 George S. Wolbert, American Pipe Lines: Their Industrial Structure, Eco-
nomic Status, and Legal Implications (Norman, University of Oklahoma Press, 
1952), 113. 
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pipeline which had been converted to products use. New 
pipelines at either end had been built to connect with the Findlay 
and Freedom refineries. Also, the eastern end of this pipeline 
system was connected with a products pipeline, owned by 
Buckeye Pipe Line Company, which delivered Ashland Oil's 
products into Ashland's new products terminal in the Cleveland 
area. Finished and semifinished products from the refinery near 
Ashland, Kentucky, often moved by water to Freedom and were 
then pumped direct from barges into large storage tanks at 
Cleveland, Canton, Findlay, Columbus, Toledo, Detroit, and 
often as far west as Huntington, Indiana, near Fort Wayne. 
On occasion, products from the Ashland, Kentucky, plant might 
move by water from Toledo to Buffalo. 
IMPORTANCE OF THE TRANSPORTATION BRANCH 
The contribution of the transportation branch to the success of 
Ashland Oil over the thirty-three years was equal to that of the 
refining branch. Early operations on the "economic ridge" of 
transportation costs provided the company with a protected 
marketing area for growth. In the 1930's the Ohio River became 
an essential factor in the economical handling of both crude 
and refined products. Ashland's growth after World War II 
through mergers was influenced greatly by its transportation 
system. The future success of the company partially depended 
upon the manner in which the company would be able to 
adjust to the trend toward use of large-diameter pipelines for 
crude oil and to the increased use of products pipelines in its 
marketing territory. 
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The Pressure for Markets and Promotion 
THE PRINCIPAL products which are refined from petro-
leum-gasoline, domestic fuel oil, diesel and gas oil, asphalt, 
lubricants, kerosene, and industrial fuel oil-are sold in fairly 
distinct and separate markets and often through different chan-
nels. The integrated refiner uses the refinery gate as a reference 
point from which he considers each product and each market 
on a marginal basis. "Netbacks" on products to different loca-
tions offer him quantitative data for making his complex 
decisions. These decisions are based primarily upon two factors: 
the price level in each local market, and the transportation cost 
for the refined products to each market. 
The refiner considers three levels of markets in which he can 
sell gasoline: the refinery wholesale or tank-car market, the local 
wholesale or tank-wagon market, and the retail or service-
station market. Efforts to integrate forward into marketing in-
volve increased activities in the local wholesale and retail 
markets. 
PRICING POLICIES 
The best way to relate the pricing policies of Ashland Oil is to 
quote a statementmade by its chief executive: 
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Originally, Ashland Oil sold all of its gasoline through independent 
jobbers, who received deliveries by tank car or by barge in tank-
car quantities. Gasoline was priced at the wholesale tank-car level 
to meet competition from more distant refineries. In the early years 
the price ordinarily was escalatored on the Group Three Oklahoma 
market plus a transportation charge, which usually was enough 
under the actual freight cost from Tulsa to discourage distant 
competition, but high enough to give a netback to the Leach refinery 
which would give Ashland Oil a better price realization than could 
be obtained by any more distantly located competitor. Gasoline 
usually was sold on annual contracts subject to automatic renewal 
unless canceled on sixty or ninety days' notice. When competitive 
conditions justified lower prices than provided by the annual con-
tracts, Ashland Oil frequently gave voluntary price reductions. 
Later, when new price basing points developed at nearer refining 
centers, destroying much of the significance of Group Three Okla-
homa prices, the company entered into contracts with hundreds of 
jobbers which specified that the gasoline price would be Ashland 
Oil's market price on date of shipment for that quantity of gasoline 
to that class of trade in that area. Ashland Oil was able to obtain 
such price clauses only because the company, over a period of years, 
had gained the confidence of their jobber distributors. 
In order to qualify for a tank-car price a customer might not be 
located on a railroad track and thus could not receive gasoline by 
tank car, but under Ashland Oil's pricing policies he would be 
entitled to the tank-car price if he had a storage tank sufficient to 
receive the equivalent of a tank car of gasoline by barge delivery. 
In one instance, Ashland Oil laid pipelines from the river to a 
number of large-volume service stations located in the center of 
the business district. Each of those stations had large enough storage 
tanks and took deliveries in quantities equal to or larger than tank-
car shipments. Gradually, over a period of years, industry practice 
developed of giving the tank-car price to operators of large filling 
stations which put in tanks large enough to hold a tank car of 
gasoline, even though actual delivery was by large transport trucks. 
For many years, Ashland Oil owned no tank trucks and made sales 
only to customers who could receive deliveries by either rail or barge. 
Unlike many independent refiners, Ashland Oil for many years 
sold no gasoline through so-called tank-car resellers or brokers. By 
developing its own sales organization calling directly on independent 
jobbers, Ashland Oil, unlike most independent refiners, was able to 
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avoid selling its products through tank-car marketers, who often 
bought gasoline at distress prices-sometimes from major oil com-
panies. 
In the early years, Ashland Oil sold much of its residual fuel oil 
through tank-car marketers such as Allied Oil Company and other 
companies which specialized in the sale of fuel oil to the steel indus-
try and other large users. It was not many years, however, until the 
company adopted the same policies in that respect as regards the 
sale of residual fuel oil that it had historically used in the sale of 
gasoline. The sale of specialty products, such as naphthas and 
solvents, continue to be sold to a certain extent through specialists 
in that field, such as American Mineral Spirits Company and The 
R. J. Brown Company, which, incidentally, Ashland Oil acquired 
in 1956. 
Many refiners entered into gasoline contracts which specified that 
the price should be a certain margin under local gasoline tank-
wagon markets. Ashland Oil avoided such contracts, since they 
took away from local distributors the incentive to avoid local price 
wars. Ashland Oil, instead, had somewhat similar contracts which 
specified prices based on statewide tank-wagon markets, in the case 
of Ohio, or on "normal tank-wagon markets" where there were 
published normal markets. 
In later years, when Ashland Oil began distributing through local 
bulk plants and selling at tank-wagon prices to consumers, dealers, 
and service stations, including operators of company-owned stations, 
the pricing was on a conventional basis comparable to that of major 
oil companies. A dealer who desired to be unconventional in his 
retail prices was encouraged to market under his own brand name. 
After the first few years, Ashland Oil gradually began to sell an 
increasing quantity of products to so-called "price marketers" who 
usually owned a number of service stations and had facilities to 
receive deliveries in tank-car quantities. Even though these marketers 
usually sold their gasoline for less than the prevailing prices for 
branded gasoline of the same quality, Ashland Oil did not give them 
a lower wholesale price. In fact, the company was proud of its 
uniform pricing policy which provided for the same price on the 
same quality of gasoline to all wholesale buyers in a given area, 
including its own local bulk plant. 
Ashland Oil has always thought that more independent refiners 
failed because of bad pricing and marketing policies than due to any 
other disability. 
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In 1928 Everett F. Wells, who had been hired by Ashland Refin-
ing Company directly from college in 1926 and who in 1957 
became president, was made assistant sales manager (Blazer 
was the sales manager). Yet numerous comments in his letters 
and speeches indicate that Blazer was finding through experience 
that integration was being forced upon him by competition. 
As early as 1927, he observed in a report to the board: 
Much as I personally dislike the tediousness of retail distribution, I 
think that it is essential to the continued success of our company . 
. . . So far as I know, our company is the only refiner of Kentucky 
crude that ever paid a dividend out of refining profits. We are the 
only refiner of Kentucky crude not having marketing facilities that 
has been able to continue operating. With the exception of some 
small Pennsylvania refineries specializing in the manufacturing of 
lubricants, we are, I believe, the only independent refinery east of 
the Mississippi not having a retail or tank wagon marketing division. 
More and more the competition is for retail outlets. Some of our 
best customers have been absorbed by other refineries .... Expansion 
into marketing is a form of insurance to protect our present very 
profitable investment. 
Because of the pressure to integrate forward, most of the 
numerous purchases in this period, summarized in Exhibit 1, 
were of local wholesalers. In January, 1929, Blazer expressed 
his opinion to the Swiss board: 
Aside from the cracking plant addition, our future principal expansion, 
I believe, will be in connection with the marketing of our products. 
For more than a year there has been every indication that we would 
be forced into a retail marketing of gasoline yet we have been able 
to postpone such a step without serious detriment to our future. Our 
present policy is to delay entry into retail marketing as long as we 
possibly can, at the same time recognizing that such a step eventually 
is inevitable. An individual case might arise at any time where in 
order to protect a profitable nearby outlet we might have to make an 
immediate purchase. Although many of our very good customers 
have disposed of their businesses to competing refineries, we have 
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during the past year been able to discourage the proposed sale of any 
of those distributor accounts which we consider absolutely essential 
to our future distribution. It is my viewpoint that we are primarily 
in the refining business and that we undertake other lines of 
endeavor only in so far as it is necessary to protect our refinery 
investment. 
In April, 1930, the purchase of Tri-State Refining Company 
was an important step in the integration into marketing. Tri-
State had been a competitor in the purchase of crude oil from 
Cumberland Pipe Line Company and had become an important 
competitor in sales of refined products in the localities in which 
Ashland marketed gasoline. After the purchase, the annual 
report for 1930 described the progress in marketing that had 
been made in the few years of the company's operations: 
The gasolines of the two refineries are marketed principally within a 
radius of 150 miles of the plants in a highly industrialized section 
of Ohio as well as in West Virginia and Kentucky under the locally 
well known brand names of Red Pepper Ethyl, Green Pepper Anti-
Knock, White Pepper, Tri-State Ethyl, Tri-State Super-Motor, Tri-
State Aviation gasoline, etc. A large portion of the Company's 
refined products is delivered by a fleet of motor trucks operating 
within a radius of 50 miles. Additional distributing facilities operated 
by the refining companies and subsidiaries include warehouses with 
railroad sidings located in ten cities within a radius of 150 miles, oil 
barges, river-rail terminals and river-pipe line terminals for delivery 
of gasoline, kerosene and fuel oils. A substantial portion of the 
gasoline and fuel-oil output of the two refineries is moved in barges 
to customers located on the Ohio River, thereby effecting a sub-
stantial transportation saving. 
The refining companies through subsidiary distributing companies 
own or control more than 50 bulk and service stations. Several 
hundred independent service stations, not owned nor operated by 
our refining companies or their subsidiaries are supplied under con-
tract. Several million gallons of refined products are sold annually 
to major oil companies that have no refineries in this territory to 
serve economically their retail outlets .... In addition to their own 
compounded motor oils, the refining companies are the exclusive 
distributors in their marketing territory for both Quaker State and 
Veedol motor oils. 
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ExHIBIT 17-PERCENTAGE OF ToTAL CAPITAL ExPENDITURES PLACED INTO MARKETING, 
AsHLAND OIL & REFINING CoMPANY, 1924-1956 
1935 
CONSOLIDATION OF THE MARKETING TERRITORY 
After the purchases of Tri-State Refining Company and the 
Cumberland pipeline, Blazer was content to consolidate previous 
acquisitions and to concentrate on those markets most favorably 
located for receiving products from Ashland's refineries. The 
depression caused him to act more cautiously; moreover, it 
forced greater attention on the marketing branch. During the 
early 1930's the greatest percentage of capital expenditures was 
made in marketing (see Exhibit 17). The absolute amount 
spent in marketing activities also increased. 
In 1931 Ashland's primary market had expanded from the 
immediate vicinity of Ashland, Kentucky, to Columbus, Ohio. 
By 1936 high rail costs forced the management to retreat from 
central Ohio. Almost 50 percent of sales volume was being 
shipped to the Cincinnati area. The shift was determined by 
the low transportation cost of $.001 per ton-mile which Ashland's 
new towboat, the Senator Combs, made possible. 
Exchanges of gasoline with other companies enabled the man-
agement to enter additional profitable markets and to maximize 
the utilization of its water transportation. In the middle of 1933 
the company was selling half of its total refinery throughput to 
other oil companies. Blazer negotiated these sales with personal 
acquaintances made during his first years in the industry. An 
illustration of the manner in which these sales and exchanges 
were interrelated was described to the board in June, 1933, by 
Blazer: 
Since much of the gasoline is being shipped to Cincinnati, I have 
arranged with Standard Oil of Ohio to give us material from their 
refinery in the Cincinnati district to fill a portion of our sale to Shell, 
repaying Standard with gasoline loaded into their barges at Catletts-
burg, thereby picking up an additional freight savings of approxi-
mately $60 per car. I did not find it easy to make the latter arrange-
ment, since Shell was opposed to taking Standard gasoline and 
Standard felt the same way about it. 
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Another such sale was to Socony-Vacuum Oil Company through 
Shell Oil Company facilities from a refinery owned by the 
Standard Oil Company (Ohio). In such transactions Blazer's 
ability to act quickly without administrative bottlenecks made 
it possible for Ashland to gain additional profits during the 
depression years. 
While the company was actually expanding its marketing 
operations in some areas, it was retrenching in others where 
competition was intense. Such a fluid marketing program 
developed into a basic sales policy of the small company. In 
1936 Blazer expressed his policy in a quantitative manner to the 
board of directors: 
We hope to give up all gasoline business which is not within Y2c 
per gallon transportation expense from either our plant or the plant 
of some major oil company with which we can exchange gasoline . 
. . . We hope that our average will be lAc per gallon. 
The expansion programs of oil companies in the marketing 
branch caused a serious problem by 1936. Blazer observed in 
February, 1936, in a speech to the petroleum division of the 
American Institute of Mining and Metallurgical Engineers: 
The largest single item of expense in the oil industry is the cost of 
marketing gasoline .... Even the most casual observer knows that 
there are far too many service stations .... There have been a few 
half-hearted attempts by members of the industry to justify the 
present number of gasoline outlets, but the amazingly small average 
volume of sales per outlet and the high unit cost of sales afford ample 
evidence to the contrary. 
However, a few months later, in August, 1936, Blazer informed 
the board of directors: 
A very substantial part of our expansion this year has been in 
connection with our distributing facilities. Our new operations are 
showing up most satisfactorily. Indications are that they will yield 
a return of between 8 per cent and 10 per cent of our investments, 
in addition to affording an assured outlet for our refinery. Their 
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value, though, is entirely independent of the refinery and their eco-
nomic life is not limited by our crude oil supply. Much of the real 
estate is already worth substantially more than we paid for it. 
In spite of his opinion regarding the general problems in the 
industry, he believed that further attention to marketing was 
the proper policy for Ashland. 
By 1936, pressure was growing in Congress for divorcement 
of the various phases of the industry. The government was 
preparing the Madison case. In this setting, Blazer testified in 
1938 before the Congressional Committee on Petroleum Market-
ing Divorcement: 
The advantages of complete integration of a small oil company, as 
protection against the alleged threat of monopoly on the part of the 
larger companies, is especially well illustrated by our own company, 
since it represents a consolidation of a producing company which, 
when operating separately, was losing money, an old pipe line which 
was being operated at a loss, two small refineries which were grad-
ually going broke, and a number of small marketing companies. (The 
marketing companies, though, were operating profitably.) 
Although the company did not expand during 1937 or early 
19 38, Blazer indicated that he was interested in rounding out 
its activities. The marketing territory still was located within a 
radius of 150 miles; it had not changed greatly for a decade. 
Approximately one-third of the gasoline throughput flowed from 
company-owned bulk plants. In March, 1938, Blazer expressed 
his ideas to the board as follows: 
Referring further to the expansion we are likely to make, it is not 
my present thought to engage in any radically different activities, 
but merely to further round out our marketing operations to include 
all points to which we have economical transportation costs, to make 
such additions to our river equipment and river terminals as will 
reduce transportation costs to present and prospective points of 
delivery, to modernize our refinery equipment and to purchase such 
Kentucky producing properties as are offered at a price that should 
give us a pay-out in not more than five or six years. I believe that 
these programs can be carried out through the careful use of our 
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depletion and depreciation money .... If there should develop an 
opportunity to merge into our company a relatively small oil company 
having attractive properties, I would not be averse to the utilization 
of the 41,010 shares of common stock in our treasury. 
A change in refining technology and a change in marketing 
prospects during the later 1930's caused Blazer some uncertainty 
as to the desirable amount of integration in marketing. In a 
letter on April 4, 1940, he said: 
There is considerable security afforded for the future by the ownership 
of assets which have a sound value independent of the fluctuation 
of the oil industry. I refer to our valuable real estate represented by 
service stations, etc .... Such properties, if judiciously acquired, will 
yield a fair current return in connection with our business and at 
the same time insure our having stable assets to help us through any 
possible period when we might be confronted with losses because of 
highly competitive conditions within the oil industry. 
But ten days later he wrote: 
At best there is not much profit to be made in that [marketing] 
department and I have felt that my time can be spent more profitably 
in refining operations where much more is at stake .... As a whole, 
the business of our distributing division is profitable, since that de-
partment puts out approximately 10,000,000 gallons a year on which 
the refinery receives an average price of about 1c per gallon more 
than the average price it received from independent jobbers. The 
higher price realized from our own distributing division results solely 
from the fact that our company-owned operations have been so 
located as to make that business especially profitable because of low 
transportation costs from our refinery to marketing areas where 
relatively high price levels prevail. 
The latter statement expressed the opinion that was to prevail 
in the long run. During the 1930's, emphasis had been placed 
on ownership of bulk plants and on relationships with i11de-
pendent jobbers. Close cooperation with jobbers and deemphasis 
upon company-owned bulk stations were fundamental marketing 
policies of the management. 
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Early 1938 sales warranted Blazer's comment to the board: 
"Never before have we had such a large share of the total gasoline 
and kerosene business in what we consider our profitable market-
ing radius." However, by January, 1939, when the gasoline 
market had weakened, the management gave close attention to 
the netback of each outlet. 
In 1940 Blazer shifted from emphasis upon a small marketing 
area by opening a new river terminal in the vicinity of Pittsburgh. 
Shifting of territories and customers continued whenever it be-
came evident that competition was depressing prices in existing 
areas. Blazer explained: "We are inclined to shift our marketing 
area farther east, but it will take time to accomplish that result." 
The latter clause was added in comments to the directors in the 
late 1930's only after an increase in size of operations. During 
the early 1930's the smaller size of the company facilitated the 
use of the flexible policy. There was little evidence in the letters 
to the directors to indicate that the shifting process previously 
had taken any appreciable length of time. 
The shifting of markets was not the result of a conscious 
desire to diversify Ashland's marketing operations geographically. 
In fact, Blazer considered concentration in a marketing area at 
this time to be an asset. In January, 1942, Standard and Poor's 
Corporation criticized the localization of Ashland's operations. 
Blazer reacted to this criticism in a comment to the board: 
The fact that our business is localized from a transportation stand-
point is its greatest asset. The greatest weaknesses of too many of 
the large oil companies is that their business is spread out too thinly 
from a transportation gallonage standpoint. 
This localized market was especially valuable during the wartime 
period. Service to consumers could be offered efficiently by Ash-
land Oil without aid from the government or from other 
companies. 
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Rationing of gasoline in the consumer market caused the 
sale of over half of total throughput to the government by July, 
1944. Marketing policies were dictated by government regu-
lation. This made it impossible for the company to continue its 
flexible marketing techniques. Blazer, spending much time in 
Washington on official business, found that at the same time 
he could obtain a better adjustment of his company's marketing 
program to the governmentally controlled system. 
PROMOTION OF AN ADVERTISED BRAND 
With the increased refining capacity acquired during the war, 
Ashland Oil was faced after World War II with a need for 
accelerating its marketing program. In 1946, sales campaigns 
emphasized a new brand name, "Ashland"; vigorous sales effort 
expanded the marketing area of the company; Blazer created a 
separate marketing division with line authority over all company-
owned bulk plants. The annual report for 1946 explained the 
change required by reconversion: 
Reflecting the reversed direction of movement of petroleum products 
that was required during the war, many of our old customers had 
been replaced by more distant consumers in the East who could be 
served only with the aid of wartime governmental transportation 
allowances or through the exchange of refined products with other 
oil companies. 
With the end of the war and the sudden termination of these 
arrangements, we soon found it necessary to greatly reduce our 
refinery thru-put pending a difficult and expensive re-arrangement of 
our marketing outlets. 
During this reconversion period, Blazer developed policies 
which formed the basis for the expanding marketing program. 
He reported to the stockholders in 194 7: 
A large part of the expansion of our sales has resulted from increased 
volume through our existing outlets. In addition, we have been able 
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to furnish petroleum products to various independent marketers who 
welcomed the opportunity to become Ashland distributors when 
their former suppliers, because of shortage of products, encouraged 
them to seek new sources of supply. Present conditions in the indus-
try are conducive to closer cooperation, on a permanent basis, be-
tween independent refiners, such as this Company, and independent 
distributors who, for many years, have furnished a substantial part 
of the outlets for nationally advertised brands of petroleum products. 
Our ability to maintain and increase supplies of refined products for 
our customers rests, to an important degree upon cooperation between 
ourselves and the many independent producers of crude oil with 
whom we are associated. Incidentally, independent oil producers, 
independent refiners, and independent distributors furnish healthy 
competition and help to prevent the possibility of control of the oil 
industry falling into the hands of a few large companies. Products 
of our Company are sold under the brand-name "Ashland" and also 
under approximately 150 individual brand-names of independent dis-
tributors. Many of the latter use cooperatively the emblem "Inde-
pendent Quality Service," which identifies them as marketers of 
products manufactured by our Company. 
This emphasis upon the independent marketer was a necessity, 
since by this time the company marketed less than 10 percent 
of its output of gasoline through company-operated bulk plants. 
Ashland Oil owned only ninety-one service stations in 1945, 
most of which were operated by independent lessees. 
Blazer's letters to the board of directors during these years 
immediately after the war made continual reference to the 
pressing sales problem: 
We believe our markets will not support crude runs much in excess 
of 15,000 barrels per day which compares with 12,000 barrels per 
day in 1941. It is not going to be easy to get our overhead down to 
a proper basis after having built up an organization to do a 30,000 
barrel per day business. 
Marketing investments run into substantial sums. I would estimate 
that we would have to spend at least a million dollars for every 
additional thousand barrels per day of controlled gasoline distribution. 
We have an original investment in our marketing facilities of 
157 
BLAZER AND ASHLAND OIL 
$1,346,000 (now depreciated to $575,000) through which we dis-
tributed an average of 830 barrels of gasoline per day .... It is much 
easier to expand than to contract. We will be able to solve our 
problems, but the process will continue to be painful. 
During this period of reconversion, the company made every 
effort to acquire additional marketing outlets, resulting in 1947 
in the purchase of several large service stations. Blazer advised 
the board: 
Our proposed program for the acquisition of additional marketing 
outlets is likely to further reduce our earnings, since the cost of each 
outlet is so high, in most instances, as to commit us to a loss for the 
first few years while we are depreciating the inflated costs. Neverthe-
less, marketing facilities are a necessary protection for the operation 
of the balance of our business. 
The increase in refining capacity during World War II 
formed the foundation upon which Blazer planned to build a 
more secure operation after the war. The ability to make high-
octane gasoline enabled the management to consider an aggres-
sive promotion of the company's own brand name and a spec-
tacular series of mergers. 
RAPID EXPANSION OF THE MARKETING BRANCH 
By August 9, 1948, Ashland Oil had successfully introduced its 
new brand, "Ashland," and expanded its marketing outlets. A 
prospectus summarized the facts: 
The major portion of Ashland's output of gasoline, kerosene, and 
furnace distillates is sold to wholesale distributors who, at their 
option, market products under their own brand names or the com-
pany's established trade name of "Ashland." Somewhat less than 
12 per cent of its output of gasoline is distributed through 26 com-
pany-operated bulk stations. The company operates tank trucks 
serving a large number of independent service stations, and 182 
158 
JOBBERS AND BRAND NAMES 
service stations, owned, leased or otherwise held by the company, 
but operated for the most part, by independent lessees. 
The pressure for markets was always the basic reason from 
Ashland's viewpoint for encouraging the mergers which took 
place during 1948-19 50. This represented a shift in emphasis 
on Blazer's part. From 1924 to 1947 he had always showed the 
greatest interest in refining. After World War II the pressure 
for markets seems to have caused him to place more and more 
importance on the marketing phase of operations. At least six 
major mergers increased the sales potential for the company's 
products. 
In late 1948 Ashland Oil further increased its marketing 
organization in Kentucky when it purchased marketing properties 
from Ohio Oil Company. These properties could not be sup-
plied economically from Ohio's refinery at Robinson, Illinois, 
but they helped Ashland Oil expand its territory in a profitable 
area. 
PROMOTION OF A MUL TIBRAND SALES PROGRAM 
As a result of the mergers, the marketing phase of the company's 
operations became more complex. While the policy of selling to 
those who resold under private brands continued, Ashland Oil 
now owned at least five brands of gasoline and many brands of 
lubricating oil. Each of these had become well known in the 
community in which it had been sold prior to the merger: 
"Frontier" had first been established as a domestic fuel oil in 
Buffalo, but later it was accepted as a single-grade brand of 
gasoline in that area; "Aetna" had developed a strong following 
in Central, Southern, and Western Kentucky, being sold through 
company-owned stations; "Freedom" gasoline had built little 
goodwill, but the "Valvoline" oils had an international reputa-
tion; "White Rose" had been a famous name of National 
Refining Company and was still accepted in a localized market. 
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After the mergers, Ashland Oil controlled a well-rounded line 
of products; it had a specialist in heavy residual oils in its Allied 
organization; it maintained a strong marketing outlet for do-
mestic fuel oil through its Aetna and Frontier business; it 
marketed several national brands of lubricating oil, including its 
own brand "Valvoline," and was the distributing agent for 
"Quaker State" and "Pennzoil"; it kept a reputation for good 
industrial and railroad lubricating oil through its National Refin-
ing organization. 
Sales of all products increased during 1950 and 1951 at a rate 
of approximately 40 percent per annum. Part of this increase 
resulted from the addition of new facilities which had been 
acquired through merger. However, in 1951 there were no 
mergers, and the continued high rate of increase during that 
year could only have resulted from internal growth of the sales 
program of the company. To a large extent, the complementary 
nature of products formerly marketed separately by antecedent 
companies explains the 1951 increase. 
The annual report for 1952 outlined the sales program which 
then existed: 
Although Ashland and its affiliated companies own and serve many 
hundreds of service stations, the greater part of the Company's output 
of gasoline and motor oils is distributed through more than six 
hundred independent jobbers. Ashland endeavors to be the best 
source of supply for these aggressive, independent businessmen. 
Frontier, Allied and Aetna divisions deliver heating oils to thousands 
of homes, principally in Buffalo, Cleveland and Louisville, but, again, 
independent jobbers distribute most of the company's output of fuel 
oil for household heating. 
Increased sales were closely related to an accelerated program 
of intensive advertising. Prior to the mergers, Blazer had not felt 
that the company distributed sufficient gallonage in the area to 
support an expensive advertising program. Now he commented 
to the board of directors: "I am impressed with the fact that 
one of the most obvious disabilities of our group of refining and 
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marketing companies is our failure to develop a cohesive mer-
chandising and advertising program." 
In an effort to develop a more unified sales program, the 
company retained more policy formulation at the home office. 
It adopted a system of universal credit cards to meet the com-
petition of credit systems of the larger companies. The adver-
tising programs were based primarily on the theme of the com-
pany as a local citizen. Suggestions had been received from 
stockholders that the various brands should be more closely 
related to the Ashland Oil organization; however, the previous 
success of the company's local community identification encour-
aged the management to continue its longstanding policy. 
MARKET SHARE AS A MEASURE OF SUCCESS 
Not until 19 51 did anyone in Ashland's management begin to 
think in terms of market share. Even at this time the study of 
market share, from which Exhibits 18 and 19 were extracted, 
was made by a staff executive who had only recently joined the 
Ashland Oil organization in one of the mergers. (It is significant 
that this executive had previously worked for a major oil com-
pany.) The charts showed the position of Ashland's sales in 
the eleven states. Also, it is interesting to note that this study, 
done after the company had become a major marketer in several 
of these states, was not made generally available even to the sales 
executives within the company. In fact, in a number of inter-
views with top executives in 1954, the knowledge of the market 
position offered by this study had not been remembered. It was 
filed away and not used as a basis of marketing decisions during 
the period after 19 51. Figures of the total absolute gallonage 
and profitability continued to be the measure that Blazer wanted 
as a basis for his actions. 
Even though the study was not used, it does provide a clear 
picture of the position attained by Ashland Oil in 1951. Exhibit 
161 
BLAZER AND ASHLAND OIL 
18 shows the relative importance of the various states in Ash-
land's markets. Although Kentucky leads Ohio in percentage of 
total market share by 18.5 percent to 6.8 percent, Ohio leads 
Kentucky by a wide margin in total gallonage of gasoline sales. 
ExHIBIT 18 
EsTIMATED PERCENTAGE OF THE GASOLINE MARKET SoLD BY AsHLAND OIL & 
REFINING CoMPANY IN ELEVEN STATES, MAY, 1951 
Share Under Under Share Under Under 
State of Company Private State of Company Private 
Market Brands Brands Market Brands Brands 
Kentucky 18.5% 15.2% 3.3% Illinois 0.7% 0.2% 0.5% 
West Virginia 7.1 4.8 2.3 New York 0.3 0.3 
Ohio 6.8 2.8 4.0 Virginia 0.1 0.1 
Indiana 4.6 1.8 2.8 Michigan * 
Pennsylvania 2.0 0.7 1.3 Missouri * 
Tennessee 1.8 0.5 l. 3 (*less than 0.1%) 
Source: Independent Market Research Agency's Report to the Company. 
ExHIBIT 19 
GAsOLINE SoLD BY AsHLAND OIL & REFINING CoMPANY BY STATES, MAY, 1951 
Quantity Percentage Quantity Percentage 
State (Million of Total State (Million of Total 
Gallons) Gasoline Gallons) Gasoline 
Business Business 
Ohio 15.2 35.7% Tennessee 1.3 3.1% 
Kentucky 10.4 24.5 New York 0.9 2.1 
Indiana 6.1 14.4 Michigan 0.1 0.2 
Pennsylvania 4.2 9.9 Missouri 0.1 0.2 
West Virginia 2.4 5.6 Virginia 0.1 0.1 
Illinois 1.7 4.0 Total 42.5* 99.8% 
* Does not include sales to other oil companies, sales to government divisions, 
and consumption by company trucks. 
Source: Independent Market Research Agency's Report to the Company. 
In Kentucky, Ashland Oil had become the second most im-
portant marketer of gasoline behind Standard Oil of Kentucky; 
in Ohio, the company had become approximately as important 
as Sun, Pure, Shell, Texaco, Sinclair, and Gulf, the leading 
marketers in that state behind the Standard Oil Company 
(Ohio). Other studies do not show clearly the relative im-
portance of Ashland Oil in Ohio, Indiana, and Pennsylvania, 
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since the company sells much of its gasoline under other brands 
and ships the gasoline from terminals located in other states. 
In the McLean study, Ashland Oil appears insignificant in Ohio 
until one notices that between 20 and 25 percent of the total 
gasoline is classified under "Miscellaneous Marketers."1 A sig-
nificant percentage of this "Miscellaneous" and that of several 
of the smaller listed marketers were actually a part of Ashland's 
share. 
In most of the markets, Ashland Oil obtained a higher per-
centage in the less concentrated markets than in the urban areas. 
Sales through company brands were less important than sales 
through private brands in most states, with only Kentucky as an 
important exception. 
During the period of increase in Ashland's business, the 
share held by the major companies was declining in four of the 
important states in which Ashland Oil was operating. Cassady 
showed that in Kentucky the share held by independents in-
creased from 27.1 percent in 1931 to 33.7 percent in 1949; in 
Indiana, from 29.5 percent to 38.3 percent; in West Virginia, 
from 14.7 percent to 16.4 percent; in Illinois, from 27.9 percent 
to 35.2 percent. In Ohio, the independents' share had actually 
decreased as a result of aggressive marketing by the Standard Oil 
Company (Ohio); yet Ashland Oil increased its proportion in 
this very competitive market to a large percentage of the total 
business done by independents in the state. In Pennsylvania, 
Ashland Oil and the other independents were effective only in 
the section west of the Allegheny mountains; their percentage 
dropped in the state as a whole from 22.0 in 1931 to 7.5 in 1949.2 
1 McLean and Haigh, The Growth of Integrated Oil Companies, 106·107. See 
also E. P. Learned and C. C. Ellsworth, Gasoline Pricing in Ohio (Boston, 
Harvard University Graduate School of Business Administration, 19 59). 
2 Ralph Cassady, Price Making and Price Behavior in the Petroleum Industry 
(New Haven, Yale University Press, 1954), 66. 
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INCREASED PRESSURE TO INTEGRATE INTO MARKETING 
In 1953 the petroleum industry experienced a weak market for 
its products. Ashland Oil had a large new refinery at Buffalo 
and faced a decrease in demand with an increase in stocks 
available for sale. An intense effort was required to increase the 
number of sales outlets. The statement in the 1953 annual report 
delineated the company's marketing organization: 
The Company engages in direct marketing operations only when it 
is unable to obtain adequate distribution through local marketers. 
Approximately 22 per cent of the Company's gasoline output is dis-
tributed through its own local bulk plants, tank trucks, or service 
stations. 
Under depressed conditions, Blazer found it necessary to expand 
the company-owned marketing operations. The expansion of 
throughput in the Buffalo area in late 1953 placed unusual 
pressure on the sales department to market the large amounts 
of gasoline being produced. The area was one in which inde-
pendent jobbers were scarce; little could be done, therefore, 
through established accounts. The time required to expand 
sales of its own outlets or to establish new outlets was too long 
to help the short-run problem. By the middle of 1954, gasoline 
from Buffalo was temporarily flowing back to Cleveland and 
Detroit. This flow represented a back haul of products produced 
from crude transported to Buffalo at extra expense. 
In August, 1953, just prior to placing the new Buffalo refinery 
on stream, Blazer predicted the future trend of capital expansion 
to the board: 
We probably will continue to increase our investment in distributing 
operations. They will do well if they earn a return of 6 per cent. 
The most that can be said for such properties is that they are a form 
of insurance as regards the output of our refineries. Probably we will 
have more local price wars to contend with; we haven't had much 
trouble in that respect in the past. 
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Expansion by merger continued only in the marketing phase. 
Early in 1954 the company purchased through an exchange of 
stock Kellogg Petroleum Products, Inc., a large independent dis-
tributing company located in Buffalo, to increase company-
owned distribution as the market expanded toward the eastern 
seaboard. 
DIVERSIFICATION INTO SPECIALTY PRODUCTS 
Emphasis on specialty, high-margin, low-volume products had 
proved to be a useful marketing policy for the small firm in the 
1930's. This policy had been abandoned during World War II 
because of pressure for volume production, but it was still very 
attractive to the large firm of the 1950's. Blazer explained in 
November, 1956: 
I am constantly pressing our manufacturing and sales departments 
to expand our production and sales of industrial and specialty 
petroleum products where the advantage of public acceptance of 
trade-marks is unimportant, and where the cost of raw material 
[crude oil] represents a smaller percentage of the value of the finished 
product. 
By this time the executive attention to these specialty areas 
and national accounts warranted an additional vice president 
for marketing. Previous success in asphalt encouraged the man-
agement to add asphalt plants at Buffalo and Findlay. 
It was not until the middle 1950's that petrochemical produc-
tion fitted into this attention toward specialties. The Buffalo 
refinery received the petrochemical manufacturing facilities. In 
June, 1956, the R. J. Brown Company of St. Louis was merged 
into Ashland Oil. \Veils explained to security analysts its im-
portance and the company's emphasis on specialties: 
[It] gave us a very substantial position in the national marketing of 
naphthas, solvents and chemicals. This company is the largest inde-
pendent marketer of special petroleum naphthas and solvents. Their 
marketing area extends from Denver and the Texas-Gulf Coast area 
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on the west to Cleveland, Detroit and Louisville on the east. They 
purchase the majority of their requirements from many refiners. 
Their future plans will not disturb their present supply arrangements 
but will extend their marketing activities eastward and secure addi-
tional business in the areas that our refineries can serve most ad-
vantageously. R. J. Brown Company will market most of the 
aromatics and a part of the other products produced in our new 
plant at Buffalo. 
Our Company pioneered in the development of jet fuel and is one 
of the largest suppliers to the military forces and to engine manu-
facturers. Also, we were among the first to work with the railroads 
in producing improved diesel fuel oils and lubricating oils to facilitate 
their conversion to diesel power. We regularly supply large quanti-
ties of diesel fuel oil to more than two dozen railroads. 
MULTIPLE MARKETING POLICIES 
The policy of selling to jobbers for resale under private brands 
was retained by Ashland Oil since its very beginning. Since Ash-
land Oil had no nationally known brand of its own for many 
years and mergers with other companies provided locally well 
known brands, Blazer reasoned that it could benefit by keeping 
the brands with established goodwill. After the merger with 
Tri-State, the management began to offer more than one com-
pany brand. Continued growth through subsequent mergers 
led to a policy of "multiple marketing." 
The term multiple marketing refers to emphasis on sales in 
the same marketing area through more than two channels. As 
a result of mergers, Ashland Oil found some areas in which 
sales territories of predecessor companies overlapped. In addi-
tion, interest in selling gasoline to owners of private brands 
increased the variety of outlets. An example will illustrate the 
unusually large number of channels employed in selling the 
capacity throughput. In Lexington, Kentucky, the following 
channels of gasoline distribution were used in 1954. The com-
pany owned a bulk plant through which it distributed its "Ash-
land" brand of gasoline to service stations and consumers. Ash-
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land Oil was represented also by an independent commiSSion 
agent who distributed "Aetna" branded gasoline. At least one 
independent jobber purchased "Ashland" branded gasoline, 
receiving deliveries by tank car or transport truck direct from an 
Ashland Oil refinery. In addition, a private brand marketer pur-
chased gasoline from an Ashland Oil refinery and resold the 
product under his own brand name at a reduced price. Also, the 
company supplied a number of small independent jobbers who 
sold gasoline under their own brand names but with an identify-
ing sign, "Independent Quality Service." Blazer had sometimes 
referred to this multiple marketing policy as "riding all horses 
in a market." 
As the company became larger, conventional marketing tech-
niques were more widely used. Yet, in July, 1955, Blazer ex-
plained his reasons for continued attention to multiple market-
ing: 
Offsetting the advertising trends favoring major oil company stations 
is the fact that such a large number of these stations are being built; 
each new station dilutes gallonage and adds to the cost of marketing, 
thereby making them more vulnerable to the competition of the 
price-sellers which, in many areas, are underselling conventional 
brands by as much as 5 cents per gallon .... In Buffalo, where we 
have many branded outlets, we are conventional marketers and we 
have about the same attitude toward the price-marketers as do the 
major oil companies. In certain other metropolitan areas our policy 
is just the opposite. 
We have made important purchases from independent jobbers of 
conventional marketing facilities. In some instances we probably 
would have been wiser if we had been more active in buying uncon-
ventional outlets, some of which have changed hands recently. 
GEOGRAPHICAL DIVERSIFICATION OF THE MARKET 
In the 1950's Blazer became more concerned with the threat 
of a low-cost, large-diameter pipeline entering Ashland's market-
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ing territory. Although this concern dated from World War 
II, he knew that ultimately the company must face the fact that 
a large line would enter the area. Whereas his policies previously 
had stressed the economy of a compact marketing area which 
could be economically served by river transportation, his new 
policy emphasized geographical diversification. The weakness 
of concentrating the company's marketing effort in one area 
became greater. 
Early in 19 54 Blazer decided to extend the marketing boun-
daries to any areas in which Ashland Oil could sell products at 
a profitable netback. This policy of geographical diversification 
was a second step in the attempt to protect the company from 
potential threats of new low-cost transportation facilities into its 
principal territory and to enable it to expand its market during 
a time in which sales were leveling off. It was reminiscent of 
the shifting of marketing territories used during the 1930's. This 
"marketing flexibility" will receive additional attention later as 
one of the fundamental aspects of Blazer's managerial philoso-
phy. 
GREATER SECURITY IN MARKETING OUTLETS 
By 1956, insecurity of market outlets again appeared to press 
Blazer to reappraise the policies which had been so successful 
for the company when it was small. Ashland Oil had grown to 
a size which made it necessary to be careful not to do anything 
which might "rock the boat." The marketing policies that 
evolved were more conventional. Blazer observed to the board 
in August, 1956: 
Business through our own outlets is more dependable, obviously, than 
the business of independent jobbers, who may be either raided or 
bought out by our competitors. I think of our marketing operations 
much the same as insurance premiums. 
The company was neglected consistently by investment ana-
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lysts because of its lack of company-owned crude oil production 
and its unconventional marketing policies. In answer to a point 
made by an analyst that independents sold at lower prices than 
those of major oil companies, Blazer in July, 1957, explained the 
status of pricing of the company: 
In the case of our Company, our wholesale prices for products com-
pare favorably, I am confident, with those of the major oil com-
panies. About one-third of our gasoline is retailed under our own 
brand names at conventional prices. A substantial part of the gas-
oline which we supply to independent distributors for resale under 
their brand names is sold to the public at reduced prices, but from 
those independent distributors we receive the same wholesale prices 
as from distributors who market conventionally at the same prices 
as the major oil companies and we believe that the average wholesale 
prices we receive for our products compare favorably with those 
received by our largest competitors. In fact, it is probable that our 
company realizes a better return on its investment in refining and 
marketing facilities than is characteristic of the major oil companies. 
By January, 1957, when Blazer retired from the position of 
chairman of the board of directors, marketing had proved that 
it was becoming the most strategic branch for executive atten-
tion. Ashland Oil still had little crude oil production, but the 
availability of foreign crude oil relieved worry over shortage of 
crude in the short run. By 1957 Ashland Oil was accepted as a 
substantial company in its transportation activities. By 1957 
the refining branch had been modernized, and the charge that 
Ashland Oil owned a number of obsolete refineries was no 
longer true. It could produce as high an octane gasoline as 
anyone. The pressure in marketing continued, however, since 
the company had outgrown the size in which its past marketing 
policies were most effective. It now was confronted with the 
simple fact that it needed to standardize its service and to build 
"prestige" stations which would be comparable with the service 
stations of the majors. 
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OBJECTIVES OF MANAGEMENT 
Concepts of the Role of the Chief Executive 
PAUL BLAZER was chief executive of Ashland Oil & Refining 
Company and its predecessor, Ashland Refining Company, from 
the incorporation of the latter in 1924 until January, 1957. The 
refining company was organized only after Blazer had accepted 
the executive position. The members of the board of direc-
tors maintained such confidence in his decisions that he en-
joyed complete and relatively unchallenged operating authority 
throughout the period; consequently, the organizational structure 
and the managerial processes developed during these years were 
primarily the result of the opinions and the actions of the chief 
executive. 
This chapter and the next summarize the objectives of the 
management and introduce various phases of the chief execu-
tive's managerial concepts. The tenets of the philosophy are 
not unusual in the management of a small firm, especially when 
an executive has grown up with a company and when he has 
not been exposed to the detailed formal study of management. 
The doctrine set forth here is somewhat at variance with current 
thinking of students of management. It is a belief that has 
developed from observation of the requirements of the situation 
by a small operator. After the company began to grow rapidly, 
OBJECTIVES OF MANAGEMENT 
the chief executive gave increased attention to arguments sup-
porting his views in his letters and oral discussion. 
As a competitor, Blazer found that he could operate success-
fully only if he were able to avoid the disadvantages of the 
generally approved methods used by the larger companies. Later, 
this negative approach developed into his "way of doing busi-
ness." In this period, 1936-1948, intermittent comments in his 
letters indicated that Blazer gradually was crystallizing in his 
mind a positive and unified body of managerial concepts. The 
rapid growth of the company stimulated an expression of his 
ideas in letters to the board of directors. Opposing views of 
personnel acquired through mergers had the effect of pointing 
up disadvantages of his concepts and offered challenges from 
outside management thought. This caused him to define his 
ideas more clearly in his efforts to mold all subordinates in his 
way of thinking. 
By the time the firm became relatively large, Blazer was 
convinced that his concepts had proved successful in the past 
and would continue to be important in future considerations. 
He recognized, however, that such principles would be most 
difficult for another man to follow if suddenly he were to assume 
the responsibilities of the chief executive. In an interview in 
1954, Blazer realized that his ideas would require changes: "The 
system that I have used will undoubtedly be modified. My 
successor probably will not occupy the same position as I have. 
I think that the department heads will instinctively assume more 
responsibility than they have under me." 
Blazer's philosophy never was expressed in any single speech, 
letter, or article. In fact, certain elements have changed over 
a period of time and can be understood only through a historical 
study. In this research a conscious effort has been made to 
refrain from reading reasons into certain statements or actions. 
No attempt has been made to change the concepts so that they 
might appear more logical. If the managerial process is partly 
nonlogical, the objective analyst should not attempt to establish 
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a framework by the help of hindsight. In a dynamic situation, it 
is quite possible that consistency through time is not a virtue. 
As conditions change, the philosophy may be supplemented in 
order to fit the newer problems. 
To organize these elements into a unified group of concepts, 
an attempt was made to establish certain useful generalizations 
which were supported by past actions. Upon review of these 
statements, Blazer qualified them and indicated that he preferred 
to avoid generalizations. His attitude was summed up in two 
sentences: "I have not been as interested in the rules as I have 
been in the exceptions to the rules," and "I have great abhor-
rence of fixed patterns." He expressed a similar idea in his 
letters to the board when he stated that if he had not acted 
unconventionally in the past, the operations probably would not 
have resulted in so great a success. 
McLean and Haigh have pointed out that the small refiner 
has developed unique areas of operations and products in order 
to fill the "interstices" of the industry. They explain the success 
of the smaller companies in niches which have been overlooked 
by the large companies.1 The management of Ashland Oil has 
emphasized this idea of "interstices" not only in problems of an 
operational nature, discussed in previous chapters, but also in 
the problems of managerial techniques. 
Discussion of Blazer's philosophy will relate to his relation-
ships with the stockholders and the board of directors, and with 
the executive personnel immediately subordinate to him. The 
former e'lcompass the general economic, social, and political 
philosophy fundamental to the orientation of the top manage-
ment and its place in the larger structure of the economy. The 
latter which include the managerial concepts fundamental to 
the manner in which the operational policies have been executed, 
are explained in Chapter 9. 
1 McLean and Haigh, The Growth of Integrated Oil Companies, 632. 
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Any study of top management should treat the fundamental 
ideals and goals upon which the operational policies are based. 
In this sphere the scientific search for facts must give way to the 
ethical search for values. Barnard's scheme of the moral element 
directs one's attention to the long-run endurance of the organi-
zation-important for outlining the frames of reference in which 
the short-run, expedient, and opportunistic approach has pre-
dominated.2 
A competitor of Ashland Oil expressed this ethical aspect in 
different words: "The success of Ashland has been the result 
more of the vision of the chief executive than from any other 
factor." The term "vision" in this statement embodied an idea 
of that ability of a top executive to think in terms of the long 
run while directing action in the present. 
In Ashland Oil & Refining Company there is no question that 
Blazer established the objectives of the firm. The legal theory 
that the board of directors determines the fundamental objectives 
is only partially satisfied. Ultimate approval was a function of 
the board, but the initiation of ideas was a function of the chief 
executive; consistently the board supported his recommendations. 
Several factors enabled Blazer to maintain this position. In 
the early period he alone of the top executives was familiar with 
the operating aspects of the industry, but he disseminated the 
most important facts to individual members of the board. 
Moreover, he repeatedly contacted individual members by letter 
and telephone to get their opinions on specific matters. While 
a single member of the board had no legal authority except as a 
part of the group, his opinions, determined prior to the meetings, 
became of fundamental importance in the decision-making proc-
ess. Although Blazer's prestige in the organization made it 
unnecessary for him to seek information and opinions so fre-
2 Chester I. Barnard, The Functions of the Executive (Cambridge, Harvard 
University Press, 1938), 282. 
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quently, this technique enabled him to advance to the board 
as a group recommendations which he knew would be approved 
because of his previous contacts with individual members. Each 
member felt that he had already expressed himself and therefore 
was inclined to support the proposals of the chief executive. 
Although the casual observer usually considered Blazer to be a 
one-man top management, the indirect impact of the members 
of the board on the formulation of company objectives should 
not be underestimated. 
Throughout the history of the company the majority of the 
board of directors were "outside members." During the early 
period of Swiss Oil Corporation, the president, general manager, 
and general counsel were operating executives on a board com-
posed of eleven members. The most important group on the 
board during the first twenty years were the Chicago financial 
interests who had become stockholders in 1919. A second im-
portant group represented the investing public of Kentucky. As 
a result of mergers during the later years, former coowners of 
antecedent companies constituted a third important part of a 
board that ultimately was increased in size to seventeen members 
(and then reduced to fifteen). 
Blazer's monthly letters performed the function of keeping 
these different groups of the board informed. The board of 
directors was a professional group with ultimate control dispersed 
to several balancing interests. The success of the company 
prevented any of the minority groups from being able to exert 
control, and so the authority remained in the chief executive 
in spite of his lack of ownership of a large amount of common 
stock. In all cases he reported unfavorable factors in great detail. 
Thus, he usually achieved results more favorable than his fore-
casts had indicated, thereby minimizing the pressure of unfavor-
able developments. Accounting records of the company usually 
reflected this conservative outlook. 
A chief executive of a corporation usually has some difficulty 
in obtaining the maximum help from his board of directors. 
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Much has been written presenting the arguments for an "inside" 
board and for an "outside" board. Gordon and others have made 
provocative remarks about the entire institution of boards as the 
top level of management.3 In practice, the board often receives 
orders from the chief executive rather than, according to the 
basic theory of private property and the corporation, delegating 
authority and responsibility as representatives of the stockholders. 
Blazer, as chief executive, succeeded in keeping close touch 
with his board, the majority of whom were "outside" members, 
and he recognized the directors to be the source of new ideas 
and action. Even though he was not a majority stockholder, he 
did not run into any potential group who would even think 
about a revolt in management. The key to this achievement was 
the constant communication with each member of the board. 
The telephone was used very intensively. The basic facts and 
thoughts, however, were transmitted by means of monthly let-
ters, quotations from which have been used throughout this 
book in support of facts concerning the decision making during 
the 33-year period. Blazer's first letters were two or three pages 
in length, but in the 1950's they became longer and often 
included communications from other executives and reproduc-
tions of press releases and other material, so that frequently they 
ran to forty pages. 
The following letter is provided as a sample of Blazer's letter-
writing technique. It was selected for several reasons: it was of 
typical length; it was written in December, 1956, one month 
prior to the change in chairmen of the board; it was written at a 
time in which the critical Suez oil situation provided facts which 
the reader can easily remember; it summarizes several of the 
ideas mentioned in other sections of this book; and it provides 
all of the important text of one letter rather than excerpts from 
several reports, such as have been used in other parts of this 
book. 
3 Robert A. Gordon, Business Leadership in the Large Corporation (Washing-
ton, Brookings Institution, 1945), 343-51. 
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Our annual report is now on the presses and should be ready for 
mailing by the 20th of the month. I was late in completing my work 
in connection with the report, and in order to meet our schedule I 
found it necessary to accompany Arthur Points [controller] and Orin 
Atkins [executive assistant] to Chicago the early part of last week 
to read proof and make such changes in copy as always are necessary 
at the last minute to balance out pages and pictures to obtain 
satisfactory appearance. From Chicago, Orin and I went direct to 
New York where we had considerable business to transact-also, a 
dinner of the Asphalt Institute which was attended by Hugh Jenks 
[asphalt division manager] and Mr. and Mrs. George Beddoe [asphalt 
engineer] of our organization. 
I have been extremely busy working with Everett [Wells, executive 
vice president] and others in our organization to adjust our operations 
to take full advantage of changed conditions resulting from dis-
turbances in the Middle East. Temporarily we are refining at 
Catlettsburg almost 60 per cent more crude oil than before we 
put into operation the new equipment only a few weeks ago. Friday 
and Saturday we averaged more than 70,000 barrels of crude oil in 
the No. 2 plant where we are endeavoring to test out maximum 
capacity. It is my recollection that formerly we considered that 
plant as having a capacity of 35,000 barrels per day with an addi-
tional 20,000 barrels in the No. 1 plant, giving an over-all theoretical 
capacity of 55,000 barrels per day. I believe we never succeeded 
reaching an average of 53,000 barrels per day for any month except 
last January when we refined almost 56,000 barrels per day. 
In view of the figures mentioned, I am sure that each of our 
directors will appreciate the significance of refining 70,000 barrels in 
a single day in the No. 2 plant along with a potential of at least 
15,000 barrels per day in the No. 1 plant. The latter plant has 
actually processed well over 20,000 barrels per day for a considerable 
period of time, but I presume its capacity would have to be reduced 
some when running so much in the No. 2 plant since some of the 
facilities of the two plants are joint-such as gasoline treating 
capacity, shipping facilities, etc. With such a big step-up in 
refinery throughput in such a short period, there are many associated 
problems such as getting that much crude into the refinery and 
moving out so much products. We have succeeded in increasing, to 
an estimated 70,000 barrels per day, the amount of crude oil that 
we can get to the lower Ohio River from the oil fields of Illinois, 
Indiana, and Western Kentucky. From that point to the refinery 
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much additional barge capacity has been required. Similarly, extra 
barges are necessary to move the refined products, since almost all 
of the additional products have to move by water. 
We don't have a market for the amount of refined products we 
are now producing, but we have considerable empty storage capacity. 
We have had a burdensome inventory of crude oil, so we have been 
glad to convert some of it into refined products. Besides, we recog-
nized that there was a possibility that, in order to supply additional 
crude oil for Europe, the Federal Government might seize excess 
stocks of crude oil (such as we have had) and make them available 
to major oil companies who are short of crude oil for their affiliated 
European refineries. 
We have considerable flexibility in our transportation system, so 
we have been able to move the extra oil into our refinery and are 
doing equally well in getting refined products out to terminals. Also, 
we have been able to take on much additional burning oil business, 
since there is a shortage of such oils on the Gulf Coast which, 
ordinarily, supplies a part of the requirements of our marketing area. 
Our increased production helps Allied Oil Company which appears 
to be able to use more residual fuel oil than it can obtain from the 
refineries which historically have supplied a substantial part of its 
requirements. However, as indicated earlier in this letter, our prin-
cipal purpose for pressing for all of this extra production at this 
time has been to ascertain our maximum capacity and locate the 
"bottlenecks." In some places we find we need larger pumps, which 
usually can be obtained by transferring from some other service 
where there is extra capacity. Also, we always have on hand spare 
pumps. We are not making substantial expenditures at this time 
in order to remove bottlenecks which are showing up at these high 
levels of throughput, but we are obtaining valuable data as to what 
we would have to do in order to maintain this high throughput 
regularly, or to increase it to a predetermined level such as might be 
desirable if our country should be involved in serious hostilities, or if, 
for some other reason, our volume of sales should increase unex-
pectedly. Besides, there is great value in having some extra capacity 
which relieves some of the pressure of having to engage in overtime 
maintenance work whenever something breaks down. For years we 
have had so much business in relation to our refining capacity that 
we couldn't afford to lose a single day's production unnecessarily. 
I suspect that before we complete these tests we will have refined 
in a single day in our various refineries more than 160,000 barrels of 
177 
BLAZER AND ASHLAND OIL 
oil, not including Niles which could be brought into operation on 
short notice. 
We averaged last year less than 125,000 barrels of crude oil daily. 
I hope we will have sufficient market to support 140,000 barrels per 
day for the current fiscal year. We don't have that much business 
in sight at this time. In fact, we did not draw on inventories as 
much as I had anticipated in October when we ran only 115,129 
barrels per day because Canton was down for inspection and the new 
equipment at Catlettsburg was not in full production. 
The incremental cost of refining additional barrels of crude is very 
low. Thus, any increase in refinery throughput is extremely profitable, 
unless in order to sell the extra production we have to absorb excessive 
transportation charges to move our products into a wider radius. Of 
course, we have an expanding demand in our normal marketing 
area, but there is a limit as to how big a percentage we can take 
without competitive problems which result in price disturbances. 
Probably one of the most important aspects of our business is the 
ability to properly appraise such situations. 
The time to expand our business for burning oils is like the 
present when there is a shortage. When our competitors are short 
of supplies they offer less resistance to giving up a few of their cus-
tomers. We are selling considerable material to major oil companies. 
We can hardly expect to retain that business under normal condi-
tions, although the changed pattern of supply might enable us to 
transfer some of our current sales to exchange arrangements, which 
would enable us, economically, to get into new, more distant markets. 
Since nearly all refiners now have an excess of gasoline, we have 
not put as much pressure recently on obtaining new gasoline cus-
tomers as in expanding our burning oil sales. We are meeting that 
situation, primarily, by reducing our yield of gasoline obtained from 
a barrel of crude oil and increasing our yield of burning oils. In 
that manner we have been able to step up our crude oil runs sub-
stantially without making much more gasoline, but under that pro-
gram we not only have to sell the burning oils from a larger number 
of barrels of crude oil but also a larger percentage yield of burning 
oils. 
Generally speaking, a smaller percentage yield of gasoline is likely 
to mean less realization from each barrel of oil refined and, thus, a 
smaller profit. However, under present conditions the spread be-
tween burning oil prices and gasoline prices is not great and to a 
large degree the difference is offset by the lower manufacturing cost 
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which has to be charged against the incremental barrels of crude oil 
refined. 
The program we are pursuing currently obviously puts a lot of 
pressure on our sales department and, also, to almost as great a degree 
on our various transportation facilities and on our crude oil supply 
department. Even within the last week we have committed ourselves 
to purchase additional crude oil over periods up to a year. We prob-
ably will continue to have more crude oil than we require, but in 
view of the situation in the Middle East we are assuming that if we 
find we have too much crude oil we should be able to sell our excess. 
Our directors should be very appreciative and proud of the way 
our department heads and their assistants respond to the extra 
demands associated with the program I have outlined; it has some 
of the characteristics of a "fire drill," except it requires considerable 
time-probably a few weeks. 
Walker Marx [Canton refinery manager] has been able to further 
step up the throughput of our Canton refinery and has a throughput 
slightly in excess of 30,000 barrels per day. Buffalo could run almost 
as much as Canton except that the Buckeye Pipe Line is able to 
deliver only slightly over 26,000 barrels per day. The Buckeye people 
indicated to me in New York last week that it should not be many 
months until they can give us approximately 29,000 barrels per day. 
We had been expecting only 28,000, which is on the basis of our 
receiving half of their anticipated 4,000 barrel per day increase, but 
Buckeye says that the Socony Mobil plant at Buffalo is not showing 
much interest in taking more than 1,000 barrels per day of the 
increase. I am unable to prophesy as to whether Buckeye would give 
us the extra thousand barrels if Socony should change its mind. 
Heretofore we have been on a 50-50 basis. 
Enclosed is our latest forecast of working capital and capital 
expenditures. We endeavor to be conservative in our forecast of 
earnings; I imagine we have considerably underestimated our earnings 
for the fall and winter quarters. It will be noted that our October 
earnings were at the rate of more than $4,000,000 per quarter. Of 
course, there are a great many current uncertainties, but we probably 
won't fall far short of a profit of $8,000,000 for the first half of our 
fiscal year. Much depends on the weather which will greatly influ-
ence our sales of burning oils and, thus, determine the level of our 
refinery throughput. We are now estimating our capital expenditures 
at approximately $100,000 more than is indicated by the forecast. 
An increase in the price of crude oil is generally expected. I pre-
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sume it is being held back by current oversupplies of gasoline and 
the weakness of that market. A shortage of crude oil-especially 
in the hands of independent refiners-should strengthen the gasoline 
market. 
From a long-range standpoint, a crude oil advance probably would 
be unfavorable to us. Temporarily it probably would cause us to 
show increased earnings, since presumably prices for refined products 
would advance sufficiently to absorb the crude oil advance and we 
would pick up some profits on our inventories. At the time of the 
last advance, refined products prices gradually eased off after the 
initial advance and at the end of a year were about as low as previous 
to the advance and in some instances lower. 
Enclosed is copy of a letter sent last week with employee-dividend 
checks. Attached to it was a copy of my letter to stockholders 
reporting earnings for the fiscal year and advising of recommended 
changes in the management of the Company. Originally we sent 
the employee-dividend checks quarterly, but after their size declined 
so much (one quarter the payments had been equal to 11.53% of 
wages) we have been sending single checks in December for the 
fiscal year ended September 30. I believe that everyone connected 
with the management of our Company is of the opinion that this 
profit-sharing plan is justified from the standpoint of the Company. 
In that connection, I am attaching to the letter which was sent to 
employees some figures which were compiled for me by Jim Barker 
[chief accountant] showing the payments by years since the plan 
was organized nine years ago. 
Our annual meeting falls on January 21. We will call a directors 
meeting for Saturday, the 19th, and I think it would be desirable 
for as many directors as can do so conveniently to arrive in Ashland 
on the 18th. Weather permitting, one of our planes probably will 
cover the Cleveland-Pittsburgh-Buffalo-Canton area. Another plane 
should cover Louisville and Lexington. Eastern Airlines has good 
service from Chicago into Ashland via Louisville, leaving Chicago 
at 3:05P.M. (C.S.T.) and reaching the Ashland-Huntington Airport 
at 6:55P.M. (E.S.T.). I understand that Earl Weaver [executive 
assistant] and Miss Riddle [a secretary J will be handling transporta-
tion arrangements, checking anticipated arrival times, local reserva-
tions, etc. 
There appears to have been an entirely satisfactory reaction to 
the proposed management changes as was suggested in my recent 
letter to stockholders. As far as I can tell, the proposed changes 
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met with general approval within our organization. In fact, I think 
no one was surprised. Everyone has the utmost confidence in Rex 
[Blazer, new chairman of the board] and Everett [Wells, new presi-
dent]. 
OBJECTIVES OF THE MANAGEMENT 
Survival was the primary objective of the management in the 
early period. Although large profits were made in the first few 
years, Blazer refrained from expanding at too great a rate. The 
conservative credit policy, the retention of earnings, and the 
continued use of relatively old equipment were his reactions to 
the earlier policy of Swiss Oil Corporation. Probably Blazer 
reasoned that first he must build security within the structure of 
Ashland Refining Company. For example, in his report to the 
Swiss board in 1925, he stated: 
In spite of the fact that these improvements would pay for themselves 
in a few months, it seemed in view of small profits not advisable to 
make the expenditures in question .... If present profits continue as 
we believe they will, we shall not forget how quickly refining condi-
tions can change, and with that in view we shall continue to keep 
down our expenditures and endeavor to increase our cash reserves. 
His early success in the development of a good credit rating for 
Ashland, so that the subsidiary could obtain funds at times 
when Swiss could not, illustrates the result of this drive for 
survival first. 
After survival seemed assured, the primary objective changed 
to gaining greater security of the company's competitive position. 
In this connection, growth became important. While growth 
in itself never appeared to be an objective, numerous comments 
pertained to expansion as a means of "insurance." Integration 
into phases other than refining was looked upon as a means 
of protecting refining operations. Preceding chapters have sum-
marized the successive steps in this integration process. In the 
early period Blazer appeared to be concerned over the problems 
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of becoming large enough to compete efficiently; in the later years 
he seemed to fear that the company might become too large. 
Beginning in 1936, Blazer made it clear that growth in itself 
was a poor objective. His speech in 1936 to the American In-
stitute of Mining and Metallurgical Engineers in New York City 
expressed this view: 
In recent years almost every oil company in the country seems to 
have been willing to sacrifice transportation economies and marketing 
efficiency for the mere sake of growing larger and covering more 
territory .... Unfortunately, the sales departments usually have been 
"gallonage minded" which is the antithesis of "profit-minded." 
In 1939, speaking before the National Petroleum Association, 
he stated that the smaller firms should look to their advantages 
and avoid the problems of large size: 
Let me again state that, in my opinion, small enterprises in the 
oil industry have few problems that arise inherently from their own 
size, but that their greatest problems, as well as those of the large 
companies, result directly from the fact that many of their big com-
petitors which are already too large from the standpoint of public 
policy, and also too large to function efficiently, are striving to be-
come still larger. ... Actually the earnings report of those companies 
would look a lot better at the end of the year, if the heads of those 
companies would tell their respective sales departments that their 
output for the coming year would be reduced and that it would be 
necessary to get rid of their least profitable 10 per cent of business. 
Later, during the period in which Ashland Oil was growing 
rapidly, Blazer continually repeated such statements as: "I con-
sider, however, that there is no virtue in size as such" ( 19 50) and 
"these large expenditures are not made merely for the purpose 
of having a larger company" ( 19 51 ) . The progressive steps in 
rapid growth were taken in spite of the fact that they made a 
larger company. The management felt that the indivisibilities 
of technological equipment, the need for numerous specialists 
in the accounting, legal, technical, and other areas, and the 
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instability of the refining sector of the industry forced greater 
size even though largeness had important disadvantages. 
Another objective of the management was the classical max-
imization of profits for its owners. Although a major proportion 
of the owners were not operators of the company, they remained 
so closely related to affairs of the company that the management 
necessarily looked to net income as a most important objective. 
For Blazer this objective was based upon pride in the efficient 
management which profits would indicate, rather than upon 
the mere acquisition of greater income in itself. His incentive 
was primarily one of "doing a good job" for men whom he knew 
personally and who were depending upon his executive actions. 
The result was that attention to net profits was probably as 
great as if the company had been owner-operated. 
A third objective of the management related to responsibility 
to employees and to the public. The development of the "Ash-
land family" illustrates a means by which the management 
sought to gain its goal. Location of the firm in a small com-
munity caused the management to identify its goals with those 
of the locality. This objective, which involved treating each 
employee on a personal basis, had definite effects upon tech-
niques of management. 
The family goal of the management established an atmosphere 
that permitted the development of strong informal organizations. 
While these spontaneous groups often were evident only upon 
close study of the operations, they formed a most important 
aspect of the total organizational picture. 
This objective extended to all those with whom contacts were 
made-the community, business suppliers, customers, and so on. 
Blazer believed that good public relations could best be achieved 
by every operating employee without formalization of functions. 
As a result, no executive held the title of public relations spe-
cialist; rather an atmosphere of informal action was promoted 
with the conviction that more sincere, and therefore more effec-
tive, public relations would result. 
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Varied methods have been used in striving toward this family 
objective. Large Christmas parties have been held each year 
since 1930; in recent years 12,000 people were entertained. In-
formal actions by individual executives have met many emerg-
ency needs of employees. For example, upon the death of the 
father of a junior executive, a company car was delivered per-
sonally by the vice president to facilitate a necessary 150-mile 
trip. On another occasion Blazer provided his personal oxygen 
equipment to help an employee's wife who had a serious heart 
condition. 
As Ashland Oil expanded through the merger route, it became 
necessary to decentralize the personnel function and to stress 
employees' identification with their former companies. Certain 
past owners were retained in operations and the previous names 
of the merged companies were kept, even though legally they 
became operating divisions of Ashland Oil. 
Many factors, however, have caused difficulty in the main-
tenance of this family concept. Unionization in 1933 laid the 
foundation for a division of loyalties of employees; government 
regulations during the 1930's and the World War II period 
necessitated formal policies rather than reliance on personal 
discretion. The mere increase in the number of personal rela-
tionships prevented executives from maintaining contact with 
each person and his individual problems. 
As the company became larger, the management initiated 
several actions in an effort to maintain high morale by means 
of the family concept. In line with the theory held by Blazer 
that it would be advantageous for the employees to own the 
stock of their company, the company offered several stock pur-
chase plans to employees, beginning in 1938. A type of profit-
sharing plan was initiated in 1947 in which "employee dividends" 
were paid quarterly to employees and declared by the board of 
directors in the same manner that the board declared dividends 
on stock. 
A fourth objective of the management was to promote com-
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petition in the industry through positive actions and to rely upon 
restrictive legislation such as antitrust laws only in exceptional 
cases. Although Blazer managed a small company which was 
the type that the government sought to help, he consistently 
fought efforts to freeze a formal pattern by regulation of the 
industry. This attitude first became clear during the days of the 
NRA codes in the 1930's, when he was an important industry 
leader on government committees. This experience with govern· 
ment administration had a lasting effect upon his ideas of man· 
agement. Many of the formal techniques employed in govern-
ment did not fit administrative experiences in the small company. 
In December, 1933, he first indicated his thinking to the board 
of directors: "Our company ... has less to gain and more to 
fear than others from this regimentation of the industry." It was 
his belief that Ashland's advantages were based upon a unique 
group of factors which would be neutralized in any governmental 
effort to "stabilize" or "regulate" the industry. A small growing 
company should not seek to freeze a pattern in which it has a 
small share. This attitude persisted after Ashland Oil grew to 
large size, as indicated by Blazer's speech to the Ohio Petroleum 
Marketers Association, Cincinnati, September 20, 1950: "Federal 
control and regulation may be forced upon us because of our 
own lack of leadership, but I can't understand why any individual 
or group should voluntarily ask for such disaster." It is interest-
ing to note that Ashland's return on investment was lowest in 
1934 and 1942-1945, both periods of greatest governmental con-
trols (see Exhibit 4). 
Throughout the 33-year period, Blazer took an aggressive part 
in the fight of the "independents" against the "majors"; yet he 
preferred to emphasize direct competitive means rather than 
appeals to Congress or to the courts. In 1938 Blazer wrote to a 
fellow independent, 
I want you to know that we consider your problems a matter of con-
cern to independent companies in this territory, since in your 
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desperate efforts to save your investments you may rock the boat 
and we will all sink .... And when the independents pass out of the 
picture we are certain to have either government control or owner-
ship of the oil industry as prophesied a few days ago by Assistant 
Attorney General Thurman Arnold. I believe that instead of attack-
ing the present advantages of the major oil companies, all inde-
pendents should try to obtain competing facilities. The problem 
can be solved only by sound economics and not through politics. 
In fact, Blazer gave testimony before Congressional commit-
tees which had the effect of supporting the interests of the major 
companies. Example of such testimony is that offered to the 
House Interstate and Foreign Commerce Committee, July 14, 
1953, in which Blazer explained the factors involved in price 
increases of crude oil in support of the position of the integrated 
producers, even though the increase proved actually detrimental 
to the interests of Ashland Oil. 
Several times this action was taken to show the majors the 
importance of the support of independents-a part of the larger 
picture of "bargaining power" with the larger companies. Such 
moral suasion to get an "even break" from the larger companies 
-through admittance into pipelines, through exchanges of gas-
oline, and so forth-were in Blazer's opinion much more effective 
than appeals to legislative or judicial power. It was evident 
throughout the letters and interviews supporting this study that 
a most important place in the decision-making process was given 
by the chief executive to what David G. Moore called "external 
economic strategies."4 Moore's term, strategy, is especially de-
scriptive of this important characteristic of Blazer's philosophy. 
The mere fact that Ashland Oil has continued to be classified 
as an independent has had an effect upon the aggressiveness of 
its relations with the government. It has continued to seek favor-
able action in ways in which other companies of approximately 
the same size feel they cannot. Major companies in the past 
4 David G. Moore, "Managerial Strategies and Organization Dynamics in 
Sears Retailing" (dissertation, University of Chicago, 1954). 
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have been confronted with unfavorable public opinion of their 
action; consequently, they remain passive on issues at times 
when Ashland Oil aggressively leads. 
DEVELOPMENT OF SUCCESSORS 
The managerial ideas and policies employed by Blazer are often 
criticized on the grounds that they do not tend to result in the 
development of new executives to take over the responsibilities 
upon retirement of the original organizer. As events turned out, 
Blazer did have the opportunity to develop new blood. One of 
the chief concerns of the financial experts in the early 1950's 
was what would happen to Ashland Oil if Paul Blazer had to 
drop out? Persistent rumors, even as late as 195 5, were that some 
major company would buy out Ashland Oil. It still was unbe-
lievable that the company could continue to prosper without 
the help from one of the major companies. The thought by 
many in the investment market that Ashland Oil could not 
exist after the retirement of Paul Blazer caused much speculation. 
Actually, Blazer had always given great attention to training 
of subordinates on how to make a critical analysis for a good 
decision. It is true that the final decision was usually made by 
Blazer, but the type of executive which developed under the 
Blazer approach can only be judged by the results after retire-
ment. Blazer's letter to a member of the board of directors in 
July, 1957, five months after a new set of officers had been in 
operation, gives a clue to the state of management which 
existed after the "strong" man retired: 
I am glad that you were favorably impressed with the way Rex 
[Blazer, chairman of the board) and Everett [Wells, president) 
handled the recent meeting. I am just as impressed with the way in 
which they are handling their other responsibilities. I consider that 
we made the proper decision in the manner in which we divided the 
management of the Company between them. Crude oil production, 
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crude oil supply, pipelines, river transportation, refining, wholesale 
marketing, accounting and part of the activities of the Personnel 
Department are under Everett. Allied Oil, Cleveland and Lakeland 
Tankers, our bulk plants and service stations, sales of Valvoline and 
our other branded products, advertising, most of our public relations 
and much of our personnel relations (other than labor negotiations) 
come under Rex. They both appear to be happy and I am confident 
that neither of them will disappoint us. 
I am not conscious of having had any difficulty in meshing my 
activities into theirs. I consider that I have very few direct responsi-
bilities, except in connection with the budget and financial matters. 
I have more time to read and plan. Having no administrative duties, 
I spend more time with Everett and Rex than formerly, although 
only in an advisory capacity. I continue to do considerable work for 
Everett as regards efficiency of refinery operations, coordination of 
crude oil supply, transportation, refinery production and sales. I have 
more time than he to dig up information, but I am careful to let 
him make the final decisions. Both Everett and Rex recognize 
that they have full responsibility for all decisions, that they are not 
obliged to take my advice on anything, and that if any mistakes are 
made they must assume the responsibility. 
In my opinion, the new responsibilities of Rex and Everett are 
no more significant than the greater reliance of all of us on our 
department heads. Although some of them are quite young, they 
have been developing rapidly and are capable of carrying much 
greater responsibilities than a few years ago. 
I am especially glad that you are favorably impressed with the 
present situation, since it is highly important to the morale of 
Everett and Rex and their assistants that our directors show their 
confidence in them. I am not aware of any significant mistakes, 
but if some are made it is important that everyone recognize that 
new management is entitled to make a few. 
We have an excellent team with many years ahead of them before 
normal dates of retirement. Everett is 52 and Rex will soon be 50. 
Palmer [Talbutt, vice president, sales] is 58, and his very capable 
office assistant Joe Davis is 41. John Fred Williams [vice president, 
industrial relations) is 52, Chub Moffitt [vice president, national sales 
accounts] is 42, and Bob Yancey [vice president, refineries] is 36. 
Erskine Owens [pipelines and crude oil supply manager) is 46. He 
has an excellent assistant in Jack McClure who is only 31. Orin 
Atkins, who is capable of being part of the top management, is 33. 
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Ned Seaton [treasurer] is within three years of retirement and con-
siderable thought is being given to the selection of his successor. 
Alex Chamberlain [vice president] who serves as a trouble shooter 
and usually has time for special assignments, is 57. Upon the death 
of Mike Dupree [transportation manager] his responsibilities were 
split up between John Fox, Bob Gray, and Dave Beldon all of whom 
are 39, and Bill Meachem who is 40. Ward Disbrow who heads 
supply and distribution is 40, and his excellent assistant Paul Kin-
naird is only 34. 
I doubt if there are many companies of our size in which the chief 
responsibilities rest on men of so young an age. 
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FLEXIBILITY AND INFORMALITY 
Blazer's Concepts of Business Management 
UNDERLYING THE concepts and practices of manage-
ment which evolved in Blazer's mind, the idea of flexibility has 
been pervasive and fundamental. Flexibility in this context 
refers to the quality of adaptability to external changes, suscepti-
bility to modification of actions, resilency of policies, and respon-
siveness of the entire organization to meet new problems; it is 
the antonym of rigidity, unchangeability, inflexibility. and in-
elasticity. 
The idea has been that d small growing company in Ashland's 
position in an expanding industry requires adaptability in place 
of the advantages of the technical concept of bureaucracy im-
portant to the large firm. Dimock defines bureaucracy in its 
rigorous sense as having three requisites: subdivision of jurisdic-
tion, hierarchy, and professionalism of personneP Max Weber 
and other sociologists have expanded the study of this subject 
as interest in the organization of large-scale governmental and 
business units has increased. Robert K. Merton has stated the 
advantages of its consideration in the management of a large 
1 Marshall Dimock and H. K. Hyde, Bureaucracy and Trusteeship in Large 
Corporations (Temporary National Economic Committee Monograph No. 11, 
Washington, 1940) . 
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unit: "The chief merit of bureaucracy is its technical efficiency, 
with a premium placed on precision, speed, expert control, con-
tinuity, discretion, and optimal returns on input. The structure 
is one which approaches the complete elimination of personal-
ized relationships and non-rational considerations (hostility, 
anxiety, affectual involvements) ."2 Bureaucracy, therefore, is 
antithetical to the doctrine under study. 
Only in the latter part of the 3 3-year period has Ashland Oil 
been a large firm in any sense of the word. Its chief executive 
has believed that concepts of bureaucracy were best applied in 
the largest firms. He would agree with Robinson, who points 
out: "Where the important decisions are infrequent, and the 
necessity for a quick decision is less urgent, the large firm can 
play its part more efficiently."3 Blazer has felt that in the refining 
branch of the petroleum industry quick decisions on important 
matters occur frequently. 
Dimock has identified the nature of the large firm and has 
focused attention on the contrast between problems of the small 
and large organizations: 
Large corporations, like other large human enterprises, are bureau-
cratic .... Organization grows in importance as size increases and 
trusteeship gains ascendency. And like other large organisms, the 
larger the modern corporation becomes, the more it tends to move 
slowly, adapt itself with increasing difficulty, be increasingly con-
cerned with its inner rules and procedures. Hence, it stands in 
danger of losing that flexibility of price adjustment and resiliency 
of managerial outlook which is the most valuable social asset of 
free competition. 
The extensive use of more or less rigid and precise rules and working 
procedures is well-nigh universal among the giant corporations .... 
Within a corporation, furthermore, subordinate officials often com-
plain that they are not permitted sufficient discretion, that trans-
2 Robert K. Merton, "Bureaucratic Structure and Personality," Reader in 
Bureaucracy (Glencoe, Illinois, Free Press, 1952), 363. 
3 E. A. G. Robinson, The Structure of Competitive Industry (New York, 
Harcourt, Brace and Company, 1932), 50. 
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actions of any size must be referred through too elaborate channels. 
When questioned on this, however, the superior officials are quick 
to point out that there are aspects of such transactions which 
subordinates cannot understand. For consistency and safety, there-
fore, the top executives claim that limitations are necessary. Indeed, 
a whole philosophy of management-that of scientific management-
is largely predicated on the idea of elaborate rules established for the 
most simple and routine actions. An unwieldy body of regulations 
is thus inevitably built up, and it becomes easy to forget the objectives 
of the system in a blind obedience to rules.4 
These quotations have referred to the term bureaucracy in a 
technical and rigorous manner with no idea of an opprobrious 
meaning. The term also has been used popularly in a derogatory 
sense. Von Mises believes that the characteristics of a bureau-
cratic organization will not appear in a private business operated 
for profit. His use of the term is more limited than Weber's 
and Merton's, but he makes several statements which are con-
sistent with Blazer's understanding of the shortcomings of 
bureaucracy: "Bureaucrats ... are no longer eager to deal with 
each case to the best of their abilities .... Their main concern is 
to comply with the rules and regulations, no matter whether 
they are reasonable or contrary to what was intended."11 
These concepts of bureaucracy relate to management of large 
firms; they are the antithesis of flexibility as it applies to the 
smaller firm. The recognition of this concept of flexibility is by 
no means new; many writers have referred to certain aspects of 
the idea. None, however, appear to have placed as great an 
emphasis upon its application to a growing firm as did the chief 
executive of the Ashland Oil & Refining Company. 
A major part of the concepts of management that proved 
useful to this management can be classified under five distinct 
types of flexibility: technological, marketing, financial, personnel, 
and organizational. 
4 Dimock and Hyde, 3-4, 33. 
G Ludwig von Mi~es, Bureaucracy (New Haven, Yale University Press, 1944), 
41. 
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The term technological flexibility pertains to Blazer's concept 
of maintaining the mechanical ability to change one's equipment 
to produce those goods desired by the consumer when and where 
he wants them. In refining, it involves the maintenance of 
specialized equipment in standby condition ready to make a 
product in limited amounts. In transportation, it involves the 
physical ability to change sources of raw materials where they 
can be most economically obtained and to shift refined products 
to those locations where competitors are placing less pressure 
on prices. The idea of technological flexibility is the element of 
the management's concepts best defined in Blazer's letters since 
the very beginning of operations in 1924. His report to the Swiss 
board of directors in 1928 indicated the concept in refining: 
"Such an arrangement [pipe stills in place ot shell stills] frankly 
could be operated much more economically than our present 
plant, but it would not give us the flexibility that we now have, 
nor the special products which add so much to our profits." 
Larger companies were installing pipe stills; shell stills had 
become obsolete. In spite of this trend in technological improve-
ments for volume production, Blazer preferred to keep shell stills 
(in addition to newly constructed pipe stills) in operation until 
1938 because of their adaptability to production of high-margin, 
small-volume business. Restricted financial resources necessitated 
that he maintain profits without installing expensive equipment. 
Blazer gave an important place to flexibility of refining equip-
ment throughout the critical depression years, as has been shown 
previously. By 1945 mechanical refining flexibility proved val-
uable in another way. For years the company had depended pri-
marily upon eastern Kentucky crude. The necessity to adapt 
refining operations to other crudes was explained in a company 
publication: 
The equipment of this refinery has been designed to operate on a 
qexible basis. It is capable of refining crude oils of widely varying 
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characteristics ranging from the low-gravity, high sulphur oils from 
certain fields in Texas, Mississippi, and Western Kentucky, through 
medium-gravity, low-sulphur content crudes from Eastern Kentucky, 
Illinois, and other mid-continent fields, to high gravity, distillate oils 
from producing fields adjacent to the lower Mississippi River. 
Refining flexibility involved both ability to use various types of 
crudes and ability to turn out various types of refined products. 
One of the best examples of this flexibility appeared in 1949, 
when the price of residual fuel oil decreased by 50 percent. The 
annual report of 1949 stated: 
There was no compensating decline in the cost of crude oil. Fortu-
nately, the flexibility of Ashland's principal refinery at Catlettsburg 
was again demonstrated when the yield of fuel oil from a barrel of 
crude oil was reduced to approximately 2% during the period of 
greatest oversupply. As a result Ashland's earnings from its refining 
operations suffered much less than those of the oil industry in 
general. 
Previous discussion of the company's transportation policies 
has made it clear that barges permitted greater physical flexi-
bility; boats could be shifted within limits of navigable rivers, 
whereas pipelines remained fixed from one source to one destina-
tion. Probably Ashland's reason for using barges was its limited 
financial capacity; however, continual change in routes of tow-
boats is evidence that this phase of transportation flexibility was 
no small factor in the operations of the company. The annual 
report for 1948 pointed out this idea: 
For a company which specializes in refining, the constant shifting 
of the economics of the oil industry necessitates transportation 
flexibility in relation to sources of crude oil supply and markets for 
refined products, as well as the ability to vary yields of the different 
products from a barrel of crude oil. Our principal refinery, located 
near Ashland, Kentucky, enjoys the flexibility of cheap transporta-
tion for crude oil and products via the Ohio River which is inter-
sected by pipe lines from both the Eastern Seaboard and the South-
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west. Likewise, this refinery has exceptional flexibility in its ability 
to maximize or minimize the yield of any of the more important 
refined petroleum products. 
MARKETING FLEXIBILITY 
A second element of the concept of flexibility has been pre-
dominant in the marketing of refined products. The term 
marketing flexibility applies to the concept evident in the tech-
niques of this chief executive that distribution of refined products 
should take whatever channels, pricing, and methods that condi-
tions on the spot seem to dictate. Examples of shifting geo-
graphical marketing areas have been evident in previous dis-
cussions. Generally the move was eastward to the "economic 
ridge." Early sales in Columbus, Ohio, decreased and sales in 
Cincinnati increased as the economics of transportation caused 
changes in netbacks. In 1940 the shift to Pittsburgh resulted 
from intense competition in other areas and favorable costs along 
the Ohio River. In 1954 the policy of shifting marketing areas 
to obtain geographical diversification was considered by Blazer to 
be important to the ability of the company to make profits. 
The policy of primary dependence upon the independent job-
ber was an integral part of marketing flexibility. Smaller amounts 
of company funds were needed for marketing properties; the 
local community served as the primary factor of sales promotion 
in place of national advertising; the company was not chained 
to any market as it might have been if bulk plants had been 
owned by the company. The idea of the efficiency of the inde-
pendent oil marketer remained a cornerstone of operating poli-
cies. Blazer reasoned in a speech in May, 1950: 
Many independents have made small fortunes in the oil industry. 
I believe there are just as many opportunities for the independents 
in the future as at any time in the past. In fact, some of the trends 
in business today are working to the advantage of individual enter-
prise as contrasted with large scale operations. Tax laws which 
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already penalize larger companies will be even more favorable for 
small business in the future. Labor relations are likely to be better 
in smaller operations. . . . It is becoming increasingly difficult for 
large corporations to retain the friendly attitude of their employees 
in the face of propaganda directed at large employers and big business 
in general. ... All that the independents need is an "even break." 
Independence of price-making action was illustrated by a 
member of the board of directors of one of the "major" com-
panies in whose "territory" Ashland Oil operated. A contract 
for a large volume of business went to Ashland Oil in a city 
where the major company had an efficient refinery. Upon dis-
cussion of this matter by the board of the major, it was recog-
nized that the reason that Ashland Oil could enter into the 
"front yard of the major's territory," even though it had no 
refinery in that city, was that Ashland Oil had little other such 
business in the community and could base its bid solely on the 
price that would yield it sufficient netback to its closest refinery. 
The major was unable to meet this price without destroying its 
price pattern and stability in its primary marketing area. 
Ashland Oil was able to use its refining flexibility to a greater 
advantage than could larger companies because its established 
commitments of any given type of refined product were not as 
definitely fixed. Ralph Cassady commented on this idea, "It 
takes very little, if any, increase in price to bring forth additional 
quantities of product. ... Usually all that is needed, particularly 
for major companies, is orders for goods from customers. It 
should be pointed out, however, that quantities of one type of 
product (such as gasoline) may be increased at the expense of 
some other type (heating oil, say) by independent refiners when 
the relationship between the two favors such a move. This type 
of flexibility may not be enjoyed as much by major companies 
as by minor companies because commitments to customers rather 
than price advantage have a more important bearing on what 
is to be produced."6 
6 Cassady, Price Making and Price Behavior in the Petroleum Industry, 18-19. 
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Growth had its effect in those areas in which acceptance for 
the company's branded products had been obtained; there were 
signs that the sales policy gradually was adjusted to encourage 
stability in those territories in which Ashland Oil distributed a 
larger proportion of gasoline. These areas, Louisville and Buf-
falo, for example, became increasingly important in the total 
sales volume. In 1954 Blazer expressed a feeling that probably 
he had encouraged the sales of private brands to too great an 
extent in some major areas. Several "price marketers" placed 
pressure on the price structure of areas highly important to 
Ashland's own branded sales. 
The policy of selling to all types of outlets continued after the 
increase in scale of operations in spite of the fact that the com-
pany acquired several important brands and became more in-
tensely integrated in marketing. The primary reason was that 
refining capacity had increased at a greater rate than sales outlets 
and the company found it desirable to utilize the "multiple 
marketing" policy to move refined products. In May, 1950, 
Blazer restated his previous ideas relating to price marketers in 
a speech: 
I think the oil industry makes a mistake in thinking disparagingly of 
so-called price-cutters who try to undersell the market. Within 
reasonable limits, they are good for the industry. We shouldn't 
"look down our noses" at them. I suspect they are our best protection 
against governmental investigation. They tend to keep our prices 
down and force us to be more efficient. Besides, the most ardent 
price-cutter today may be a most respected member of the industry 
tomorrow. 
The policy of selling to distributors for rebranding has required 
marketing flexibility. Adaptability to several reference marketers 
encouraged further emphasis on flexibility. Cassady makes the 
following observations: 
The principal characteristic of price making in the minor firm is that 
decisions can be made without reference to committees or other 
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executives. This flexibility results, in part at least, from the fact 
that this type of concern is definitely the follower type and also that 
the organizational structures of such concerns are very simple and 
authority and responsibility are concentrated in a few key individuals. 
Very often in such organizations the vice-president in charge of sales 
makes most of the pricing decisions, although at times the president 
wishes to be informed on such important matters as any serious 
soft market conditions in which the company is involved or any 
unusual types of deals which the firm has taken on and especially 
those which involve financing or financial obligations. 
This flexibility is one of the most valuable assets of this type of 
organization.7 
When Ashland was small, flexibility was mandatory for sur-
vival in the particular niche in which the company operated. 
Flexibility made possible a dynamic outlook that encouraged 
rapid growth. After achieving large size, the emphasis on 
branded products to some extent opposed the flexibility de-
manded previously. 
FINANCIAL FLEXIBILITY 
The term financial flexibility refers to the ability of a firm to 
change its investments from one type of activity to another and 
to secure additional funds quickly on good terms when an oppor-
tunity appears for profitable investment. 
As a result of the stringent times experienced by Swiss Oil 
Corporation, the management of Ashland Refining Company 
watched its financial condition carefully throughout its existence. 
A policy of relating capital expenditures to the amount of 
allowance for depreciation was used as a rule of thumb to avoid 
financial difficulty. By 1928 (when an 8-percent preferred stock 
was issued) the subsidiary was better able to obtain new funds 
than its parent. Listing on the New York Curb Exchange of 
7 Cassady, 104. 
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the securities of Ashland Oil & Refining Company in 1936 was 
a further step in gaining increased flexibility of financial actions. 
In 1945 the company became known in the national securities 
markets upon sale of 40,000 shares of 4~-percent cumulative 
convertible preferred stock in April and the refunding of an 
insurance term loan by issuance of $5,000,000 of twenty-year 
3-percent sinking fund debenture bonds in August. The working 
arrangements with an underwriting firm, developed in these two 
issues, laid the foundation for numerous entrances into the 
securities market in the next ten years. Ashland's good finan-
cial name cannot be overestimated in its effect on the growth 
of the company. One observer commented that he felt that 
Blazer had not considered rapid growth until the success of 
his entry into the national investments market in 1945. 
Each time the management sought new funds after 1945, the 
amount depended upon an estimation of the maximum which 
the company could obtain on good terms. Funds "for working 
capital" were obtained when such funds were available in the 
market rather than when they were needed. It was assumed 
that the funds could be used profitably at some time in the 
future, since the industry was an expanding one. Evidence of 
this action does not appear in consecutive balance sheets be-
cause, by the time the money was actually obtained, the manage-
ment usually was able to put most of it to work before the date 
of the next annual report. Comparison of current ratios of 
Ashland Oil with those of other companies shows no significant 
difference, partly because the management did not give attention 
to the current ratio but to net working capital. Blazer reasoned 
that the use of net working capital for general management 
planning was preferable; unlike the current ratio, it was not 
susceptible to being improved merely by more rapid payment 
of the company's current obligations. 
References to this policy of securing funds whenever possible 
appeared from time to time in Blazer's monthly letters. An 
example of one such statement occurred in October, 1939, dur-
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ing negotiations for a loan from an insurance company: "We 
do not need the money at this time. . . . Possibly we will not 
make the anticipated large capital expenditures before two years, 
but in the meantime we can use much of the proceeds." 
A capital budget was not formally prepared until 1950, and 
then only as a flexible guide for department heads, when a 
serious illness incapacitated Blazer. However, even then the 
budget was more an estimate of source and application of funds 
than it was a capital plan. Blazer late in 1951 stated that "in 
an opportunist business like the oil business, budget estimates 
do not mean much." In spite of this statement, a budget com-
mittee was appointed and depended upon for its estimates. 
Until the late 1930's the method of deciding upon capital 
expenditures used postponability as a criterion.8 This method 
kept the management cognizant of the obsolescence factor so 
important in the refining branch. As long as the company could 
refrain from committing itself on new capital expenditures, it 
retained the ability to shift its future operations to meet new 
technological advances. Committing only a minimum of its 
funds to fixed assets at any one time gave the management that 
much more reserve power to meet new situations. The small 
refining firm has such limited financial resources relative to the 
size of a capital commitment, that it must continually maintain 
its ability to shift to possible new courses of action. The intro-
duction of the Dubbs process in the 1920's illustrates the 
adaptability in refining; the discovery of new fields in Illinois 
in the late 1930's was an example in production. 
PERSONNEL FLEXIBILITY 
The term personnel flexibility refers to the ability of the execu-
tives and employees of the company to perform in various posi-
s For further discussion on this method, see Joel Dean, Managerial Economics 
(New York, Prentice-Hall, Inc., 1951), 567. 
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tions within the organization as they may be needed. This fourth 
aspect of flexibility relates to dependence upon executives who 
are "generalists" rather than specialists. Blazer felt that this 
phase of flexibility resulted in high morale and good cooperation 
and was, therefore, essential to other aspects of his philosophy. 
He outlined this idea in a commencement speech in 1950: 
The demand for trained men to fill the best jobs in large companies 
exceeds the supply. There are more vacancies near the top than 
down the line. I don't know why that should be, unless it is because 
large business is inclined to make specialists out of its key people, 
thereby precluding breadth of experience. Possibly a contributing 
factor is the necessity for the various levels of authority in big busi-
ness to make decisions and assume responsibility for those under 
them. Or it may be because so much emphasis has been placed on 
technical training and not enough on those qualities which make for 
leadership. In that connection, we must never forget that essentially 
we shall always live in a world of people-rather than in a world of 
things. Others can do for us more than we can do for ourselves. 
He considered a training program tailored to the needs of a 
particular person as part of the answer to the problem. His 
executive development procedure was handled on an informal 
basis to accomplish this. He explained that in many cases large 
companies have had to secure their top executives from small 
companies because the large companies had developed only 
specialists. A company in the oil industry is especially troubled 
with this problem, since its four branches are very different 
from one another and require men of different skills and back-
grounds. The small oil company must encourage executives to 
look at integrated groups of problems; it cannot afford to main-
tain specialists who do not see the problems of other depart-
ments. 
The small company must usually develop its own top execu-
tives. In only a few instances has Ashland's management gone 
outside for experienced executive personnel. The company 
started with young college-trained men and gradually developed 
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a team of executives who became accustomed to working to-
gether. After its rapid growth through merger, it relied upon the 
executive talent of the newly acquired companies to supplement 
its supply of experienced executives. It maintained a low over-
head with little "fat" in order to keep costs low. Moreover, it 
increased the breadth of ability of those executives it did have. 
A contrasting statement was made by the officer of a large 
company: "If you want to develop management, you need to 
have some 'inventory' to work with, some people to rove around, 
some men 'in transit', some extra jobs where men are in training 
for greater responsibilities. You must have spares."9 
A second aspect of personnel flexibility involves implementa-
tion of personnel policies. Even in 1954, when the company was 
relatively large, there was no "employees' handbook" nor any 
precisely stated group of personnel policies (except those which 
were required in government regulations and union contracts). 
The emphasis continued to be upon personal and individual 
relationships between management and employees even though 
the company was one of the first to recognize the Oil Workers 
International (em). The contest for loyalty of the workers 
between the management and the union has been strenuous. 
According to a union leader, often after union officers had 
attempted to achieve unity of effort on the part of employees, 
Blazer through personal contact would convince the individual 
workers that their best interest called for their support of 
management. 
ORGANIZATIONAL FLEXIBILITY 
The foundation upon which all other aspects of flexibility have 
been built will be referred to as organizational flexibility. The 
concept refers in part to that "quality in an organization that 
9 Frank W. Pierce, Executive Talent: Its Importance and Development (Cali· 
fornia Institute of Technology Industrial Relations Bulletin 19, Pasadena, March, 
1951). 
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enables it to adjust itself to temporary changes in business 
conditions without serious losses of economy or effectiveness."10 
The concept also refers to dependence on "informal organiza-
tions" and a minimum formal structure-evolution in place of 
planned engineering. It differs from the concept of personnel 
flexibility in that the latter pertains to the human element, 
whereas the former refers to structure and processes. 
Although it would be possible to obtain degrees of flexibility 
in other aspects without special emphasis on this element, 
Blazer's idea was to avoid a static pattern of structure for fear 
that it would defeat his efforts to maintain the adaptability of 
his total managerial effort. Since little thought was given to 
organization, the emphasis on organizational flexibility was 
mostly unconscious for a number of years. 
In spite of his attempt to keep a clear and simple line struc-
ture, by the late 1930's Blazer was forced by the increased size 
of operations to depend on functionalization (a personnel de-
partment was organized in 1938). Later, after the rapid growth 
of the late 1940's, he began to decentralize some authority in 
sales divisions to retain organizational flexibility. Throughout, 
he increased his own span of control to an extreme degree. 
In the early period there was little need for an organization 
chart. When the company became larger, Blazer remained 
adamant in his opposition to the use of charts. Reference to 
this idea did not appear in his letters to the board until the firm 
became large (about 1948). It was at this point that he 
rationalized from his past experience that conventional organiza-
tion charts create too much rigidity to fit his other ideas of 
flexibility. Thus, not until the growing company demanded 
more formal structure did Blazer begin to organize his arguments 
against it. 
Continued emphasis on these five types of flexibility promoted 
efforts to achieve the company's objectives. Blazer believed that 
10 Ralph C. Davis, The Fundamentals of Top Management (New York, 
Harper & Brothers, 19 51), 508. 
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his doctrine uniquely fitted the needs throughout most of the 
company's history. Environmental and historical factors pre-
viously discussed provide a basis for understanding this opinion. 
In later years the skeleton of these managerial concepts appeared 
in writing; however, for this study it was necessary to supplement 
the written statements with extended interviews. Tape record-
ings and on-the-spot observations form the basis for the following 
discussion. 
The elements of Blazer's managerial concepts can be classified 
into concepts of organizational structure, concepts of organiza-
tional process and internal communications, and concepts relat-
ing to the evolution of responsibilities. 
CONCEPTS OF ORGANIZATIONAL STRUCTURE 
During the early years Blazer dealt with his operating problems 
directly through personal leadership and few subordinates. Pre-
vious discussion of refining growth has shown that new functions 
were assumed by assistants. Although there was some func-
tionalization, Blazer preferred the "staff assistant" to the "staff 
specialist."11 Most of the young and inexperienced junior execu-
tives required training, and delegation of authority necessarily 
was minimized. The company was of such a size that one bad 
mistake by an inexperienced executive could wreck it; Blazer 
felt that he just could not afford to allow new officers to "learn 
by their mistakes." Any academic criticism of this breach of 
currently accepted principles of management should consider 
the environment in which this technique was used. 
As the company grew and required more managerial personnel, 
11 Ernest Dale, Planning and Developing the Company Organization Structure 
(American Management Association Research Report No. 20, New York, 19 52), 
61. "The 'assistant to' has no power to act on his own. Instead he furnishes 
his chief with information and recommendations which the latter is free to use 
a~ he pleases. . . . The position of 'assistant to' may have the advantage of 
introducing a new function 'under the wing' of the boss. Thus the incumbent 
of the new function is given a chance to show what he can do." 
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Blazer tailored his organization to the personal characteristics of 
his subordinates and his needs for assistance. There was no 
attempt to establish "positions" with definite titles or clearly 
defined duties. In the early 1930's organization planning first 
took on importance. Observation of organization disadvantage 
experienced by other companies caused Blazer to take a definite 
stand against the use of organization charts in his company. 
In spite of advice from new executives, external pressures to 
establish a clear-cut structure, and additional pressures resulting 
from increased size, the chief executive continued to oppose 
formal organization planning. 
A series of charts could have been used to explain the organiza-
tion as it appeared at a series of points in time. In this case, 
however, it would be misleading to use this conventional tool 
which shows the flow of authority in the usual lines, because it 
would mean the addition of a synthetic tool that was not 
actually used in practice. Moreover, this study focuses its 
attention only on the relationships of officers who normally 
had direct access to the chief executive. For these reasons, the 
chart in Exhibit 20 has been developed, principally from inter-
views, to summarize the actual evolution of the organizational 
structure of major functions directly under the chief executive. 
Exhibit 20 shows a number of characteristics of the top 
management organization and the personnel that filled the 
positions over the 33-year period. There were relatively few 
positions and executives in the first four as compared with the 
last four years; between 1924 and 1928 only one line and three 
staff executives answered to Blazer; in 1952-1956, there were at 
least a dozen line and a dozen staff and functional executives 
who were normally in direct contact with the chief executive. 
Many additional executives on the lower levels might have 
received direct telephone calls or visits from the chief requesting 
information or giving orders. 
The exhibit also shows the gradual development of organiza-
tion from a single executive performing line functions, to the 
205 
BLAZER AND ASHLAND OIL 
development of departmentation in the early 1930's, to the 
beginning of functionalization in the late thirties, and finally 
to the development of operating divisions after 1948. Moreover, 
it pictures the development of specialization of functions. 
As the company increased in scale of operations and number 
of personnel, the emphasis upon a loose structure at the top 
contrasted with the more clearly defined organization of lower 
echelons. This difference became even more marked after the 
mergers of the 1948-1950 period. In spite of the known objections 
of Blazer to charts, many lower executives planned their depart-
ments more or less privately with the use of charts and direc-
tories. This difference between the levels with respect to 
formality will further explain Ashland's organization. First, the 
reasoning behind Blazer's philosophy only partially permeated 
to the lower echelons. Second, the lower levels were staffed 
with younger personnel, schooled in the advantages of char~jng 
and formality. Their techniques were the product of institu-
tional training in business administration instead of the gradual 
development of a modus operandi acquired from experience. 
Third, the more routine and standardized problems of the lower 
echelons lent themselves more easily to formality. Major execu-
tives had worked together over a long period of time and knew 
the management's "way of doing business"; this made the loose 
structure of the upper levels possible. The low turnover of execu-
tive personnel over the entire history of the company prevented 
any major crisis in the top working group; on the other hand, 
new personnel were continually added to the lower levels. 
By the time the company had reached larger size, Blazer had 
formulated his reasons supporting his ideas on organization. He 
recognized that there was greater difficulty in the application of 
the concepts in the larger organization and that some other 
person in his position would not be able to carry out such a 
degree of informality. In an interview he observed: 
My form of organization was better adapted to a company somewhat 
smaller than we are today and in an industry less complex. This type 
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is only practical where the management has grown up with the com-
pany. I don't think anyone could come in cold. 
The emphasis has remained on company rather than func-
tional departmental loyalty. A central idea in Blazer's concepts 
was expressed in an interview: 
If you had really sharp departmental lines, you would find people 
telling others that "it is none of your business" and "leave that to 
me." ... Nobody is going to take that attitude if they don't know 
themselves the limits of their responsibilities. I have felt that you 
get more cooperation from people if your organization is so set up 
where they have to cooperate to get along. 
Immediately after the mergers, special effort was made to 
integrate the new employees into the "Ashland family" while at 
the same time making use of their loyalty to predecessor com-
panies. The emphasis was on identification with each of the 
former company groups but a continual guard was kept against 
functional segmentation of loyalties. Good communications 
were maintained between these divisions and the home office. 
In spite of this effort to build an unsegmented identification 
with the company, the increased size, geographical decentraliza-
tion, and different historical backgrounds of antecedent com-
panies made this technique increasingly difficult. The result 
was the use of the decentralized division for the organization 
of each merged company. 
The closest approach to a visual pattern of the organization 
was first compiled on December 1, 1951, in the form of a 
directory, which was distributed to major executives only. Al-
though it included the names of major and middle executives and 
their position titles, often the individual himself did not know 
the exact title of his position as stated in the directory. No titles 
of positions nor names of departments appeared on the doors 
of the home office. When questioned on the possible significance 
of this omission, Blazer indicated that he had not consciously 
planned such a practice. Such incidental evidence, however, is 
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ExHIBIT 20-EvoLUTION OF ORGANIZATION, 
LINE 
Chief Executive 
President 
Executive VIce President 
General Refining Supt. 
Supt. Catlettsburg 
Supt. Canton 
Supt. Freedom 
Supt. Louisville 
Supt. Buffalo 
Supt. Findlay 
Production, Crude Oil 
Sales Mgr. National 
Sales Manager 
Ex. V. P. Allied 
Ex. V. P. Freedom-Valvoline 
Ex. V. P. Aetna 
Ex. V. P. Frontier 
Captain, Tankers 
Transportation, River 
Transportation, Pipelines 
STAFF a FUNCTIONAL 
Secretary 
Treasurer 
Controller 
Accounting 
Auditing 
Traffic 
Purchasing 
Crude Oil Purchasing 
Labor Relations 
Personnel 
Legal 
Advertising 
Management Engineering 
Research 
Supply a Demand 
Executive Assistant 
Executive Assistant 
Paul G. Blazer ('/. P. a Gen. Mqr. ) 
c. A. Jouett• E.F: Irwin 
J. F. Miles,.. j Buck Williams 
-------r.------
E. L. McDonald 
W. A. Waples 
;, 
; Everett Wells (V. P.: 
M. C. Dupree* 
W. H. Keffer* 
Rov Grossenbach 
'' B.F: Vinson,. 
Stokely Rion* 
INITIAL SECOND LEVEL 
OF DEPARTMENTALIZATION 
1924 1926 1928 1930 1932 1934 
AsHLAND OIL & REFINING CoMPANY, 1924-1956 
Paul G. Blazer (President) Paul G. Blazer (Ch. of Board) 
Ill 
Mf 
lli B. Morgan 
J. Howarc:fMarshall"' Rexford s. Blazer 
L. Alexander '" 
E. A. Brown"' lrl 
Everett Wells 
R.A.Whealy R. Yancey(vPJ 
W. Marx G.Mxers 
~ w.s. rr~·~ren .ta:~ 
W. H. Keffer* l V.P.) 
. M. C. Sumpter 
H. C. Amold"'d:Larshal~:f~a~~:~ ... E. Emrick 
, . F. M. Moffitt (V • .EU_ 
P. Talbutt (V.P.) 
F. C. Colegrove 
H. I. Johnston 
C. M. Alexander• F. Ware 
W. D. Baskett 
; , L. M. Jonassen 
R.Grav 
Ray Laughner 
E.W.Seaton 
A.J. Points 
A.J. Points J.H.Barker 
S. E. Hippensteele 
P. H. Banks• W. Meachem C. Lovil'lq 
Edward Emrick J. K.Barron 
W. M. Luthy"' E. Owens 
f--:~ 
Ale~ Chamberlain 
John Fred Williams (V. P.) 
Lewis Ware 
· S. M. Burnam 
Willis Munro* G. Sisler 
INITIAL 
FUNCTIONALIZA TION 
IE 
Alex Chamberlain (V. P.) 
H.C:Houlton 
W. Disbrow P. Kinnaird 
_INITIAL 
DIVISIONALIZATION W. Hull 0. Atkins 
E. Weaver 
56 1938 1940 1942 1944 1946 1948 1950 1952 1954 1956 
"'Left Company *Died • Retired 
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significant in showing the pattern of his entire managerial 
emphasis. 
The layout and furnishing of the offices did not indicate any 
effort to show the rank of executives through the use of prestige 
symbols. Both junior and senior executives of the company 
(except when addressing Blazer) called each other by first names. 
Little use was made of a formal status system. The previous 
discussion of the dynamics of the industry and particularly of 
the operations of Ashland Oil within the industry has pointed 
out the changing conditions that confronted the management. 
Barnard stresses stability as important in the development of a 
status system: 
The overvaluation of the apparatus of communication and administra-
tion is opposed to leadership and the development of leaders. It 
opposes leadership whose function is to promote appropriate adjust-
ment of ends and means to new environmental conditions, because 
it opposes change either of status in general or of established 
procedures and habitual routine. 
From what has been presented, it is perhaps evident that the sum 
effect of the status system, though essential to coherence, coordina-
tion, and esprit de corps, is to reduce flexibility and adaptability. 
When the external conditions to which an organization must be 
adapted are stable, the importance of flexibility and adaptability is 
much less than under rapidly changing conditions.12 
Blazer looked upon any definite position title as potentially a 
straitjacket. For example, if he allowed an executive to become 
identified with some segment of the organization through clear 
delegation, he felt that he would be outlining a bailiwick in 
which that executive would feel a vested interest and would 
tend to oppose a change which would destroy his delegated 
departmental "empire." 
Throughout the first thirty years of the company the number 
12 Chester I. Barnard, "Functions and Pathology of Status Systems in Formal 
Organization," Organization and Management (Cambridge, Harvard University 
Press, 1948), 240, 242. 
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of vice presidents was kept to a minimum. The title of vice 
president did not identify a chief functional executive as such; 
it referred to the recognition of general ability. No predeter-
mined group of duties carried the prestige of the title of vice 
president, because different phases of operations alternated in 
receiving major emphasis. Rank depended upon the importance 
of the job in current operations, not upon a title structure fixed 
in some past period. In 1954 there were four vice presidents: 
only two held line authority-the executive vice president and 
the sales manager; the other two held staff positions- the director 
of personnel and an industrial engineer. As the company became 
consolidated as a large organization, additional vice presidents 
were appointed in the last two years of Blazer's administration. 
Flexibility of titles also permitted Blazer to make the maxi-
mum use of the individual support from the former owners of 
predecessor companies. After the Freedom-Valvoline merger, 
one owner was placed on the board of directors of the parent 
company; the other served as chairman of the board of Freedom-
Valvoline. In the case of the Allied owners, both were placed 
on the board of directors. In the case of Aetna, the surviving 
owner remained in the position of president of the subsidiary. 
One owner of Frontier retired, and the other became a member 
of the board of directors. 
Precise job descriptions of executive positions were deliberately 
unstated. Blazer felt very strongly that the degree of cooperation 
that had been attained in the Ashland Oil organization had 
resulted from this reluctance to compartmentalize any part of 
the operations. He felt that numerous disadvantages of such 
compartmentalization greatly outweighed its advantages. For 
example: if there were a clear-cut, continually emphasized set 
of duties for each person, there could be a tendency for the 
executive to avoid any other responsibilities that might arise in 
a dynamic situation; emphasis on rigid channels and departments 
would confuse organization means with organization goals; a 
spirit of teamwork in the company as a whole could not develop 
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as easily when specialized departments and ranks were empha-
sized. 
Blazer always believed that a "flat" organization was preferable 
to an organization with a number of levels in the hierarchy. He 
placed emphasis upon short lines of authority. He felt that it 
was more economical to be "underorganized" than "overorgan-
ized." Administrative overhead remained low as a result of the 
following reasoning, quoted from an interview: 
Our organization started out being very simple. Probably we have 
been underorganized rather than overorganized. I always said that 
one man may have a job, running it successfully, and not be over-
worked. He may be running the whole department by himself, or he 
may be running two departments-and happy in his work. You give 
him an assistant. The job may not have changed a bit; at the end 
of a year, he couldn't possibly do the job himself; he becomes 
dependent on the assistant. If you gave the two a third man, they 
would become dependent upon him. That is true when you start 
organizing and delegating responsibilities. It is better to let one 
man, in my opinion, cover a little too much territory than it is to 
have two men. Two things happen. One is that they begin to get 
jealous of each other-each starts to feel that the other is getting 
out of his bailiwick. On the other hand, if one man is doing the 
job, he is carrying it pretty well in his own head; he doesn't have to 
spend a good share of his time conferring with someone else and 
coordinating what each is doing. You put two men on the job; you 
can't expect to get twice as much work. They have to confer a lot 
to keep from getting their wires crossed; they do get them crossed to 
a certain extent and spend time getting them straightened out again. 
Now the weakness of my philosophy is that there is a tendency to be 
short-handed organizationwise. 
In an analysis of the past titles of the major executives, two 
terms appear to have special prominence and significance. As 
the firm grew rapidly after World War II, Blazer appointed 
several "executive assistants" (or assistants to) and "coordina-
tors." These vague titles appeared not from a lack of a clear 
understanding of the duties of the position, as is often the case, 
but from Blazer's basic concept of organizational flexibility and 
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general executive development as opposed to specialists' develop-
ment. Later, in the exposition of the evolution of responsibili-
ties, this idea is shown to be a positive action by the chief 
rather than mere irrational procedure. 
CONCEPTS OF INTERNAL COMMUNICATIONS 
The organizational structure evolved at Ashland Oil depended 
upon communications that would help Blazer to respond quickly 
to new conditions. Two classifications are important in con-
sidering the flow of internal communications. Vertical com-
munications relate to lines of authority from top to bottom of 
the hierarchy. Horizontal communications relate to means of 
informal cooperation among executives on the same level of the 
structure. Henri Fayol characterized these two classifications as 
ladder and gangplank concepts.13 
Since Ashland's organizational structure was often not well 
defined, the lines of authority were not clear. In the early years, 
authority descended in a simple line from the chief executive. 
As the firm increased in size, additional young executives were 
appointed as semiline officers. Often they functioned as staff 
executives, but as they became more experienced, they began to 
operate more with true line authority. 
Direct vertical communications were encouraged. Blazer felt 
that he operated not only as a decision maker but as a "reporter" 
among the various departments.14 He encouraged the collection 
of complete information and its dissemination to all subordinate 
levels which needed the facts. The greater the number of levels 
through which this information passed, the greater was the 
opportunity that the information would become inaccurate 
13 Henri Fayol, General and Industrial Management (New York, Pitman Pub-
lishing Corporation, 1949), 34-35. 
14 Blazer's experience as a reporter on his father's newspaper during his 
adolescence and on his college paper possibly affected his attitude toward this 
function of a manager. 
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because of the human tendency to add impressions to original 
facts. As a result, Blazer contacted the person closest to the 
information, although that person might not be his immediate 
subordinate. 
While all quantitative reports were distributed in writing, 
instructions for future action usually were oral. The need of 
the smaller company to change its plans quickly was thought 
to be met better by a minimum of memoranda. The very fact 
that a policy was in writing would cause the subordinate execu-
tives to rely on the letter of the policy in place of understanding 
its intent. Blazer felt that once a policy was placed in writing, 
there was a tendency for it to remain in the files long past the 
time of its applicability. 
Gardner and Moore express Blazer's feeling nicely: 
There is a strong tendency for many organizations to develop pro-
cedures for handling practically every problem situation-to define 
everything to the point of eliminating all individual decision and 
initiative. In considering many modern industrial organizations, it 
would seem almost as though they were being slowly strangled by an 
over-elaboration of procedures and policies. In some organizations, 
no one dares to breathe unless he first finds out what the procedure 
is. Everything has been defined. Nothing has been left to the 
imagination or individual decision. Rigid, unadaptive bureaucracy 
reigns supreme ... It appears as though a procedure, once established, 
seldom dies a natural death; it usually has to be murdered in cold 
blood if it is to be done away with at all. Probably one reason why 
procedures are taken for granted and allowed to continue ad infinitum 
is that they were originally set up to eliminate thought.15 
The technique of bypassing intermediate subordinates both in 
seeking information and in giving orders will be referred to as 
the "jump method of direct management." It depended upon 
the ability of the chief executive to retain sufficient details in 
his mind to enable him to converse on the technical aspects of 
15 B. B. Gardner and D. G. Moore, Human Relations in Industry (Chicago, 
Richard D. Irwin, Inc., 1950), 195-96. 
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subordinates' operations. This method of seeking information 
served several purposes in Blazer's opinion, as expressed in an 
interview: 
It keeps me educated, not only informed. My education in this 
manner is a refresher course. I pick up information that many 
times is more significant to me than it would be to the super-
intendent over the particular operation .... Maybe I am more 
interested in details than the superintendents are and maybe I am 
drilling them on it. I very deliberately put them on the spot some-
times by asking them questions that I already know about their own 
plant-that I think they should know-and I know they feel that 
they won't get caught that way again. 
While this jump method of direct management was often 
used to seek information, it was also used to give orders. Of 
course, this procedure violated the scalar idea in which orders 
are passed down to the various levels through the complete line. 
In order to avoid the obvious disadvantage of undermining the 
authority of the intermediate subordinate, the method required 
that each subordinate fully understand that it was his duty to 
inform his immediate superior of orders received from the top 
level. Any failure of this upward communication would have 
caused middle management quickly to get out of touch with 
actual operations and to feel that its function was no longer 
important in the process. Blazer recognized that this technique 
had many pitfalls and was dependent upon a previously estab-
lished high morale and an idea of cooperation to avoid jealousies. 
He reasoned in an interview: 
The only people that we have had any trouble adjusting to our way 
of operating have been people who have come in from other organiza-
tions .... You lose efficiency if you make it [organization] absolutely 
rigid because a lot of things can't be settled intelligently except by 
contacts between two people .... It is everybody's responsibility to 
not only do their own job but to make sure that others who are 
affected by their work are informed of something that they might 
not otherwise know. 
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Such a management concept depended upon low executive 
turnover. The executives were able to get the "feel" of opera-
tions. They developed an esprit de corps which provided an 
atmosphere of mutual help among members of the management 
team. Dependent upon these necessary conditions, the jump 
method yielded certain advantages: the decision of top manage-
ment resulted in immediate action at the lowest levels, and top 
executives maintained intimate contact with all members of the 
organization. The result was an increase in the morale of the 
organization because members felt that they were more closely 
associated with the top decision-making process. Top executives 
had better personal knowledge of the capabilities of those on 
the lower levels and could act accordingly in executive develop-
ment. 
In Blazer's concepts, the use of committees as a means of 
maintaining coordination was considered slow, inefficient, and 
expensive. As a substitute for staff and committee meetings or 
other multilateral methods, he emphasized the use of bilateral 
communications. The tools discussed below were adapted to the 
numerous contacts between two operating executives on the 
same level. Blazer strove for close cooperation through de-
pendence upon informal organization to eliminate any prede-
termined obstacle that might interfere. 
Growing out of this emphasis upon an informal approach to 
organization, horizontal communications evolved into a system 
which was not planned and, moreover, not generally recognized 
by those in the operating processes. This unplanned system will 
be referred to as "horizontal automatic coordination." It grew 
as a result of the pressure placed upon an organization tailored 
for a small firm but confronted with an unusual increase in 
organizational problems due to a rapid increase in size. 
Sidney Swensrud, former chief executive of Gulf Oil Corpora-
tion, expressed a similar idea: "I am also far from clear as to how 
far the decision-making process can be made sort of 'automatic,' 
or at least less personal. With some decisions, you have to reach 
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conclusions very quickly because there is a deadline hurrying you 
along. These, I am sure, are made decisions, and they may have 
to be personal within the grasp of the top executive. With 
others, you have more time, and it has been my experience that 
if you let the people who are best equipped to do so throw light 
on whatever problem is under review the right decision will often 
emerge more or less automatically out of the process."16 
Each executive on the lower levels knew his general primary 
function but often was not sure where his authority and responsi-
bility ended and the next man's picked up. Each was motivated 
to seek counsel with other executives, directly but informally, in 
cases in which there was no clear-cut concept of responsibility. 
This bilateral communication (usually by telephone) between 
two executives on the same level enabled both to plan a co-
ordinated effort to meet the immediate problem. The basis for 
discussion often was one or several reports which had originated 
in each of the departments concerned. These written operating 
reports had been developed by Blazer to give sufficient informa-
tion for his own decisions. They originally were communications 
submitted vertically from the lower levels to the chief executive. 
As the load on Blazer became greater with little use of func-
tionalization and additional levels to relieve him, the reports 
began to flow horizontally to other departments for their infor-
mation. Whereas Blazer gave the ultimate orders when the firm 
was small, increasingly such orders were issued by lower echelons, 
not through delegation, but through the necessity which resulted 
from inability to reach the chief executive. At this stage the 
reports became more important as a basis of horizontal informal 
discussion than as a control device of the vertical lines of 
authority. 
The result of the combination of these numerous reports and 
telephone conversations was that each department put into 
writing what it .planned to do on a certain problem and dis-
lG Carnegie lnstitnte of Technology, Fundamental Research in Administration: 
Horizons and Problems (Pittsburgh, Carnegie Press, 1953), 74. 
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tributed the quantitative "proposals" to all departments which 
could possibly be affected. If there was a part inconsistent with 
another's action, a telephone call resulted. Blazer observed in an 
interview: "I think that we have five times as much communica-
tion between departments as do other companies." Often when 
the firm was smaller, these reports were consistent; but as the 
firm became larger, each department's idea of the actions of 
other executives became less accurate, and more phone calls 
resulted. Not until 1954 was this system formalized to some 
extent by the introduction of a functional production control 
department. 
This system of automatic horizontal coordination satisfied a 
need in the informal organization after the firm began to grow 
rapidly. The smaller firm (until 1948) found its simple, flat-line, 
and semifunctional organization equal to the task. During the 
transition period in which formal efforts to organize were 
avoided because of emphasis on flexibility, the high morale of 
the executives, who had learned the modus operandi through 
long personal associations, enabled the firm to maintain a degree 
of coordination that would seem to be impossible under such 
concepts employed in the organization of a large firm. In the 
smaller organization, Blazer had been able to expand his span 
of control so that his direct method of management was equal 
to the task. After the sudden and rapid increase in size between 
1948 and 1950, this method of management became more dif-
ficult. Even this chief executive with his immense capacity 
found it more difficult to retain contact directly with all elements 
in the organization. 
Blazer's capacity appeared to result primarily from two factors: 
the mental ability to remember details and the hours per week 
devoted to the business. Throughout the history of Ashland Oil, 
his duties with the company were· both vocational and avoca-
tional for him. 
Although there was no conscious change in the techniques of 
management, gradually the department heads and the lower 
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echelons of executives evolved this system of automatic hori-
zontal coordination. The final step of recognizing a clear formal 
organization of the top level failed to develop by 1956, although 
there were signs of efforts by subordinate executives to formalize 
their immediate functions. 
The development of this informal system resulted because 
Blazer thought that bilateral methods of communication had 
basic advantages over the committee type of organization. No 
committees of any importance operated until 1951. At that 
time a budget committee, an annual report committee, and 
a credit committee were the primary examples of multilateral 
discussions. Actually, Blazer's device of encouraging conferences 
among two or three members of the executive staff approached 
the idea of committees. On many occasions after 1950, three or 
more executives would be involved in telephone conversations 
that lasted from fifteen minutes to an hour. 
After the firm had increased in size, luncheon meetings of the 
top executives served often as informal committee meetings. 
A new building finished in 1954 provided an executive dining 
room which facilitated informal discussions. In this way the 
team spirit was used and the usual disadvantages of committee 
actions were avoided. An operating executive commented that 
this private dining room was used much more than the con-
ference room and was worth its cost aside from its dietary 
function. 
Through bilateral techniques of conferring with his executives, 
Blazer was able progressively to supplement his factual informa-
tion, obtained directly from supervisors, with opinions from top 
executives. When he made a decision, he took account of 
opinions of all executives involved in the actions. This approach 
left the final decision to Blazer; it could be said that there was 
little delegation of decision-making powers. On the other hand, 
the ideas of the chief executive could easily have changed pro-
gressively after each bilateral conversation so that the ultimate 
decision reflected the impact of the opinions of all who had been 
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contacted. In many cases, the subordinate was not conscious 
of his importance in the final decision. 
This bilateral method depended upon the competence of the 
central figure. Several important shortcomings of the method 
were expressed by an employee, trained in another organization, 
who had not adjusted his thinking to this unconventional 
type of management: each subordinate failed to get the advan-
tage of the thoughts and reasoning advanced by other subordi-
nates; the subordinate first contacted often found that the 
ultimate decision was quite different from that which he assumed 
to be the result of the initial conversations; of greatest im-
portance, the subordinate did not obtain the experience of 
shouldering responsibility for a final decision. 
Concepts of both vertical and horizontal communications 
within the Ashland Oil organization depended upon the use of 
efficient mechanical media. Need for frequent exchanges of 
comments by executives on the same level increased the use of 
telephone contacts. The informality surrounding the organiza-
tion encouraged a telephone call in event of any doubt. In this 
emphasis upon quick changes of policies, the telephone was used 
in the place of written memoranda in more formal systems. 
When operations became decentralized geographically, private 
telephone lines connected important divisions. 
Informality and speed were achieved through direct contact 
of major executives. Each executive had two telephone lines 
to his office-one for his secretary and one for himself; an 
employee could call the executive directly without first talking 
with the secretary. The family atmosphere encouraged em-
ployees to contact executives in any event that appeared im-
portant. Restrictions on access to executives remained minor 
even after the attainment of larger size. 
vVhile written memoranda were infrequently used, quantita-
tive reports and estimates were circulated widely. Blazer's in-
terest in detail resulted in a large monthly operating report 
which was distributed to major executives. The section pertinent 
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to each department was given to its department head. This 
information enabled each supervisor to obtain facts of his own 
progress for his own control. 
Blazer commented in an interview: 
The average person does not in my opinion understand and fully 
appreciate the importance of accurate information and details. Most 
people, not all of them, have pretty good judgment based on facts 
as they have them, but they often make wrong decisions because 
they didn't have enough facts. Many decisions have pros and cons 
in them and you can find many reasons for handling them this way 
or that way, but the final decision rests upon where is the pre-
ponderance of information. That is the thing that I have kept trying 
to drill into them and that's one of the reasons that I think justifies 
my working with a lot of people in that I think that I have a lot of 
people way down the line trained in my way of doing business. 
The informal method of organization depended upon close 
personal relationships with the lowest employees. Every chance 
was taken to write to employees at favorable times. For example, 
one reason for originally paying the "employees' dividend" 
quarterly was to give the chairman of the board a medium 
through which he could explain to employees the problems 
facing the company. Blazer expressed his idea to the board in 
March, 1948: 
I believe the employee-dividend plan will install considerable interest 
in our stock and in our earnings. It gives us a vehicle to encourage 
that interest by the sending of a letter each quarter, along with 
employee-dividends, giving such information concerning current 
operations and earnings as we believe will be interesting to our 
employees. 
Blazer also considered that contacts between the management 
and the families of employees yielded high returns in labor 
relations. 
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Departmentation under Blazer's concepts depended primarily 
on the individual traits of the personnel and only secondarily on 
criteria of departmentation that appear logical and rational in an 
"ideal" set of circumstances. This view is supported and criti-
cized by many in the management literature. Emphasis is placed 
upon personal factors which cause executives to maintain co-
operative efforts. Under this concept it is believed that the 
establishment of rigid policies of organization distract the execu-
tives from the essence of the problem-cooperation and imagina-
tion. If responsibilities were outlined completely, the incentive 
of each individual would be toward a betterment of his own posi-
tion in the rigid requirements of the hierarchy, whereas the 
primary effort should be toward more complete cooperation 
and coordination of the entire group. 
The building of an organization under this philosophy is a 
"natural evolution of responsibilities." This phrase appears in 
various forms in Blazer's letters, but it became more frequent 
and more clearly stated in 1954. A comment in an interview in 
that year will help to clarify this viewpoint: 
[In the NRA] we formalized this with the idea of eliminating some 
wasteful competition but that brought up two other things and then 
you had to fix that and that brought up 15 other things and then 
you had to fix them and the first thing you knew the whole structure 
fell of its own weight-too many regulations .... Human nature is 
too complex and business is too complex-no one can compensate 
for all of those variables. It can't be done with the human mind-it 
can't be done by regulations-it's got to be done by competition and 
evolution. It has to be done with the confidence that what is best 
will survive and what is not best will sometimes be a source for 
worry, but in the aggregate, things that are good will succeed and 
things that are bad will fail. ... In my organization I come back to 
that same idea. I put people in jobs that call for a title and a public 
announcement. I don't give them the title right away .... I don't 
perceive accurately the outlines of that job any more than I can 
visualize fully the capacity of an individual in a new capacity .... 
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Most people think that you can say that 1ogica11y a thing fa11s in a 
certain place. WeB, maybe it does and maybe it doesn't. 
The idea is that each new executive should be introduced 
into the going concern with specific duties; he should gradually 
increase his scope of understanding and fit himself into the com-
pany's "way of doing business." This way of doing business 
was not concretely defined and in most instances involved what 
Barnard has called "informal organization."17 The idea was to 
refrain from setting a fixed pattern which would form a fence 
for the developing executive. A specific list of duties and re-
sponsibilities hinders the aggressive leader from becoming better 
acquainted with the more general problems. 
Blazer used as an illustration one of his vice presidents who 
was both able and aggressive. He had been one who had pressed 
for more formal organization. Yet, as Blazer pointed out, he 
was the best example of a top executive who could not be 
fitted into a formal chart of authority. Often he would study 
problems as a staff executive in one of the line departments, 
only to end up assuming some of the line responsibility. It was 
claimed that much of his energy and effectiveness would have 
been lost if he had been completely fenced in in a definite spot. 
Blazer claimed that the vice president was making a much better 
top executive because he had had a variety of experiences. 
If the specialized job in which he had been placed did not fit 
his personal capacities, the young executive could gravitate to-
ward that area in which he could contribute the maximum to 
the welfare of the company. If "positions" were established into 
which persons were fitted, Blazer felt that the company would 
be likely to lose the advantage of unique capacities of developing 
executives. Positions could be changed more easily than personal 
capacities. 
In all organizations there is the "informal" which exists inde-
pendently of the formal but which can be used to strengthen 
17 Barnard, The Functions of the Executive, 114-23. 
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Executive: Birth 
Date, Education 
Everett F. Wells 
Jan. 18, 1905 
Illinois '26 
(Economics) 
P. C. Talbutt 
May 25, 1899 
Three months 
of college 
A. S. Chamberlain 
July 4, 1900 
Yale '22 
(Engineering) 
E. W. Seaton 
April 15, 1894 
Yale '16 
(Engineering) 
Arthur J. Points 
July 19, 1904 
G'town (Ky.) '25 
(Liberal arts) 
Edward Emrick 
Feb. 17, 1909 
Illinois '31 
(Accounting) 
R. A. Whealy 
Nov. 25, 1907 
Iowa '3 3 (M.S.) 
(Chern. eng.) 
ExHIBIT 21-ExAMPLES OF ExECUTIVE DEVELOPMENT, AsHLAND OIL & REFINING CoMPANY 
Previous 
Experience 
No previous full-
time employ-
ment 
Shipfitting; dry 
cleaning; fire-
man at oil re-
finery 
Soap company 
foreman; engi-
neering con-
sultant 
Iron and mining 
company; shoe 
company treas-
urer; banking 
Bank teller 
Dairy cattle; 
dry goods ship-
ping department 
Schoolteacher; 
research as-
sistant at 
university 
Initial Job with 
Company 
Refinery operator 
( 1926-1928) 
Dubbs cracking 
plant operator 
( 1926-1928) 
Industrial engi-
neering con-
tant (1932-
1933) 
Credit manager 
( 19 32) 
Accounting clerk; 
two summers in 
refinery 
Refinery operator 
( 1930) 
Chemist (1935-
1936) 
First Executive 
Position 
Assistant sales 
manager (1928-
1930) 
Assistant refining 
superintendent 
(1928-1929) 
Personnel man-
ager (1938-
1950); safety 
Credit manager 
Accounting (1939-
1945); adviser 
to chief execu-
tive 
Assistant treas-
urer; assist-
ant credit 
manager 
Chief chemist; 
asphalt sales 
Intermediate 
Position 
Sales manager 
( 1930-1949) 
Division sales 
manager, Cin-
cinnati ( 19 3 2-
1949) 
Employee maga-
zine; credit 
union; methods 
studies 
Treasurer; coordi-
nation with 
Defense Plant 
Corporation 
Assistant to 
president; ar-
bitration; an-
nual reports 
Director of pur-
chases; special 
assignments 
Assistant ( 194 3), 
superintendent 
of refineries 
( 1946-1953) 
Title of Major Position ( 1956) 
and Principal Executive Duties 
Executive Vice President (Director)-
Top-level coordination of refining, 
transportation, marketing; relieves 
chief executive of operating duties 
Vice President (Director)-
General sales manager 
Vice President-
Management engineering; pipelines; 
insurance benefits; economic studies; 
community projects 
Treasurer (Director)-
Treasurer; real estate; credit manager 
Controller-
Functional executive in accounting; 
investigator in all mergers 
Director of Purchases; Manager of Pro-
duction-Exploration-
Finance 
Coordinator, Refining and Sales-
Executive assistant to executive vice 
president 
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the formal organization. If the formal organization were precon-
ceived in a rigid manner involving precise definition of duties, 
Blazer believed that the chances were that the informal organiza-
tion would be inconsistent with the formal and would weaken 
rather than strengthen the formal structure. His concept of 
"evolution of responsibilities" referred to an effort to allow the 
informal pattern to become evident prior to conscious decisions 
relating to formal organization. Often this "natural" construc-
tion might not have appeared as logical as one would have liked, 
but it had the advantage of being effective in gaining the maxi-
mum cooperative effort in those cases in which it was possible to 
develop slowly human relationships in the organization. 
Under this natural evolution of responsibilities, Blazer pre-
ferred not to make a promotion until the individual executive 
was allowed gradually to obtain experience, often as a "staff 
assistant." The flexibility of job titles made it possible for an 
executive to work on a job in an "acting" capacity prior to 
recognition of the change. If the executive proved that his 
abilities and interest qualified him for promotion, an announce-
ment ultimately was made. Often the new title was not the same 
as the one held by his predecessor; the job was tailored to the 
person's abilities. Exhibit 20, therefore, can only give a first 
approximation of the personnel that performed the various 
functions. If the executive proved that he was not able to fill 
the duties of the new job, Blazer could easily shift him to one 
more suited to his abilities and yet avoid loss of status for him. 
Ashland Oil could be continually in a state of reorganization 
as a result of changing conditions without the confusion that 
usually develops in periodically changing the formal structure. 
At the time of each of the mergers, this evolutionary process 
enabled Blazer quietly to work out the new management with-
out sudden changes that could adversely affect the morale of the 
workers. In the case of Allied, the entire operation remained 
separate with the exception of refining, but gradually the home 
office absorbed certain overhead personnel. In the case of Aetna, 
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the individual around whom the employees identified themselves 
remained as a symbol of a continuation of past policies. There 
was no sudden change in the management. The problem at 
Freedom-Valvoline was more difficult. Three executives were 
potential material for the chief position. The actual change was 
made only after a year, during which the division was operated 
by a committee of the three. In the case of Frontier, one of the 
owners remained temporarily to give the new management a 
chance to become established. An executive from Allied spent 
part time in Buffalo and gradually evolved into the position of 
executive vice president of Frontier. In each of the cases, time 
was taken to secure the effects of the informal relationships prior 
to establishing the formal position. The pliable characteristics 
of the system permitted changes to occur without attracting 
unfavorable attention of employees. The fact that the status 
of an executive was dependent upon his actual functional rela-
tionships in place of scalar or hierarchical positions made the 
growth of the organization correspond closely with current 
necessary functions rather than with preconceived and static 
patterns of an engineered structure. 
Blazer's idea of evolution of responsibilities in organization 
through the adaptation of the organizational structure to the 
individual executives resulted in informal executive development 
procedures. From the very beginning of the company, the train-
ing of executives was a primary problem. Consistent with his 
basic philosophy, Blazer did not set up an executive development 
program in the sense that the phrase has been used in formal 
plans. Nevertheless, the stress he placed upon the general 
evolution of each potential executive contributed to a solution of 
his needs for capable executives in the rapidly growing company. 
The major executives in 1956, shown in Exhibit 20, came pri-
marily from two sources: young executives hired by Blazer in 
the early 1930's, and key executives of merged companies who 
remained in the combined organization after the mergers. 
Exhibit 21 is a summary of the principal duties of seven of the 
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executives who had been with Ashland Oil for twenty or more 
years and who in 1956 were major executives. 
The philosophy of management discussed in this chapter 
gives great weight to flexibility and informality. The concepts 
were important in the early success of the company; they had 
characteristics that contributed to its rapid growth; but they 
posed a number of problems as the firm became large. 
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The Evaluation of Policies and Practices 
THE PROCESS of evaluation is the measurement against 
certain standards considered to be valid by the appraiser. In 
the theory of management there are many proposals for such 
standards. Most depend upon their logical appeal and their 
mutual consistency for their proof. Concepts are said to be 
"good" when they agree with these defined standards, and "bad" 
when they differ. At their present stage of development, these 
standards are inadequate as a basis for evaluation. Often they 
result in ambiguous and contradictory recommendations. The 
student of management, therefore, must use an evaluation 
procedure that measures in terms of objective results. 
Intensive case studies provided a fruitful approach for research 
in administration. In the case of Ashland Oil it has been obvious 
that repeated successes have been achieved by Blazer over a 33-
year period. As the number of observed successes increased, the 
probability that chance was the cause has decreased. The writer 
has studied the numerous situations of decision making in 
search for the basic causes of this record of successes. Now it is 
time to point out the generalizations that logically follow from 
this historical study of administration in action. 
Several factors that more or less were out of the control of 
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the management were necessary but by themselves not sufficient 
for the 3 3-year record. The growth in the demand for oil 
products provided the opportunity for good managers to direct 
profitable ventures. The social policy of the federal government 
in its control of monopoly practices was of value to the operation 
of smaller companies. The geographical characteristics of Ash-
land's area of operations provided important advantages for a 
company that was located there. Yet these reasons were generally 
applicable to other companies which failed. A look into internal 
administrative processes is required to find the sufficient causes. 
Two groups of factors within the control of the management 
answer the question as to why the company was successful. 
First, the operating policies have set the guides to proper de-
cisions. Second, Blazer's managerial concepts have implemented 
the direction of the company in execution of the policies. The 
results have been due to exceptional abilities and ideas of a 
single chief executive. In this case, a single executive has pro-
vided the top-level direction over the entire period. The history 
of the company has become a specialized biography. This study 
of the policies and concepts employed by him contributes valu-
able empirical data to management research. 
The most important of the general operating policies was 
continual emphasis on the interstices of the oil industry. Blazer 
searched for and found niches in all four branches of the indus-
try. He considered that he was not as interested in the conven-
tional approaches to operations as he was in the advantages of un-
conventional actions. For example, he was more afraid of govern-
mental help for small business by guaranteeing a fixed place in 
a rigid pattern that would prevent expansion into new areas 
than he was of the advantages of scale held by the larger com-
panies. 
Preceding chapters have offered instances of the application 
of this policy of filling niches. In the production branch, it was 
seen that Ashland Oil obtained its greatest success in the opera-
tion of "stripper" or marginal wells. Executive attention was 
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directed to decreasing the cost of operations of these producing 
wells which others found uneconomical to operate. Most of the 
remaining company requirements of crude oil were bought from 
independent producers through its large purchasing organization. 
Only at times of exceptionally favorable tax treatment of ex-
penditures in exploration and development did the company 
follow the view held by many executives in the industry and 
expand its company-owned crude oil supply. 
The management placed great importance on river transporta-
tion as the niche in which it was able to obtain an economic 
advantage. This specialization on river barges provided a means 
by which the company was able to meet the competition of 
pipelines operated by larger companies. Even when Ashland Oil 
acquired a pipeline-the Cumberland-it did so at a time when 
no other company believed that operation of the facilities 
would be profitable. 
In the refining branch the management acquired obsolete 
equipment of little value to anyone else and continued to 
operate it long past the time when other companies considered 
its use desirable. Even though the management shifted to the 
use of new refining techniques when absolutely necessary, it 
retained the obsolete equipment and continued to operate it 
profitably. Whereas other refiners emphasized automation and 
volume production, Ashland Oil, as a small company, effectively 
exploited the niche of production of low-volume, high-margin 
specialty products. 
In the marketing of refined products, the management filled 
the geographical niches left by major companies. It specialized 
in offering service along the economic ridge of costs between the 
eastern seaboard and the midcontinent oilfields. Whereas the 
managements of many large companies regarded an increase in 
their market share in a given area as a criterion of success, Ash-
land's management tried to remain an insignificant marketer in 
any given area and to expand by moving into other profitable 
areas. It specialized in the sale of products in areas of low-sales 
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concentration which were relatively unattractive to the larger 
companies. 
As a small company, this specialization in the niches of the 
industry proved to be an important reason for success. As the 
firm grew, it became increasingly difficult to find niches suf-
ficiently large to accommodate the company's complete opera-
tion. Growth forced a greater emphasis on conventional phases 
of operations. The company sought intermittently to expand its 
exploration for crude oil; it found that participation in pipelines 
was desirable; it promoted branded gasoline. As the company 
grew, its operating policy remained one of emphasis on inter-
stices but necessarily became more like those of large firms. 
A second general operating policy was the continual adjust-
ment of its pattern of integration. Previous discussion has shown 
that repeated changes in Blazer's opinions were characteristic 
throughout the company's history. These resulted partially from 
financial inability to maintain the rate of increase of company-
owned crude oil production and company-owned marketing out-
lets equal to the rate of increase of refining capacity. Each step 
in the growth of refining brought with it additional pressures to 
acquire greater security in the supply of raw materials and 
marketing outlets. These pressures caused Blazer to change his 
reasoning quickly in the planning of capital expenditures. His 
opinion that independent producers and jobbers could perform 
their function more efficiently than could his company-owned 
departments continually reappeared as conflicting with the fact 
that supply by independent companies was more insecure. The 
result was that he made repeated changes in his rationalizations 
to the board. Although the fluctuation of capital expenditures 
among the four branches fitted the dynamic situation in the 
oil industry, the management probably failed to achieve greater 
returns from investments by its lack of a planned capital expendi-
ture program in production. 
The reluctance of the management to set any fixed integration 
pattern had an important impact on the nature of growth of the 
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company. Since operations were based upon the assumption that 
throughput should always be kept near capacity, refining became 
the reference branch. Other branches were forced to balance 
their operations with refining throughput. In times of de-
creased demand for oil products, the sales branch became a 
potential limiting factor to economical refining operations. 
Although the area of competition was extended in order to 
maintain volume, it was often necessary aggressively to seek new 
independent jobbers. If sufficient outlets were not available or 
if other companies purchased Ashland's jobber outlets, the man-
agement became especially receptive to offers of merger from 
independent companies. During these times of decreased de-
mand, most independents were experiencing financial problems. 
As a result, both parties looked favorably on mergers. 
Previous discussion has shown that in most of the mergers, 
marketing facilities were the chief interest of the Ashland Oil 
management. The two periods in which most mergers took 
place were ones of decreased business activity in the oil industry 
( 1930-1931 and 1949-1950). Purchase of these marketing prop-
erties facilitated adjustments in the integration pattern neces-
sary to keep refining throughput at capacity but was not the 
result of a formally planned program of expansion. This policy 
of giving primary importance to refining thus led to growth in 
marketing at a time in which properties could be obtained on a 
most favorable basis. 
Although the majority of the mergers were with independent 
companies which possessed good marketing outlets, the fact that 
each company also owned a refinery provided the foundation 
for still further growth. In every case the refining equipment 
was small, obsolete, and not valued highly in the negotiations. 
Yet after the mergers, the Ashland Oil management quickly 
expanded throughput to exceed that attained by the former 
company. In this way the initial attempt to seek marketing out-
lets resulted in still greater increase in throughput, and in turn, 
new pressures for sales outlets. 
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The result of this opportunistic policy in integration was that 
the company acquired marketing facilities and refining capacity 
at a reasonable cost. It grew rapidly in spite of the lack of a 
strong desire on the part of management to expand. Successful 
negotiations and profitable operations made growth inevitable. 
Ashland's policy on integration led to a continued use of a 
third operating policy that had originated at the very beginning 
of the company. The Ashland Oil management recognized the 
sporadic nature of refining improvements in the industry and the 
indivisibility of additions to equipment. Consequently, as a 
result of limited financial resources, Blazer decided to refrain 
from adding new equipment until it became clear that an in-
novation would affect the entire industry. Only after unusually 
rapid changes in technology was he willing to make improve-
ments which had forced many independents into poor financial 
condition. Once it was clear that the change would be necessary, 
he added equipment of sufficient size in order to obtain reason-
able economies of scale. In most cases, this increased capacity 
reinforced the pressure on the sales branch, since the company 
could not expect to increase outlets for refined products as 
quickly as it increased refining capacity. The incremental cost 
of the extra capacity was so low that the management preferred 
to extend its marketing territory and accept lower netbacks in 
an effort to attempt to increase volume rather than to depend 
upon the security of a smaller but more stable throughput. This 
policy was a logical one for a small company that is operated 
with a flexible netback and a management that was not satisfied 
to accept a static sales volume for an extended period. 
These three general operating policies help explain the manner 
in which the small company operated profitably in competition 
with very large firms. The execution of these policies further 
explains the company's growth. Blazer developed his own con-
cepts of administrative behavior that achieved especially good 
coordination. 
The concepts of technological, marketing, financial, personnel, 
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and organizational flexibility have provided the keystone of 
Blazer's managerial philosophy. The evidence shows that these 
ideas are interrelated and especially suited to growth. They have 
resulted in high morale of executives and employees, while at the 
same time their successful application has depended on the 
existence of high morale. The problem that confronts the stu-
dent of management becomes one of reconciling these ideas with 
current, apparently conflicting, thoughts-or he must discard one 
group. Some reconciliation can be achieved. The discarding of 
Blazer's thoughts would be unwise in the light of the evidence 
as to their success under the situations faced over the thirty-
three years. Additional research on the success of such ideas in 
other companies can provide a more conclusive answer. This 
research should be focused on the smaller growing companies, 
inasmuch as the likelihood of finding such philosophies will be 
greater in those companies than in the large companies whose 
managements have been molded in the pattern of the current 
thought of the "professional manager." 
What useful generalization of administrative behavior is sup-
ported by the evidence submitted in the preceding chapters? It 
is evident that the degree of flexibility has been a most important 
factor in the growth and profitability of Ashland Oil. Some 
degree of flexibility is generally agreed to be desirable. The ques-
tion of the correct degree should be answered in the light of 
returns or advantages from each type of flexibility balanced 
against the costs or disadvantages of each. 
As Ashland Oil grew rapidly after 1948, it appeared that the 
returns from the degree of organizational flexibility achieved up 
to that time were diminishing and the costs of maintaining 
such a degree were increasing. The most important factor that 
caused the net returns to decline was the increase in the scale of 
operations. Other factors that could have been important in 
explaining the increase in costs to this company, for example, 
changes in governmental policies and changes in personnel in 
the company, were relatively constant between 1948 and 1957. 
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The evidence that a high degree of all types of flexibility con-
tributed to the growth of the company is convincing. This same 
growth caused the costs or disadvantages of this degree of flexi-
bility to increase as the returns decreased. It therefore follows 
that in the continued growth of the company a point has been 
or will be reached where the management should emphasize a 
lesser degree of flexibility. Up to this point the emphasis yields 
increasing net returns; after this point the returns are less. 
This relationship of changes in scale to net returns from a 
given degree of flexibility appears to be valid for each type dis-
cussed in Chapter 9. The point of maximum net returns, how-
ever, tends to differ for each type. Since each tends to reinforce 
the advantages of the other types, the determination of the 
overall point of maximization is a complex problem. Further-
more, these points of maximum advantage are functions not 
only of the scale of operations but also of the rate of growth, the 
nature of the industry in which the company operates, and the 
personal characteristics of the executives. 
In the past discussion it has been shown that the structure of 
the oil industry, especially its composition of very large com-
panies and a number of much smaller ones, has affected Blazer's 
orientation to his problems. The industry's low ratio of labor 
costs to capital investment has enabled the company with larger 
assets and sales to employ those administrative techniques char-
acteristic of a company with a small total executive and labor 
force. Furthermore, in the early period ( 1924-1933) the in-
stability of prices and production in the industry demanded 
sensitive communication and organization patterns that would 
enable quick adjustments to the changing situation. 
In addition to scale of operations and nature of the industry, 
the degree of flexibility that was desirable has been determined 
by the personal characteristics of the company's personnel. The 
leadership of Ashland Oil has been provided by a man who built 
the organization from the beginning and developed a charismatic 
atmosphere in his relationships with his subordinates. The 
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subordinate executives were young, inexperienced, and potenti-
ally malleable to the uniquely functioning organization. The 
subsequent low turnover of personnel made it possible for each 
executive to become thoroughly familiar with the modus oper-
andi of the organization. The confidence of the stockholders in 
the chief executive permitted him to direct activities as if the 
company were owner-operated. The "Ashland family" idea and 
its resultant high morale was engendered by the location of the 
company's major facilities in a small town. 
The point of maximum net returns from a given degree of 
technological flexibility was early affected by the extent of use 
of automation in the industry. After the change from the batch 
process to the continuous process in the late 1920's, most larger 
companies stressed economy of volume production rather than 
flexibility of products. This action by the other companies left 
a place for Blazer to maximize returns by applying his idea of 
technological flexibility. His use until 1938 of shell stills in 
series with fractionating towers is a good example of his success 
in the maintenance of returns in this type of flexibility above its 
costs for a longer period than was characteristic of the larger 
companies. After its own rapid growth in 1948-1950, Ashland 
Oil, as a larger company, continued to emphasize volume produc-
tion, which had been practiced during the World War II years. 
This policy, which resulted from the increase in scale, caused 
the management, in the period of depressed prices in 19 54, to 
recognize that its ability to adjust to new products had become 
smaller. Volume throughput had impaired technological flexi-
bility. 
The advisability of emphasis on a high degree of personnel 
flexibility is clearly a function of the scale of operations. As 
Ashland Oil grew, the "family" became so large that it was 
impractical for all executives to have personal contact with all 
others. Geographical dispersion increased the problem. Yet 
the continuation of the application of this concept was success-
ful even in a company of 4;600 employees. The characteristics 
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of the personnel discussed above were important in this suc-
cessful application in such a large company. Moreover, the 
experience and proficiency of all executives for handling their 
decisions on an informal basis increased the desirability of this 
concept. In addition, the number of hours per week that each 
executive devoted to company duties remained exceptionally 
high and permitted greater use of both the "generalist aspect" 
and the "personal aspect" of personnel flexibility. It is evident 
that one group of managers will be able to utilize successfully 
the ideas on a given scale where another group of equally com-
petent executives may not. Ashland's management represents a 
case of continued successful application in a relatively large 
firm in spite of the increased costs resulting from growth. 
F1exibility in marketing has remained valuable throughout the 
firm's growth for several reasons. First, operations in the "ter-
ritories" of six different reference marketers has required that 
the firm's marketing policies be especially adaptable to the 
actions of its competitors. Second, the firm's rate of growth has 
required such a rapid increase in marketing outlets that multiple 
channels and use of independent jobbers have remained finan-
cially necessary. Third, in spite of the rapid absolute growth of 
the firm, the company's relative importance in most of the ter-
ritories remained small. It appears that the returns from 
marketing flexibility were still relatively great for the firm's size 
in 1957 as compared with the cost of such flexibility; however, 
the critical size requiring a different approach was only slightly 
larger. 
One aspect of financial flexibility tended to become more 
potent as the firm grew, while another generally decreased in 
usefulness. The shiftability of assets became more difficult as 
the firm committed itself to greater fixed assets in the different 
branches of the industry. On the other hand, after 1945 the 
ability to secure additional funds in the securities market en-
abled Ashland's management to take advantage of merger oppor-
tunities which occurred on short notice. The net effect was that 
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as a larger firm, Ashland Oil attained a different kind of financial 
flexibility than it had as a small firm. 
The five flexibility concepts give content to an important ex-
planation of Blazer's success. His "bargaining ability" was 
founded upon these ideas. In the 1930's he was able to sell the 
capacity throughput of his refinery during the Great Depression 
through application of these ideas. In the late 1940's, because of 
emphasis on these fundamentals, he demonstrated his ability to 
act quickly when an opportunity developed. Without these man-
agerial concepts, it seems unlikely that he would have been able 
to adjust so skillfully to the dynamic situation. 
While the gross advantages of these concepts of management 
have been necessary to the management of the small and rapidly 
growing company, their potential disadvantages, that is, their 
costs, have been significant. By far the greatest of these disad-
vantages is the centralization of key elements of decision making 
in the chief executive. Although special attention has been given 
to the development of executives of general ability, the ac-
ceptance of specific responsibility for a decision on the part of 
subexecutives was not clear. In fact, in 1954 the company had 
many "good general vice presidents" but might have found that 
the succession problem was critical. The problem, however, 
arose not from the inability or inexperience of the subexecutives 
in the general functions of the firm, but from the psychological 
problem on the part of a potential chief executive to develop 
confidence in his own final decisions. 
The succession problem became not one of the generally dis-
cussed maneuvering on the part of several potential chief 
executives, but one of developing confidence on the part of an 
executive to fill the "old man's" shoes. In the case of Ashland 
Oil, several executives had qualities that could have provided 
good management for the future; however, their problem of 
convincing themselves, the board of directors, and the public 
that they could successfully manage the company remained. 
The full impact of this problem never was felt, since nothing 
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happened to shift suddenly the responsibilities from Blazer 
to someone else. This type of managerial philosophy caused 
Blazer to retain complete control over a long period of time 
when the risks of loss of his services were great. 
It was fortunate that during the last three years of control by 
Paul Blazer ( 1954-1957) greater responsibility was given to the 
subordinates. Gradually, Blazer began to test how the company 
could run without him. On one occasion he went on a Mediter-
ranean cruise, when he was more out of touch with immediate 
problems than he had ever been previously. Before, the mere 
fact that he was in Florida did not mean that he was not actively 
running the company, for daily long-distance calls were used to 
keep in touch with the home office-no different from his calls 
from his home while he was in Ashland. 
The idea of the chief executive function being handled by 
two men became attractive for the large company as it shifted 
from the administration of Blazer. The techniques employed by 
Robert E. Wilson and F. 0. Peake of Standard Oil Company 
(Indiana) had been noticed by the Ashland Oil management. 
Moreover, President Rexford Blazer and Executive Vice Presi-
dent Everett Wells were uniquely qualified for this type of 
management. 
Rex Blazer had operated for twenty years in Allied, using 
managerial techniques different from those of his uncle Paul 
Blazer. He had always had a personality which fitted sales and 
public relations. He preferred to delegate more authority and 
responsibility than Paul Blazer had. He was very active in civic 
organizations and trade associations. In short, he was ideal for 
the "outside-directed" man for the top management team. 
Everett Wells, on the other hand, had worked for Ashland 
Oil since his graduation from college in 1926. His college train-
ing in business gave him the background to go into sales. He 
gradually had been given more authority, and during the last ten 
years he had been the chief coordinating officer among sales, 
transportation, and refining. He had worked so closely with Paul 
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Blazer that his managerial ideas were similar. In short, his 
knowledge of operations of the company made him ideal for the 
"inside-directed" man for the top management team. 
Blazer's complete philosophy yields a paradox. The philosophy 
of flexibility had been so important that the chief executive had 
actually become inflexible in his own administrative behavior. 
He had realized that his techniques had been of greatest value 
in a smaller company, but he had been unable to change his 
techniques to fit more nearly the needs of the larger organization. 
Since he had become so proficient in the application of his 
flexibility concepts, his philosophy of management, so excep-
tional in the direction of the small firm, remained the best 
technique for him in the larger firm. Even for the chief executive 
who continued to fight the trend toward greater formalization of 
authority, the use of formal types of organization evolved. 
Exhibit 20 has graphically shown this evolution from simple line 
organization, through the addition of staff assistants, to the use 
of functional specialists, and finally, to some decentralization by 
product division. 
The temperament of certain individuals is such that they seek 
decision-making powers. It is no accident that many of the 
notable successes in the promotion of a business have been the 
type that would emphasize centralization of decision making. 
A man who has built a company primarily through his own 
energy and skill finds that it is most difficult to adapt his tech-
nique to a situation that demands decentralization and delega-
tion. The executive who has always made decisions by initiation 
finds it very difficult to make the majority of his decisions by 
approval. Yet the time comes that a firm reaches the critical size 
which requires a different type of administration. The fact that 
new tools are needed for administration in the larger firm does 
not offer evidence per se that these new tools should have been 
used throughout the firm's development. Nevertheless, the prob-
lem of this inflexible emphasis on flexibility potentially causes a 
major disadvantage when costs of flexibility exceed returns. 
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In conclusion, this study has shown the value of a group of 
policies and concepts to the success of a company. Although the 
policies are not in agreement with those of other leaders in the 
oil industry and although the concepts conflict with certain 
"principles of management," they obviously have been useful to 
this management. In fact, the chief advantage, in the writer's 
opinion, that this management has maintained throughout its 
history has been administrative creativeness unfettered by the 
shackles of a "cookbook" solution to its business problems. It 
is this ingenuity to seek techniques uniquely suited to the specific 
problems that is the principal administrative strength illustrated. 
Further research should be directed toward intensive case studies 
of other situations in search for new ideas to improve the art of 
management. 
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tion, Tri-State Refining Company 
Merton, Robert, I90-9I 
Middle East, 88 
Midwest Refineries, II 3 
Miles, J. Fred, and the formation of 
Swiss Oil, 2, 2 3-28; attempts to get 
financial help for Swiss Oil, 29-30; 
loses control of Swiss Oil, 31-33; and 
purchase of Leach refinery, 47; men-
tioned, vii, 56, 208-209 
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